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Abstract 
Questions regarding the relationships between new media technologies and contemporary 
capitalist dynamics are currently subject to considerable discussion and debate across myriad 
academic disciplines and schools of  thought — notably (but not exhaustively) within various 
fields of  sociological inquiry, current strains of  Marxism and political economy, marketing 
theory and research, literature concerned with intellectual property and legal rights, and a 
whole host of  other lines of  investigation into the nature of  production/consumption, 
labour/leisure, work/play, and their apparent commingling within a world predominated by 
the presence of  new media. This thesis contributes to this debate in several ways. Firstly, it 
seeks to establish a set of  theoretical trajectories, and gives consideration to the ‘post-
industrial’ and ‘information society’ literature. This consideration reveals a noticeable 
marginalisation of  the question of  capitalism in the extant literature and research. As such, a 
turn to Autonomous Marxism and the ‘social factory’ thesis is suggested as a much-needed 
starting point for investigating the interrelations between new media technologies and (post-
Fordist) capitalism. The thesis then raises points of  critique to rethink the need for both (a) a 
conceptual understanding of  the relations between capitalist dynamics, new media, and socio-
economic change, and (b) research into specific (new) media industries and their attendant 
modalities of  production and valorisation. The investigation then returns to Marx’s 
formulation of  the qualitative and quantitative dimensions of  production, surplus value, and 
cooperation in order to consider how this can be mobilised as a foundational viewpoint from 
which to consider the sociality of  production as central to the formation of  economic life in 
general. From here, the thesis outlines the concept of  ‘sympathetic cooperation’ (Terranova, 
2014) and the proposed problem of  the incommensurability of  social production as two key 
framing devices for the case study on labour and value in the video games industry. Finally, 
these considerations are put to work through a two part case study on the video games 
industry that proceeds, firstly, to detail the history of  its configurations of  labour and value as 
it has developed since the 1960s; and secondly to investigate some of  the prevalent directions 
of  this new media industry’s strategies for identifying and valorising potential sources of  value — 
for seeking out the hitherto un-valorised. 
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1.  Introduction: Initial Considerations and a Sketch of  the Thesis 
1.1 — Video-Games: Some Initial Points for Consideration 
New and social forms of  media have undoubtedly altered social life a great deal over the 
course of  their development and adoption. Video and computerised gaming has developed at 
a phenomenal rate since its commercial inception in the 1970s. Starting off  as the 
experiments of  hacker hobbyists funded by the US military in the late 1960s, video-games 
soon became the subject of  major commercial investment and industry organisation on a 
scale that, by the mid-1970s, established them as a multi-million-dollar consumer industry 
(Kline, Dyer-Witheford and de Peuter, 2003: 84-192). Today, video-gaming is positioned as 
one of  the most profitable media-entertainment industries operating around the globe, and is 
estimated to be worth around $81bn USD by 2016 (DFC Intelligence, 2011). To put this 
figure in perspective, the ‘global games industry’ – an umbrella term employed by Kerr (2006) 
– was thought to be worth around 27 billion USD in 2002, amounting to a potential 
quadrupling of  global revenues in less than a decade.  
 However, as Kerr (2006: 43-74) has demonstrated in her overview of  digital games as 
a ‘cultural industry’, an accurate estimation of  the total economic value of  both hardware and 
software sales globally is extraordinarily difficult given the current diversity of  markets, 
platforms, and genres available – a problem which is further compounded by the increasing 
introduction of  service, rent, and other perpetual transaction models as methods of  game 
provision. Nevertheless, although it is necessary to emphasise that sales figures and revenue 
reports vary considerably across the spread of  sources available – most of  which are either 
research agency bulletins, government and consultancy firm reports, or industry associated 
press releases (Kerr, 2006) – one thing is clear: the games industry is both considerable in size 
and continuing to grow, making it set to become one of  – if  it not the – dominant ‘culture 
industries’ of  the 21st century. But the size, scope, and impact of  gaming within popular 
culture can be seen irrespective of  immense industry revenue figures such as those above. 
Indeed, one only needs to superficially survey the diversity of  platforms and genres available 
today to discover that gaming permeates the everyday in an increasingly pervasive fashion. 
 Games are now played on mobile smartphones, home PCs, laptops, handheld devices, 
and consoles; they are becoming seamlessly integrated into transitional, domestic, and 
vocational spaces through the virtues of  the near-ubiquitous internet; they are produced with 
an increasingly diverse range of  player-demographics in mind, indicated by the emergence of  
dominant marketing tropes such as “casual”, “hardcore”, and “social” entering the ever-
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expanding cosmos of  game genre definitions. As Larissa Hjorth rightly points out, although it 
is important not to succumb to the “technofetishism” that surrounds much new media, it is 
equally important to acknowledge that games are moving onto centre stage as a dominant 
media form of  21st century entertainment – a movement which is reflected in the expansion 
of  player demographics to include the young and old, male and female, and those less 
technologically literate within what she describes as ‘the emergence of  gaming as one of  the 
most pervasive forms of  global popular culture’ (2011: 145). Such forms of  technofetishism 
surrounding video-games are not difficult to locate. Indeed, one needs look no further than 
the celebratory hyperbole found within texts that consider video-games and gaming to be a 
future panacea for deep-rooted social problems (McGonigal, 2011) , and ‘Web 2.0’ as the 1
embodiment of  unencumbered collaboration and mass innovation —  as the antithesis to 
mass production (Leadbeater, 2009). 
 Nevertheless, over the last decade or so there has been an immense ballooning of  
academic literature on video-games and gaming. Computer game studies – a term coined by 
Norwegian ludologist Espen Aarseth (2001) – is an established multi- and inter-disciplinary 
field that draws from a range of  academic traditions such as economics, psychology, 
sociology, computer science, anthropology, arts and literature, media studies, and 
communication. Within this field of  inquiry there are many specialised areas of  research and 
literature, ranging from debates about ‘computer game architecture and design’ (Jenkins, 2004; 
Juul, 2006), to detailed studies of  the emergent cultures and economies within ‘massively 
multiplayer online games’ (MMOG) (Castranova, 2005; Taylor, 2006a). However, rather than 
attempting to provide an overall summary of  this rather broad field, the following shall (a) 
briefly outline the major areas of  recent social scientific research on computer games and (b) 
provide a necessary critique of  the current theoretical traditions that underpin contemporary 
computer game studies – most notably ‘ludology’ and ‘narratology’ (Dovey and Kennedy, 
2006). 
  Social scientific interest in computer games has dramatically increased over the past 
decade, with new and innovative research areas emerging at an annual rate. For example, there 
is currently a growing interest in computer games from researchers in education (Mayo, 
2009), healthcare (Deutsch, Borbely, Filler, Huhn and Guarera-Bowlby, 2008), and cognitive 
social psychology (Bartlett, Vowels, Shanteau, Crow and Miller, 2009); nevertheless, many of  
these fields are still in embryonic stages of  development and remain highly tentative. A more 
 With a distinctly darwinian flavour, McGonigal suggests that gaming skills and knowledge may soon confer an 1
evolutionary advantage on those for whom it becomes a second nature (McGonigal, 2011). 
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substantial and well established area of  social scientific interest has been the rapid 
development and widespread use of  online games, especially MMOGs – generally referred to 
as ‘virtual worlds’ – such as ‘World of  Warcraft’ and ‘EverQuest’ (for example see: 
Bainbridge, 2010). Within these vast simulated environments thousands of  players from 
around the globe come together to participate in a variety of  social networks, take on 
specialised roles, and contribute to the emergence of  a rich and dynamic social milieu 
(Castranova, 2005, 2007; Taylor, 2006). However, although there is an emerging body of  
research that explores the potential for utilising MMOG designs for educational purposes – 
especially as a possible solution to problems with long-distance learning programmes (see for 
example: Albion, 2008; Childress and Braswell, 2006; De Freitas and Griffiths, 2008) – the 
vast majority of  social scientific literature pertains to three general areas. These are: game design 
research, which, drawing heavily from the aforementioned field of  ludology, seeks to 
systematically analyse how players (mis)use and interact with the programmed game 
mechanics (Achterbosch, Pierce and Simmons, 2008; Ducheneaut, Yee, Nickell and Moore, 
2006); game culture research, which primarily focuses on emergent cultural practices and 
community structures within MMOG environments (Nardi and Harris, 2006; Seay, Jerome, 
Lee, and Kraut, 2004; Taylor, 2006); and, game economics research, which addresses the 
complexities of  in-game economic relations and how these are giving rise to (a) the possibility 
for conducting ‘naturalistic’ economic experiments — particularly on supply and demand 
(Castranova, 2008) — and (b) various pecuniary and legal issues (MacInnes, 2006; 
Pappagiannidis, Bourlakis and Li, 2008).  
 Much of  the research within these three areas exhibits a general tendency to focus 
upon the “interesting” features of  in-game environments by documenting in great detail the 
ways in which they are similar – economically, culturally, and systemically – to aspects of  the 
“real” social world – that is, they focus primarily upon the game as technology and the gamer as 
interacting with and through the medium of technology. This, however, has been accompanied by a 
distinct lack of  consideration for how and in what ways video-games and gaming are — and 
have been — (re)produced, commercialised, (re)configured within and through complex 
economic and cultural processes of  organisation, reorganisation, management, investment, 
creative endeavour, mass manufacture, workforce mobilisation and so on. The lack of  an 
identifiable body of  literature on what I will tentatively refer to here as the political economic 
relations of  the video-games industry and gaming is not only notable across disciplines of  
social scientific research; it is also exemplified by the preoccupations of  the two major 
schools of  thought within the aforementioned field of  computer game studies — ‘ludology’ 
and ‘narratology’. 
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 The crucial difference between the ‘narratological’ and ‘ludological’ perspectives for 
studying computer games can be summarised as follows: proponents of  narratology ‘argue 
for the importance of  narrative experience as part of  the pleasures of  gameplay’ (Dovey and 
Kennedy, 2006: 148), whilst ludologists emphasise the need to consider ‘the experiential 
nature of  rule-based interactions’ (Dovey and Kennedy, 2006: 147). Broadly speaking, key 
proponents of  narratology (Ang, 2006; Jenkins, 2004; Mateas, 2004; Murray, 2004) have 
argued that games can be studied through recourse to existing literary and humanities 
methods of  understanding texts, which the ludologists (Aarseth, 1997, 2001, 2004, 2007; Juul, 
2003, 2006) argue cannot be the case since computer games are not conventional texts at all 
but an (inter)activity more akin to play or sport.  
  These two perspectives have – irrespective of  their contested definitions – been 
fundamental in establishing the importance and need for serious academic study of  computer 
games. However, despite their differences ludology and narratology adopt a similar game as 
primary object of  study focus, which, whilst valuable for understanding how games are 
experienced as either stories or rule-based interactions, provides little conceptual groundwork 
for considering the ways in which the video-games industry — if, indeed, one can use this 
term in the singular, given the breadth and diversity of  games and gaming — is founded 
upon processes of  industrial enterprise, production, profiteering, market research, 
distribution and so on. In their book Games of  Empire: Global Capitalism and Video Games, 
Dyer-Witheford and de Peuter reach a similar conclusion, stating that: ‘[m]uch of  this 
literature is concerned with delineating the specific properties of  games as media, describing 
their genres and conventions, and forming a lexicon with which to describe them’ (2009: 
xxvi). 
 However, over the last few years there has been a growing interest from researchers 
concerned with investigating the ins-and-outs of  production within the video-games industry. 
Although still a relatively minor area of  literature in comparison to the aforementioned field 
of  computer games studies, scholars working in this area have taken considerable steps 
towards problematising and interrogating the conditions, dynamics, and — often complex — 
processes of  (co-)production within the video-games industry (see: Banks and Humphreys, 
2008; Banks and Potts, 2010). Couched within a broader area of  literature deriving from 
Cultural Studies that seeks to understand the particularities, contradictions, and processes of  
‘cultural work’ within the ‘creative industries’ (for an excellent overview of  this literature, see: 
Gill and Pratt, 2008), writers such as Banks and Potts (2010) have developed a range of  
conceptual devices that attempt to make sense of  the ways in which consumers (or players in 
the case of  the video-games industry) are becoming increasingly enrolled in production 
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processes — what they refer to as ‘consumer co-creation’ in which new ‘[m]edia consumers 
increasingly participate in the process of  designing, producing and marketing media content 
and experiences’ (2010: 253). Yet, even within this budding literature there is a noticeable 
reticence with regards to understanding these developments in terms of  capitalist market 
forces and the possibility of  forms of  exploitation or resistance — however diverse these 
may be. Rather, there is an overarching concern for detailed understanding and description 
with the aim of  arriving at a means to ‘understand and model these emerging behaviours, 
agencies, identities and practices’ (Banks and Potts, 2010: 254).  
 Somewhat in line with Dyer-Witheford and de Peuter’s (2009) suggestion of  
contributing to ‘critical analysis of  video-games’, I too would place myself  firmly in this camp 
— if  I was intent on contributing to a study of  video-games per se. However, it is by no small 
feat that Dyer-Witheford and de Peuter (2009) have subjected the Video-game media format 
to a thorough and — at times highly entertaining, at others shocking — critique through the 
lens of  Autonomous Marxist writers, particularly Hardt and Negri’s notion of  Empire and 
immaterial labour — their book is not mistakenly called Games of  Empire. I too, like Dyer-
Witherford and de Peuter am not interested in formally analysing video-games. 
 In this regard, of  central central importance for scholars such as Hjorth is the current 
need — given the recent emergence of  participatory and collaborative architectures in video-
games and so-called ‘Web 2.0’ more generally — to ‘consider the types of  labour that 
players/users/produsers are performing as part of  broader shifts in consumption/production 
paradigms’ (2011: 48). Also, Hjorth (2011) adds, such an investigation must — in light of  the 
need to think through the political economic relations of  such processes — look far beyond 
the market hyperbole of  “empowerment” and “exploitation”, of  unbridled creativity and 
inclusion founded upon a perceived ethic of  playful engagement; as far as this goes, I am in full 
agreement with hjorth on the former of  this false-binary, not so much the latter… 
1.2 — A Sketch of  the Thesis: Theoretical Trajectories and the Present Investigation 
In the second chapter I want to provide an outline and critique of  two schools of  thought 
concerned with contemporary socio-economic change. Simply, these schools of  thought: 
‘post-industrial society’ (Bell, 1973) and the ‘information age’ (Castells, 2009, 2010a, 2010b); 
and, Autonomous Marxism which maintains that we are witnessing a ‘post-Fordist’ form of  
capitalist dynamics (Virno, 2004, 2007), frequently referred to as ‘cognitive 
capitalism’ (Berardi, 2009). The first of  these schools to be discussed is the formalised 
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‘theories of  the information society’, which, though differing in detail, gravitate around a core 
set of  shared arguments regarding the nature and direction of  ICT innovation and socio-
economic change. After a careful reading of  these two theories, a critique is offered up and 
articulated from the viewpoint of  a number of  thinkers who have noted a peculiar absence in 
literature on the information society — notably, that capitalism is not treated as a core 
concept for understanding socio-economic change, and it is not given consideration as a force 
or dynamic. In short there is, in the literature on the information society, a distinct lack of  
consideration given to what capitalism is, how it changes, and the implications of  this for 
understanding socio-economic change, its dynamics and direction. 
 I shall then move to discuss a group of  radical thinkers who, over the last two 
decades, have gained considerable attention — a group of  diverse scholars who can be 
loosely categorised as ‘Autonomous Marxists’. Their attempts at conceptualising the relations 
between transformations in labour, production, and digital media technologies has generated 
a great deal of  discussion regarding the contemporary dynamics and functioning of  
capitalism. In this section I shall discuss two key themes: ‘immaterial labour’ (Lazzarato, 
1996); and, the ‘social factory’ thesis (Terranova, 2000, 2004; Virno, 2004). The importance 
of  these is stressed throughout as critical concepts through which to interrogate 
contemporary socio-economic and technological developments alongside placing questions 
concerning the logic(s), dynamics and organisational form of  capitalism at the epicentre of  
analysis. 
 In closing the second chapter, I shall draw attention to how a reading between 
Autonomous Marxism and the focus in cultural studies research on the concepts of  ‘labour’ 
can shed light on and open up a distinct and potentially fruitful perspective on one of  the 
foundational components of  Marx’s legacy: the labour theory of  value. In particular, my 
reading shall point to the concept of  ‘temporality’ as an analytical motif  that holds a 
possibility for fruitful dialogue between Autonomous Marxism and recent sociological 
literature on ‘cultural work’ and ‘cultural labour’. This has special relevance to the key concept 
of  life as a social factory — dissemination of  the Fordist factory logic into all the times of  
social life. In general, however there is noticeable grumbling from ‘cultural labour’ scholars 
regarding a disparity between the overarching breadth of  the Autonomous Marxist concepts 
and the need for “on the ground” analyses of  particular industries, and of  particular 
production processes. In response to this, I want to suggest that a return to Marx’s (1983) 
formulation of  the qualitative and quantitative dimensions of  production might be a useful 
place to begin thinking about this possibility, especially if  we consider placing how and in 
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what ways everyday activities are becoming, and have become, enrolled in the generation of  
value. 	
 In the third chapter, then, I proceed to provide a two-part outline of  the theoretical 
framework that underpins and informs this investigation. This chapter  focuses on a specific 
set of  arguments that proceed from Marx’s formulation of  the qualitative and quantitive 
dimensions of  production, to his theory of  surplus value and cooperation. Marx’s 
formulation of  the qualitative and quantitative relations of  production is of  central 
importance to the overall narrative of  this thesis. The second section of  this chapter then 
moves to discuss the more recent literature on social production and, more speficially, the 
notion of  ‘sympathetic cooperation’ through the recent works of  Maurizio Lazzarato (2008) 
and Tiziana Terranova (2009; 2014) in order to highlight the importance and primacy of  of  
the sociality of  production as a way of  conceptualising the primacy of  qualitative social relations 
to all forms and configurations of  production, including economic production. 
 The main aim of  the third chapter is to  work through and highlight how an 
understanding and working through Marx’s formulation of  the qualitative and quantitative 
dimensions of  production can be mobilised to construct a framework of  concepts with the 
explicit purpose of  interrogating the intricate interrelations between, on the one hand, broad 
(structural) questions regarding socio-economic change and capitalist dynamics and, on the 
other, the particularity of  processes of  production as they take place “on the ground”, within 
certain contexts, temporalities, and through social relations. A return to Marx’s core categories 
of  analysis and a foregrounding of  the concepts of  labour, value, and cooperation constitutes 
the groundwork from which I intend to begin an investigation into the video-games industry. 
 The fourth chapter of  the thesis tells the history of  the video-games industry on the 
basis of  “key Moments” — as such it is perhaps useful to provide summaries of  these. The 
following is a brief  overview of  the narrative that chapter 4 lays down. The rise of  
computerised games to the forefront of  21st century commercial entertainment forms the 
starting point of  chapter four with major changes, crises, and innovations occurring over the 
fifty-year period since its inception in the early 1960s. The start with this decade and work 
through the 70s and 80s with a view to unpacking the ways in which the innovations of  key 
actors and research groups became subject to processes of  commercialization, venture capital 
speculation, and corporate organization. Indeed, the games industry – with its beginnings in 
the U.S. ‘military-industrial complex’ of  Cold War research and playful ‘hacker culture’ (Kline, 
Dyer-Witheford and de Peuter, 2003: 84-108) – has a far from straightforward history of  
technological and commercial development that, when laid out, reveals a great deal about the 
  13
lineage of  its economic organization and, moreover, how this is reflected by key 
developments in the ways labour and processes of  value-production have been profitably 
(re)configured.  
Although a great deal has been written on the history of  the games industry, much of  
this has tended to focus upon what can be loosely termed the ‘genealogy of  technological 
innovations’ – that is to say, much of  this literature emphasises the chronology and people 
associated with the invention of  gaming technologies (see for example: Herz, 1997; Hjorth, 
2011: 19-25; Kent, 2002; King, 2011; Poole, 2000, 2004). As Kerr surmises, this literature is 
useful to the extent that it organises and classifies an otherwise messy set of  events into neat 
temporal boxes (2006); however, it provides little in the way of  a critical understanding of  the 
historical connections between the invention of  gaming technologies and the wider contexts 
of  cultural and economic change within which they emerged and became subject to 
commercial forces. In particular, scant attention has been paid to the historical 
interconnections between (a) the practices and innovations of  key figures and organizations 
involved in the invention of  gaming technologies, and (b) the establishment of  commercial 
configurations of  production and lines of  profit-accumulation – in short, the 
interconnections between the formation of  the games industry and broader developments 
within the organisational logic of  capitalism over the latter half  of  the twentieth century . An 2
important theme for such an analysis to adopt, as Kline et al. make clear, is an interrogation 
of  the ways in which the logic of  capital has moulded, managed, and appropriated the 
emergence of  digital play and its possible futures (2003) through a potent dialectic of  financial 
venture and speculation on the one hand, followed by phases of  economic development and 
(re)organisation on the other — the result, of  course, being what can only be described as a 
relatively continual growth of  the games industry over the last half  a century. 
As the home console market was undergoing its tumultuous development in the consumer 
market, a new platform for commercial growth was emerging in the video game sector: the 
personal computer (PC). The computer’s transition from its military-industrial routes to 
household appliance via the U.S. hacker culture of  the late 1960s and 1970s provided the 
entry point for new and expanded possibilities for commercial investors. While PC gaming 
was present throughout the 1980s, the initial financial incentives for PC manufacturers came 
in the business and education industries; gaming was an ancillary, but significant benefit. By 
 The work of  Kline, Dyer-Withford and de Peuter (2003), along with the more recent work of  Dyer-Witheford 2
and de Peuter (2009) is, to the best of  the author’s knowledge, a sole case in point here. However, the recent 
work of  Donovan, entitled Replay: The History of  Video Games (2010), provides brief  glimpses of  such an 
interconnecting analysis amongst what can best be described as a flurrying and disjointed glut of  journalistically 
organised information.
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the 1990s and the proliferation of  the internet and the introduction of  the World Wide Web, 
PC gaming developed into a full-fledged market of  its own. 
 The two related developments that resulted in particular successes for the PC gaming 
industry were the platform’s ability to adopt new technologies, like CD-ROM hardware, 
allowing for scaling complexities and graphical quality to the gaming experience. This, 
coupled with the rise of  the internet as a conduit for player-to-player co-operation and 
competition without needing to occupy the same physical space provided PC manufacturers 
and software developers new commercial opportunities. The internet also provided another 
boon: a new platform for the selling and distribution of  video games. No longer were sales 
dependent upon the existence of  brick-and-mortar storefronts; it was now possible to expand 
sales into subscription or rent-based models to expand the platform’s profit-accumulation 
capacity. Equally, it allowed developers to capitalise on the efforts of  the gaming ‘community’ 
to engage in beta testing and quality control efforts prior to a product’s release. This merging 
of  elements of  ‘play’ and ‘labour’ have been incorporated into a unified logic: 
‘playbour’ (Hjorth, 2011 and Kückluck, 2006) Hjorth extends this notion of  playbour to 
other fields, such as new media and an extensive expansion of  consumption/production 
paradigms increasingly adopted by distributors of  interactive entertainment. I aim to expand 
on upon this, but to also consider a more fundamental point: to what extent is productivity 
becoming indistinguishable from non-productivity? For this investigation, an understanding of  
value and processes of  valorisation is critical 
The fifth chapter of  this thesis constitutes the substantive analysis of  video gaming 
industrial practice and organisation. The main question it poses is, in light of  Marx’s 
theory of  value, where might we look to find hints or evidence of  valorisation 
processes within the remit of  an investigation into the video-games industry? As I 
intend to demonstrate, such questions do not require one to look to the peripheries or 
the margins, but to the recent debates and developments that have occupied — and, 
in many cases, that are still occupying — centre stage within the video-games 
industry.  
 The first section of  this chapter looks at the views on monetisation expressed 
by leading industry figures and officials, and asks the question: how since the turn of  
the millennium, the video-games industry has developed in a variety of  directions. 
For example, multiple forms of  monetised exchange practices within online game 
worlds now exist alongside an emerging plethora of  so-called ‘social’ and ‘mobile’ 
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games based around a “new” revenue model. The latter is referred to throughout the 
video-games industry as ‘free-to-play’ (or ‘freemium’) gaming, and has come into 
widespread commercial use in recent years. These developments are particularly 
notable as they represent core shifts and changes, and exemplify the way the video-
games industry has reflected upon — and responded to — new ways of  thinking about 
of  value and methods of  valorisation — they exemplify, to invoke Graeber (2001) once 
again, the ways in which the video-games industry has acted and reflected upon its 
currently existing ‘system of  value’. 
 The other key factor, perhaps less well known, but equally salient within the 
games industry, is the recent burgeoning of  ‘game analytics’ companies. A 
particularly noteworthy example of  a game analytics company is Games Analytics 
(now known as 'Delta DNA’):  specialists in providing video-game publishers with 
detailed metrical analyses of  player behavior ‘right down to event level’ in order to 
provide advice and direction on how to identify “untapped” sources of  value and, 
thereby, further monetary gains. The emergence of  such companies, I shall argue, is 
indicative of  the ways in which value, as a central subject of  continual action and 
reflection within the context of  the video-games industry’s commercial logic(s), is 
being placed under increasing levels of  metrical examination and quantitative analysis. 
 Overall, what I intend to demonstrate is that such developments can be understood 
and investigated in considerable detail through a focus upon the relations and processes of  
how labour and value can be understood in both qualitative and quantitative terms, and that 
there is a fundamental connexion between these that becomes apparent when one considers 
the following: how are the qualitative properties of  social life in general subjected to systems 
of  measurement. Such a focus can provide an insightful means of  interrogating the broader 
question of  how new media industries are driving — and benefitting from — innovations in 
the production logic(s) of  capitalist markets. A detailed and grounded consideration of  
questions regarding the ways in which value and valorisation processes operate through, 
reshape, and inform the commercial calculations of  the video-games industry today 
constitutes the final stage of  this investigation.  
This introduces the overarching research question for this inquiry, which will be further 
refined in Chapter 3:  how is (qualitative) sociality subjected to (quantified) capitalistic valorisation?  With 
this in mind, the thesis will proceed to outline and critique the range of  aforementioned 
developments through an investigative consideration of  recent trends in the ways that 
monetisation, measurement, and game design are being both researched and discussed as ways for 
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thinking about, identifying, and valorising potential sources of value within the video-games 
industry. The primary overarching research question (above) of  the thesis will therefore be 
interrogated through three more specific questions: 
(i) “what have been the sources of  labour and value in the video games industry throughout 
its historical and commercial development?” 
(ii) “what are the sources of  labour and value in the video games industry today, and how, if  
at all, have these changed over time?” 
(iii) “what are the means of  valorisation in the modern video-games industry?”; and,  
(iv) “how and in what ways is value being identified and acted upon within the video-games 
industry today?” 
  
  17
Section I 
Theoretical Trajectories: Labour and Value in The 
Social Factory 
‘All the basic concepts of  political economy express, as we have seen, social 
production relations among people. If  we approach the theory of  value from this point 
of  view, then we face the task of  demonstrating that value … is a social relation 
among people’ [original emphases] (Rubin, 2010: 63). 
‘Here, the production of  oneself  is the production of  wealth and vice versa; the 
basis of  the production of  wealth is the production of  oneself. Potentially, work 
— in the sense it has in political economy — is eliminated: ‘labour … appears no 
longer as labour, but as the full development of  [personal] activity itself ’ (Marx, 
1973, quoted in Gorz, 2010: 14-15).  
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2. A Social Factory? From post-Industrial Society to post-Fordist  
 Capitalism 
In this chapter I want to provide an outline and critique of  two schools of  thought 
concerned with detailing the relationships between technological developments and 
contemporary socio-economic change from the early-mid 1970s onwards. Put somewhat 
simply, these schools of  thought are: sociological literature pertaining to what is often 
referred to as the rise — or coming — of  ‘post-industrial society’ (Bell, 1973) and the 
‘information age’ (Castells, 2009, 2010a, 2010b); and, Autonomous Marxist writings on the 
ascendancy of  a ‘post-Fordist’ form of  capitalist dynamics (Hardt and Negri, 2000; Marazzi, 
2008; Virno, 2004, 2007), frequently referred to as ‘cognitive capitalism’ (Berardi, 2009; 
Vercellone, 2007). The first of  these schools of  thought is what Frank Webster (2006) has 
termed ‘theories of  the information society’, which, though differing in detail, gravitate 
around a core set of  shared arguments regarding the nature and direction of  ICT innovation 
and socio-economic change. Most prominent amongst the theorists of  the information 
society are the works of  Daniel Bell (1973) and his theory of  ‘post-industrial society’ on the 
one hand, and Manuel Castells’ (2004, 2009, 2010a, 2010b) writings on the ‘network society’ 
and ‘informational capitalism’ on the other. In the following section, the work of  these two 
theorists shall be outlined and critiqued as archetypal representatives of  what Webster (2005) 
hails as the kinds of  macro sociological analyses of  socio-economic change that, combining 
theory and empirical evidence, have been distinctively lacking within British sociology since 
the 1980s and the ‘cultural turn’ towards focused, localised studies of  work and employment.  
 Whilst casting the work of  Bell and Castells in this light allows one to acknowledge 
the current lack of  macro-level sociological analyses of  the major contours of  social change, 
it likewise opens up a point of  departure from which to subject their narratives to another 
angle of  critique – notably, their seeming lack of  a critical engagement with key political 
economic issues regarding the ways in which technological and socio-economic change is 
both shaped by — and generative of  — capitalist market dynamics. This is most clearly 
demonstrated within the work of  Bell and Castells by a notable paucity of  attention to 
questions concerning the labour process, the production of  (surplus) value, and (potential) 
changes in capitalist accumulation strategies as fundamental characteristics of  contemporary 
socio-economic change. In short, I will argue in the following section that there is a distinct 
lack of  focus on questions concerning the operative logic(s) of  capitalism itself  within this 
‘information society’ literature, most of  which considers technological developments and the 
rise of  ‘knowledge work’ (Bell, 1973) as key drivers of  contemporary socio-economic change. 
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 The school of  thought that enters at this point of  departure is the Autonomous 
Marxist school of  political economy deriving from the Italian ‘Workerist’ movements of  the 
1960s and 70s (Peters and Bulut, 2011; Toscano, 2007), which, over the last two decades, has 
gained considerable attention as a body of  social theory that addresses the relations between 
transformations in labour, value-production, and digital media technologies. Grounded in 
critical re-readings of  Marx’s lesser-known writings compiled within the Grundrisse (1973), this 
area of  literature has generated an enormous amount of  research and discussion regarding 
the contemporary dynamics and functioning of  capitalism, especially in relation to the ways in 
which labour and economic production have come to intersect with networked information 
technologies and digital media. In this section I shall provide a detailed outline of  two key 
concepts employed by these Autonomous Marxist thinkers in their schematic analyses of  
‘cognitive capitalism’ (Vercellone, 2007), post-Fordist production (Virno, 2004), and (free) 
labour in what many of  these commentators refer to as the digital or “new” economy 
(Berardi, 2009; Terranova, 2004). These are: the notion of  ‘immaterial labour’ (Lazzarato, 
1996) and the ‘social factory’ thesis (Gill and Pratt, 2008; Terranova, 2000, 2004; Virno, 2004), 
both of  which combine to form a perspective centred upon critiquing contemporary socio-
economic and technological developments that places questions concerning the logic(s), 
dynamics and organisational form of  capitalist accumulation at the epicentre of  analysis. The 
purpose in detailing these concepts is to show that – at a time (particularly in the 1990s) when 
sociology and cultural studies appeared to be failing to provide viable theoretical frameworks 
for understanding emerging interrelations between new and digital media technologies and 
the systemic functioning of  capitalist dynamics (see: Burrows, 2005; Gane, 2003, 2005; 
Webster, 2005) – the Autonomist Marxist school of  thought carried out the important role of  
maintaining a critical focus upon capitalism as a (perhaps the) core driver of  contemporary 
socio-economic change from the mid 1970s onwards. In particular, this school of  thought 
provides a key point of  departure from the sociological analyses offered by thinkers such as 
Bell and Castells by maintaining a critique of the political economy of  information technologies 
and new media through an engaged reworking of  the Marxian concepts of  labour, value and 
production.  
 Finally, in the closing section of  this chapter I shall offer up some much-needed 
points of  critique and conceptual tempering that can be found within the emerging empirical 
scholarship on ‘cultural work’ and the ‘creative industries’, much of  which maintains a strong 
focus upon the specific roles and daily working lives of  designers, artists and new media/
creativeworkers (Banks, 2007; Deuze, 2007; Gill and Pratt, 2008). This emerging area of  
literature, which, interestingly, Gill and Pratt refer to as ‘the recent ‘turn to labour’ in cultural 
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studies’ (2008: 17), brings to the fore two important points for consideration when discussing 
and developing the aforementioned notions of  immaterial labour and the social factory thesis. 
Firstly, given the criticism levelled at Cultural Studies for failing to address the emerging 
interrelations between new media, capitalist dynamics, and processes of  production in the 
1990s — and the well-known conflict between representatives of  Cultural Studies and 
Political Economy that came to a head in 1995 (see: Babe, 2009) — it is readily apparent that 
this ‘turn to labour’ represents a key resource through which one can begin to think through 
and carve out a perspective that is sensitive to (a) the need to make sense of  contemporary 
socio-economic change and emergent forms of  work as expressions of  — and responses to — 
capitalist dynamics and strategies of  accumulation, and (b) the need, as Gill and Pratt (2008) 
suggest in their overview of  the Autonomist and cultural work literatures, to pay close 
attention to the specificities of  different industries and their attendant modalities of  
production. Throughout this chapter, I shall endeavour to outline the key points of  debate 
and discussion that surround these modes of  thought and highlight the ways in which the 
Autonomous Marxist and ‘cultural labour’ bodies of  literature have informed this study of  
the video-games industry. More specifically, I shall focus heavily on the ways in which these 
bodies of  literature bring to fore a number of  concepts and ideas that can be put to work to 
further our understandings of  both the ways in which capitalism operates as an adaptive 
socio-economic system, and the everyday places we might look to to develop such 
understandings.  
Thus, in closing, I shall point to how a reading between these two perspectives opens up a 
distinct and fecund space for returning to one of  the foundational cornerstones of  Marxian 
political economy: the labour theory value. In particular, my reading shall draw heavily upon 
Gill and Pratt’s discussion of  ‘temporality’ as an analytical theme that holds the possibility for 
fruitful dialogue between Autonomous Marxism and sociological work on cultural labour, 
particularly in relation to the idea that everyday social life — that is, both work and non-work 
time — is becoming subject to capital to the extent that we might suggest a ‘takeover of  life 
by work’ (Gill and Pratt, 2008: 17), a dissemination of  the Fordist factory logic into all the 
times of  social life — in short, what Autonomous Marxists have adequately termed the ‘social 
factory’ (Terranova, 2000, 2004; Virno, 2004). Importantly, however, Gill and Pratt (2008) 
point to a disparity between the overarching breadth of  the Autonomous Marxist notions of  
‘immaterial labour’ and the ‘social factory’ and the need for focused analyses of  particular 
industries and the ways in which production within these may, or may not, exemplify the 
general socio-economic trends these concepts refer to. In response to this, I want to suggest 
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that a return to Marx’s (1983) theory of  value — and a turn to the concept of  value and 
valorisation in general — affords the possibility of  supplementing these broad-brush notions of  
immaterial labour and a seemingly homogeneous social factory with much needed details 
regarding how and in what ways everyday activities are becoming enrolled in the generation 
of  value and wealth, how quotidian tasks not commonsensically thought of  as work or labour 
might be understood exactly in these terms. My aim in providing such a discussion is to show 
how a consideration of  labour and value as deeply interconnected concepts can be mobilised as a 
means to provide the kinds of  focused analyses Gill and Pratt (2008) call for without 
jettisoning the importance of  concepts such as immaterial labour and the social factory — 
that is, concepts that highlight general trends and changes in the socio-economic organisation 
of  social life. 
2.1 — The Information Society: Sociological Accounts of  Knowledge Work and 
Informational Labour 
Questions regarding societal and economic changes that have come about with the 
widespread dissemination of  new media technologies into everyday social life have been a 
major preoccupation of  sociological scholarship since the writings of  Daniel Bell and his 
predecessors in the early 1970s. Since then, many social scientists from a variety of  
backgrounds have conducted research and developed theories pertaining to the ways in which 
new communication technologies, information processing, and knowledge are reworking 
established modes of  social and economic organisation. An underlying assertion of  many of  
these theories is that we have – and are continuing – to witness major changes in the 
operation and organisation of  contemporary economies due to technological innovations in 
the ways in which we analyse, utilise, and network information throughout our daily lives. 
Various equivocal concepts have been put forward in an attempt to capture these 
developments under a single heading, the most widely employed being Daniel Bell’s (1973) 
‘Post-Industrial Society’, Manuel Castells’ (2001, 2010a) dual notions of  a ‘Network Society’ 
and an ‘Information Age’, and the more general umbrella term ‘Information 
Society’ (Mattelart, 2003; Webster, 2006). These various theories, bracketed by Frank Webster 
(2006) under the single heading Theories of  the Information Society, constitute the mainstream of  
sociological literature relating to the socio-economic impacts, organisation, and changes 
effected by the innovation and dissemination of  new media technologies; they all attempt to 
grapple, in their variously similar ways, with the defining features of  economies built around 
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the everyday use of  new media and ICTs. In what follows, I want to provide a brief  outline 
of  these mainstream theories with an eye to highlighting what I consider to be a distinct lack 
of  critical focus upon the ways in which new media technologies are becoming increasingly 
bound up in and generative of  (potentially ‘new’) political economic configurations. The 
overall aim in providing such a starting point in mainstream sociological theory is – in a 
similar vein to that of  Frank Webster’s (2006) critique of  Theories of  the Information Society – to 
demonstrate that much of  the perceived social impacts of  ICTs and digital media present 
within this body of  literature are either overly simplistic in their conceptual schematics, or 
positively misleading in pronouncing – in a typically uncritical and hyperbolic fashion – an 
‘information revolution’ that will overhaul all that has gone before it.  
2.1.1 — Daniel Bell and Manuel Castells: From Post-Industrialism to the Network 
Society 
One of  the first instantiations of  a sociological theory that deals with supposed societal 
transformations resulting from innovations in informational technologies and their economic 
deployment is Daniel Bell’s (1973) theory of  ‘post-industrial society’ . Widely recognised as 3
perhaps the first major sociological instalment in the collection of  theories relating to the 
‘information society’ thesis (Webster, 2006), Bell’s theory outlines a series of  arguments based 
upon a swathe of  socio-economic data that purport the arrival of  a new era of  societal 
reorganisation he calls ‘post-industrial society’. For the most part, this theory focuses upon 
the ways in which economies are being transformed and occupational systems reworked due 
to changes in the character and role of  scientific knowledge, its application, and the ways in 
which this shall influence social (re)organisation in the future. A key aspect of  Bell’s theory 
that has come to define much of  the subsequent sociological literature on the information 
society is the emphasis he places upon (a) the supposed shift from a goods-producing 
economy to a ‘service economy’ as the basis of  growth and productivity, and (b) the rise and 
role of  a new ‘intellectual technology’ that can be mobilised to deal with societal issues 
containing a large amount of  variables and probabilities – of  which the modern computer is a 
quintessential example for Bell (1973). The emphasis Bell places upon these two facets of  his 
theory can hardly be understated. Indeed, in a typically hyperbolic fashion, Bell states that 
‘[t]he goal of  the new intellectual technology is, neither more nor less, to realize a social 
alchemist’s dream of  “ordering” the mass society’ (1973: 33). An important corollary here is 
 Although Bell does not employ the term ‘information society’ initially, it has been noted by some that he 3
adopted the term as a synonym for ‘post-industrial society’ in later works (see: Mattelart, 2003; Webster, 2006).
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that Bell envisions these new intellectual technologies giving rise to a new system of  
professions in which a ‘technical class’ of  ‘knowledge workers’ emerges as the predominant 
occupational group in the post-industrial society. Placed alongside the perceived shift from a 
goods-producing economy to a service economy, these changes in the occupational structure 
toward a predominance of  ‘knowledge work’ constitute nothing less for Bell than a major 
overhaul of  ways in which production and its mode of  operation are socially organised; in 
short, a complete transformation of  labour and employment markets away from manufacture 
and towards a ‘centrality of  theoretical knowledge as the axis around which new technology, 
economic growth and the stratification of  society will be organized’ (Bell, 1973: 112). 
 During his discussion and analysis of  the shift from goods to services, Bell (1973) 
suggests that in post-industrial society it is not raw muscle power that counts, nor energy; it is 
information, and this shall be transmitted through scientific education and training in order to 
equip the new professional with the kinds of  informational skills needed to become an in-
demand worker of  the coming economy. This line of  argument leads Bell to conclude that 
the chief  problem facing post-industrial society is the organisation of  scientific knowledge – 
and its primary institutions, the university and research institute – since this shall become the 
foundational source of  economic productivity and skilled workforces. Moreover, this 
overwhelmingly neat conclusion serves as the basis for Bell’s forecasting (the term he employs 
in the subtitle of  the book) prediction that the science-based industries would come to 
predominate the ground of  the economy and that science and education policy would pose 
the core political problems of  the coming post-industrial society. Thus, for Bell the post-
industrial society is characterised by ‘a common core of  problems, hinging largely on the 
relation of  science to public policy’ (1973: 119), which in turn relates directly to the 
gravitation of  scientific occupations and ‘knowledge work’ towards the core of  economic 
productivity.  
Labour and economic productivity — according to Bell’s predictions — was to 
become so radically overhauled by the proliferation of  ‘intellectual technologies’ and 
knowledge-based occupations that it would challenge previous – at the time, predominantly 
Marxian (Bell is referring here to writers such as Radovan Richta (1969), Andre Gorz, (1967), 
and Alain Touraine (1974) – understandings of  political economic and social change, 
especially those relating to social class, to such an extent as to render them obsolete. An 
important point to establish here is that, although Bell explicitly declares Marx as the source 
of  his interest in social change, there is a strong rejection of  many Marxian principles of  
political economic analysis woven throughout his work. For example, Bell (see 1973: 54-63) 
dedicates considerable effort to outlining why the theoretical schema found within volume 
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one of  Capital is, in his terms, mostly redundant (Bell terms this ‘schema one’) and that the 
only prescient work of  Marx is to be found within volume three – what he calls ‘schema two’. 
Despite this marginal endorsement, Bell (see 1973: 63-80) goes on to state that, at the time of  
his writing, all sociologists in the West have become ‘post-Marxists’ and that most of  Marx’s 
theoretical system has been falsified by a demonstration ‘that there is no intrinsic tendency for 
the rate of  profit to fall; that the State has been able to intervene and soften, if  not prevent, 
economic crises; and that technology has been an open frontier for the reinvestment of  
capital’ (1973: 62). This explicitly ‘post-Marxist’ position underlies much of  Bell’s theory 
regarding post-industrial transformations in labour, employment markets, and economic 
production to the extent that there is little critical engagement with enduring political 
economic issues such as unemployment or labour exploitation; moreover, many of  Bell’s 
claims regarding the complete negation of  economic crises and constant profit rates have 
been placed into question by a string of  developments over the last three decades, the 2008 
economic crisis being the most recent example.  
Nevertheless, for the most part Bell’s theory of  post-industrial society remains 
unconnected to any form of  emancipatory critique of  capitalism, its internal contradictions 
or conditions of  exploitation; indeed, Bell’s theoretical position swings far enough in the 
opposite direction to suggest that ‘there is no evidence – in theory or reality – that capitalism 
must collapse from economic contradictions within the system’ (1973: 63). Although this may 
seem striking given his initial endorsement of  Marx as a necessary starting point for any 
analysis of  social change, it is nonetheless clear that Bell’s position is tied to a belief  that 
Marx’s theoretical system is dedicated to the denial of  the possibility of  indefinite capitalist 
expansion, rather than an analysis of  the specifically economic breakdown of  capitalist 
production (Bell, 1973). It is a dedication to the latter of  these two programs – an analysis of  
the specifically economic breakdown of  capitalist production, devoid of  any critique of  it as 
an exploitative or potentially contradictory social system – that leads Bell to the conclusions 
outlined above; in short, that the post-industrial society of  the ‘future’ will be predominated 
by the occupational roles of  the scientist, the professional, and the technician as the core 
drivers of  economic productivity and capitalist accumulation, that labour will come to be 
characterised by knowledge, service work, and information technologies. As an additional 
point to this, Bell (1973) goes on to forecast – in a distinctly Marxian manner – that the 
forces of  production (technology) will come to replace social relations (property) as the 
major axis of  capital accumulation in society. Nevertheless, the crucial point to emphasise 
here is that Bell’s theory of  post-industrial society – in which labour and economic 
production comes to gravitate around knowledge and informational service work – is centred 
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solely upon the proposition that it is occupational change that shall be the primary socio-
economic outcome of  innovations in information technologies and their application.  
In sum, Bell’s 1973 experiment in ‘social forecasting’ – a theme he revisited in 1987 
with a surprisingly cogent analysis of  ‘The World and the United States in 2013’ (Bell, 1987) – 
predicted that society and, more specifically, economic production would undergo 
fundamental transformations; for Bell, labour and occupational groups would become 
increasingly focused around the application of  scientific knowledge, innovations in 
computing technologies, and a growth in the provision of  services. Although reflection upon 
this prediction from today’s standpoint would find it too vague and broad-stroked to be 
comparable against current trends, Bell’s theory of  post-industrial society has remained 
influential within mainstream currents of  sociological analysis. Of  particular note here is that 
Bell’s sweeping conception of  the relations between information technologies, the application 
of  knowledge, and socio-economic change has been subjected to a great deal of  analytical 
application and revision within mainstream sociology throughout the 1990s and 2000s, much 
of  which is distilled in the extensive work of  Manuel Castells. 
Perhaps the most widely cited theorist of  the ‘information society’ literature, Manuel 
Castells has produced a monumental quantity of  scholarly undertakings pertaining to the 
impact of  new media and ICTs upon contemporary (Castells uses the term ‘global’) social 
change, the most well-known of  these being the three-volume book The Information Age: 
Economy, Society, and Culture (2009, 2010a, 2010b). Although Castells adopts the term ‘network 
society’ in place of  information society, these are nonetheless equivocal concepts for 
bracketing a whole series of  socio-economic developments under one heading; indeed, Frank 
Webster (2006) clarifies this point by demonstrating that the central arguments underlying 
these concepts amount to a singular, straightforward conviction that quantitative changes in 
information and information processing are bringing a qualitatively new social system into 
being, whether that be the ‘information society’ or the ‘network society’. 
 In his outline of  what constitutes the ‘network society’ Castells (2004, 2010a) 
dedicates a considerable amount of  time to a discussion of  the organisational logic of  what 
he ambivalently terms the ‘new’ or ‘information’ economy. For Castells (2004, 2010a), the 
‘new’ or ‘information’ economy comprises three interrelated components: firstly, a new model 
of  productivity, characterised by the capacity of  information technologies to enable greater 
feedback between the production of  knowledge and its application in the generation of  
wealth; secondly, a global economy made possible simply because of  a ‘new technological basis’ 
upon which capital markets, major multi-national corporations, and highly skilled labour 
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forces can operate as a single unit in real time on a planetary scale; and, thirdly, a new 
organisational form that, through the gathering of  resources in a very flexible way around a 
project, serves as the basis for productive performance in the information economy – Castells 
call this organisational form the ‘network enterprise’. Importantly, Castells clarifies that the 
information economy is not just the internet or the dotcom economy; rather, ‘[i]t is an 
economy in which companies – or firms or entrepreneurs – around the world are working on 
the basis of  Internet and in which their organizational and innovation logic is embedded in 
the Internet or related information technologies’ (2004: 150). As nuanced as this may seem, 
Castells (2004) goes on to suggest in a seemingly vague fashion that the information economy 
is predominantly built upon the ability to do things in a new way with new information 
technologies, the most important of  which being the capacity to constantly feedback 
scientific knowledge and information into processes of  production, management, and 
distribution. Here it becomes clear that, for Castells, the key determinant of  contemporary 
socio-economic change is innovations in the technical ways in which knowledge and 
information are produced and fed back into processes of  economic production – a 
conclusion strikingly similar to that of  Bell thirty years previous. In sum, economic 
production in Castells’s vision of  the ‘network society’ is based primarily upon developments 
in information technologies and their capacities for creating, distributing, and applying 
knowledge. Thus, for Castells ‘the first feature of  the information economy is the ability to 
develop through information and communication technologies knowledge-based, innovation-
based productivity growth’ (2004: 152).  
 Another core aspect of  Castells’ (2010a) theory of  the network society that derives 
directly from his conceptual schematic of  productivity in the information economy is the rise 
of  occupations based around what he calls ‘informational labour’. Again, the resemblance to 
Bell’s theory of  post-industrial society is evident here as Castells conceives of  ‘informational 
labour’ in much the same way as Bell conceives of  ‘knowledge work’; that is, as a seemingly 
homogenous occupational form that, for the most part, entails the productive application of  
knowledge and/or a provision of  services based upon the utilisation of  key informational 
skills and technologies. Unfortunately, Castells devotes very little time to providing a clear and 
precise definitional breakdown of  ‘informational labour’ and its properties as a mode of  
economic production.  
 There is, however, a set of  arguments laid out in The Rise of  the Network Society (2010a) 
regarding ‘the transformation of  work and employment’ that provide some clarification of  
Castells’ thoughts on ‘informational labour’. In sum, the argument proceeds as follows: the 
most important change in the information economy is the key role of  ‘flexibility’ in labour 
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markets, resulting in what Castells (2004) describes as an ‘end’ of  stable, long-term 
employment. The primary reason for this, Castells (2004) argues, is that new ICTs allow 
companies to offshore production and outsource labour to smaller firms in different 
countries, especially those with different labour regulations – the result being a global 
economic situation in which downsizing, subcontracting, and ‘flexible networking’ through 
ICTs come to define employment. Interestingly, however, Castells goes on to assert that 
despite instability and flexible networking being the defining characteristics of  ‘informational 
labour’, unemployment is nevertheless a non-issue in the information economy because ‘no 
relationship exists between information technology and unemployment’ (2004: 157). Castells 
proceeds to make a range of  hyperbolic claims alongside this, notably the idea that innovation 
within the information economy is based upon the sharing, rather than hiding, of  
information at every level of  organisation; Castells calls this the ‘culture of  innovation’, which 
is supposedly characterised by an ethos of  ‘[y]ou win, I shall win, and together we will win 
even more’ (2004: 158). Such hyperbole clearly does not account for the role of  proprietary 
economic mechanisms such as intellectual property rights in the exertion of  control over 
information and digital content, often in order to actively prevent such sources of  value from 
circulating for free. 
 Nevertheless, the main point to emphasise here is that Castells’ conception of  labour 
and economic production in the ‘network society’, whilst remarkably similar to the 
aforementioned schematic of  Bell’s post-industrial society, has served as one of  the primary 
theoretical touchstones for macro sociological analyses of  socio-economic change. Indeed, 
the Information Age trilogy (Castells, 2009, 2010a, 2010b) has led to the recognition of  Manuel 
Castells as an authoritative commentator on nothing less than contemporary civilisation itself  
(Webster, 2004). As such, the outline of  the main features of  the ‘Network Society’ outlined 
above – though clearly rooted in the earlier sociological theory of  Bell (1973) on post-
industrialism – remains to this day the authoritative, mainstream account of  the nexus 
existing between information technologies and contemporary socio-economic change. 
However, that is not to say that this account is the authoritative source one must turn to in 
order to develop an understanding of  such changes; rather, it provides an initial starting point 
for opening up questions regarding the ways in which transformations in labour, economic 
production, and computing technologies have been hitherto understood within the social 
sciences. 
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2.1.2 — Points of  Critique: Re-opening the Marginalized Question of  Capitalism 
A number of  differing critiques of  what has here been bracketed under the heading of  the 
‘information society’ thesis have been in development over the past decade or so. As 
previously mentioned, one of  the most notable and well-recognised of  these is found within 
the extensive work of  British sociologist Frank Webster, for whom much of  the information 
society literature shares a both common set of  strengths – especially in the commendably 
ambitious, macroscopic work of  Bell and Castells (see: Webster, 2005) – and drawbacks (see: 
Webster, 2004, 2006). Here, I want to briefly outline the more well-known points of  critique 
before moving to discuss a specific set of  points regarding the work of  Bell and Castells 
brought to light through a lively exchange between Frank Webster (2005), Roger Burrows 
(2005), Steve Fuller (2005), and Nicholas Gane (2005) – published in the journal Information, 
Communation & Society – regarding the ways in which British Sociology and Cultural Studies 
have hitherto made sense of  social change and the ‘information age’. An intriguing set of  
problems and questions arise out of  this exchange; the most notable being what Webster 
(2005) decries as the apparent inability of  British Sociology to come up with ambitious and 
scoping studies of  social change that blend theory with empirical evidence in the tradition 
supposedly upheld by that of  Bell and Castells. The exchange that proceeds from this 
assertion of  Webster’s opens up what I consider to be a crucial set of  questions regarding the 
way in which sociological analysis should proceed if  it is to make sense of  the nexus existing 
between new information technologies, digital media, and contemporary social change. 
Firstly, however, there are a common set of  critical points regarding the information society 
literature that are deserved of  mention. 
 A point of  critique, emphasised most strongly by Garnham (2004), is that much of  
the literature pertaining to the information society supports and advocates a theory that, in 
the end, is technologically determined; in relation to Castells’ theory of  the Network Society, 
Garnham points out that the source of  dynamic social change and what are seen as radical, 
epochal transformations in the structure of  the economy, Politics, and Culture is a 
technological paradigm based upon a cluster of  innovations in ICTs. Garnham (2004) goes 
on here to show that Castells’ emphasising of  ‘new technological conditions’ as the drivers of  
what he loosely refers to as a new mode of  production encapsulated by the notion of  an 
‘informational capitalist system’ or 'the information age', is followed up by large epochal 
claims regarding the restructuring of  the labour process and labour markets without 
unpacking these in considerable conceptual detail – one such claim being the supposed end of  
social class as both a political and structural configuration within contemporary society. 
Furthermore, the basic model of  ‘informational capitalism’ offered by Castells – though 
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rooted in a Marxian understanding of  ‘modes of  production’, much like Bell’s theory of  post-
industrial society – is explained by apparently new sources of  productivity growth attributable 
to technologies of  knowledge generation, information processing, and symbol 
communication – all of  which, as Garnham (2004) explicates, are problematic insofar as they 
amount to conceptual homogenizations of  otherwise very disparate activities, thus failing to 
consider the nuances of  the relations between technology, the labour process, and labour 
market restructuring.  
 Perhaps one of  the most well-noted shortcomings of  much of  the information 
society literature is its apparent fascination with technically describing what is considered to 
be a radical transformation so great that we are now living in an entirely ‘new’ society that can 
be summarised using concepts such as ‘networks’ (Castells, 2010a) or ‘post-
industrialism’ (Bell, 1973). Christian Fuchs (2011), in his evaluation of  the information society 
thesis, has referred to this as a predominance of  ‘discontinuous information society theories’ 
that prefix macro-sociological categories such as society or economy, implying that we have 
undergone a radical transformation in the past decades that has resulted in an entirely new era 
of  society. ‘These approaches stress discontinuity, as if  contemporary society had nothing in 
common with society as it was 100 or 150 years ago’ (Fuchs, 2011: 78). The key issue that this 
fixation on the radically new raises for many critics of  the information society is that it has 
resulted in a widespread form of  distraction from – or ignorance of  – the continuity and 
dynamics of  capitalist structures as a key component in socio-economic and technological 
change. This is a key point that is further elucidated by the aforementioned exchange between 
Frank Webster (2005), Roger Burrows (2005), Steve Fuller (2005), and Nicholas Gane (2005). 
 In an article entitled ‘Making Sense of  the Information Age: Sociology and Cultural 
Studies’, Frank Webster (2005) puts forward the argument that sociological and cultural 
studies research on information/communication technologies has consistently proved 
incapable of  developing work of  the ambition and scope to match that offered by the 
‘leading thinkers’ Daniel Bell and Manuel Castells, primarily due to a supposed inability to 
match their vision and combination of  empirical evidence and macro theorizations. Noting a 
homology between Bell’s theory of  post-industrial society and Francis Fukuyama’s ‘The End 
of  History?’ (cited in Webster, 2005), Webster advocates that Bell’s account of  social change 
is nothing short of  a majorly impressive achievement due to its clarity in explaining how the 
driver: 
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‘towards the Information Society is technology and technique, since this is what enables 
increased productivity on which services depend … [;] … at root Fukuyama presents 
much the same thesis: it is productivity that changes the world, capitalism has won out 
because it out-produced communism, and thus the direction of  history is set’ (Webster, 
2005: 443).  
Yet a key problem with this conclusion is that, whilst capitalism is incorporated as a 
conceptual component in Bell’s analysis, there is very little beyond the opening pages of  The 
Coming of  Post-Industrial Society that attempts to deal with how to conceptually understand and 
make sense of  capitalism as a system; the question of  “what is capitalism and how, if  at all, is it 
changing or remaining constant?” is for the most part absent from this seminal analysis of  
social change. If  Bell’s conception of  the information, or post-industrial society is indeed an 
intellectually sophisticated and ambitious attempt to ‘paint a big picture’ of  social change 
(Webster, 2005), then its marginal treatment of  questions relating to capitalism as a 
changeable — or perhaps stable — social system is nothing other than an oversight. 
Nevertheless, for Webster (2005), the key point to be made here is that, subsequent to Bell, 
British Sociological research into information technologies and social change provided 
nothing to match the scale and scope of  his work; Webster (2005) attributes this to the 
proliferation of  Cultural Studies research into information and media technologies that has 
remained decidedly local, small-scale and particular.  
An important point of  clarification is required here regarding this supposed tendency of  
Cultural Studies to be parochially restricted. As demonstrated by Babe in his assessment of  
the tension and colloquy between Cultural Studies and Political Economy in the 1990s,  — 
notably, that it was the rise of  poststructuralist Cultural Studies that was responsible for this 
development of  decidedly local and small-scale analyses, most of  which became concerned 
with an interest in and celebration of  difference and identity politics through consumption 
practises (Babe, 2009). This is an important side note to allude to here because, as shall be 
demonstrated in due course, a current subfield deriving in part from the Cultural Studies 
tradition — that concerned with ‘creative labour’, ‘cultural work’, and the ‘cultural 
industries’ (Banks, 2007; Gill and Pratt, 2008) — has, in recent years, offered up a range of  
useful and detailed counterpoints to the analytical frameworks and concepts developed within 
the Autonomous Marxist literature. Thus, despite Cultural Studies being alluded to above by 
Webster as at least partially responsible for the lack of  British Sociological research matching 
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the scale and scope of  Bell’s analysis of  ‘post-industrial society’, there are nonetheless some 
crucially important points of  critique offered up from within current Cultural Studies to take 
on board when considering the viability of  Autonomous Marxism as an antidote to the 
deficiencies of  the ‘information society’ literature. I shall return to this point at the closing of  
this chapter.  
 Nevertheless, for Webster (2005) the only work noteworthy of  being a successor to 
Bell is that of  Castells, which, being distinctively ambitious in its endeavour to account for the 
major patterns of  contemporary civilisation, is commended for also being the work of  a self-
described and determinedly ‘empirical sociologist’ who wears his theoretical clothes lightly in 
the form of  ‘disposable theory’ – that is, theory being an essential tool, but something that can 
be discarded when it becomes incapable of  addressing the substantive world (Castells, 2000, 
cited in Webster, 2005). While such a position may be commendable for its being openly 
flexible to major revision regarding how we understand the contours of  social change, it also 
provides some clarity for why, in Castells’ writings on the Network Society (2000, 2009, 
2010a, 2010b), important theoretical concepts such as ‘informational labour’ and 
‘informational capitalism’ are not unpacked or elucidated in significant detail. Indeed, 
although Castells employs these terms as core categories of  his analytical framework, there is 
very little in the way of  analytical exposition to supplement these notions with an in-depth 
understanding of  what principles, for example, characterise capitalism in the ‘information age’ 
as a social system and how it is different – or indeed similar – to social systems that have 
preceded it. Steve Fuller (2005), in his response to Webster’s advocacy of  Bell and Castells as 
exemplary analysts of  social change, also highlights a noticeable lack of  conceptual exposition 
within their respective schematics of  analysis. For Fuller, both Bell and Castells’ relative 
richness of  empirical detail is met with a seeming paucity of  technical language that, whilst 
commendable in the eyes of  some, often makes it difficult to differentiate between what is 
presented as fact, interpretation, or explanation – in some cases, justification or criticism . 4
 A case in point can be found within the schematic of  the Network Society outlined 
above, in which Castells (2009, 2010a, 2010b) places great emphasis upon ‘informational 
labour’ as a radical departure from previous modes of  (largely stable) employment on account 
of  its inherent flexibility becoming a way of  life due to ‘informational capitalism’ – a term 
throughout Castells’ writings that often appears vaguely synonymous with his notion of  
 As an aside, attributing this, in the case of  Castells, to the aforementioned preference for ‘disposable theory’ – 4
rather than, for example, ‘testable theory’ – Fuller goes on to suggest that this is perhaps symptomatic of  the 
extent to which academic and policy-making contexts of  inquiry ‘have come to be blurred so as to compromise 
the integrity of  the former’ (2005: 461).
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‘informational economy’ – being characterised by unceasing, unending change. An additional 
point to highlight here is that, whilst concepts such as Castells’ ‘informational labour’ and 
Bell’s ‘knowledge work’ appear closely synonymous with one another, they are also 
extraordinarily multidimensional, as Webster himself  demonstrates in other writings (see for 
example: Webster, 2004). When discussing the problematic elasticity of  Castells’ notion of  
‘informational labour’, Webster observes that: ‘[b]y turns he emphases education, 
communicative skills, organisational abilities and scientific knowledge, in this way lumping 
together a wide range of  disparate activities and capacities under one blanket 
designation’ (2004: 116). Often, then, it seems as though Castells’ notion of  ‘informational 
labour’ points to little more than the observation that dispersed – or “networked” – activities 
require people with organisational, communicative, or management skills to co-ordinate them, 
or that organisations tend to be headed by people with knowledge/informational skills. As a 
consequence of  this, the concept of  informational labour is left short of  analytic power due 
to its elasticity to include just about any group of  people in informational, or service roles 
within what seems to me to be a suspiciously class-based concept.  
 Nevertheless, whilst these conceptual shortcomings in the work of  Bell and Castells 
are important to highlight here, it is equally important to acknowledge, as Webster (2005) 
does, that these two thinkers have upheld the important task of  addressing macro and 
system-level issues of  social change. In this light, regardless of  the seemingly marginal status 
of  in-depth consideration for understanding capitalist dynamics and their connexion to forms 
labour and value-creation, Bell and Castells’ work nevertheless serve as touchstone examples 
of  sociological research that combines empirical observation with conceptual insight into 
complex socio-economic relations, which, in the judgement of  Webster, constitutes a 
‘superior’ form of  analysis to ‘studies which remain, as it were, with their intellectual blinkers 
fixing them on the merely particular’ (Webster, 2005: 453).  
 In a thought provoking response to Frank Webster’s condemnation of  British 
Sociology and Cultural Studies for their analyses of  ‘information age’ phenomena, Roger 
Burrows (2005) presents a case for suggesting that this ignorance – or distraction – is due to 
the development of  a strange kind of  amnesia about the functioning of  capitalism within 
mainstream social science. Appealing to more critically orientated sociologists, Burrows 
presents a case to suggest that during the 1990s there was a failure on the part of  mainstream 
Sociology ‘to respond adequately to the concurrent demise of  Marxist social theory and the 
emergence of  a virulent form of  informational capitalism’ (Burrows, 2005: 465). A decline in 
this period of  social theories inspired by Marxist thought led to ‘capitalism’ — as a core 
analytical category within sociology — being superseded by: 
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‘a rather more mellow sounding concern for modernities of  various sorts, with the 
consequence that much contemporary theorizing has come to be produced in a context 
in which the functioning of  capitalism has sunk into the background as an analytical given 
with little or no explanatory sociological purpose’ (Burrows, 2005: 466).  
This relegation of  capitalism into an un-interrogated background position is noticeable, not 
only within the information society theories outlined above – which, instead, place greater 
emphasis upon supposedly straightforward notions such as economy and society – but also 
within other areas of  sociology; indeed, there has been a general tendency within cultural 
studies literature, as Gane puts it, to ‘analyse the technical form or content of  new media 
technologies in isolation from the general structural dynamics of  capitalist culture’ (2003: 
430).  
 This sociological amnesia towards the form and functioning of  capitalism in 
mainstream sociology is directly related to what Therborn has outlined in detail as ‘post-
Marxist’ social commentary that, especially in the case of  Manuel Castells, sets out from new 
management conceptions of  information technology without attempting to meaningfully 
relate it to previous sociological theory (see: Therborn, 2010: 151-153 and 165-168). The 
result, which is to a lesser extent is characteristic of  Bell’s analysis, is a seemingly unanimous 
divorce from certain core principles of  Marxian political economy in an effort to produce 
some form of  ‘new’ empirical forays or social commentary, which, despite having a Marxist 
backdrop in the sense of  “homage to old masters”, amount to original works that are first 
and foremost ‘contributions to social analysis rather than social theory’ (Therborn, 2010: 
168). Despite this silencing of  the Marxian project of  critique, ‘capitalism’ as a concept 
remains a crucial yet unuttered backdrop to any consideration of  social theory in today’s 
context (Burrows, 2005). 
 By way of  conclusion, then, it seems appropriate to pose the question: what does a 
viable analysis of  ‘informational capitalism’ look like, and where might it be located? 
(Burrows, 2005). The main theoretical challenge posed by this question – and the seeming 
inability of  sociological accounts such as Castells’ to provide the conceptual groundwork – is 
how, in a supposedly post-Marxist field, can one develop relatively enduring sociological 
insights into ‘informational capitalism’ within sociocultural and technological contexts that it 
itself  generates (Burrows, 2005). For Burrows, the answer to these questions potentially lies at 
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the interface between Social and Cultural Geography – an area that has been most productive 
in generating viable and durable analyses of  ICTs and their enmeshing with socio-economic 
processes (2005). Indeed, for Burrows it is ‘perhaps a ‘spatial turn’ in Sociology [that] will save 
the sociological analysis of  ICTs from the detrimental effects of  its … attendant amnesia 
regarding the functioning of  informational capitalism’ (2005: 468). Here, however, I want to 
turn to a different body of  literature that – situated for the most part outside of  mainstream 
sociological – has come to prominence over the last decade as a major source of  inspiration 
for radical political economic analyses of  the relationships between new media, ICTs, and the 
dynamics of  contemporary capitalism. In a final note of  response to the propositions of  
Frank Webster regarding the work of  Bell and Castells, Nicholas Gane (2005) suggests that it 
might be through a consideration of  informational and digital technologies as both driving and 
deriving from the capitalist marketplace, while at the same time opening up the possibilities for 
an alternative arrangement, that should serve as a starting point for a radical Sociology of  the 
‘Information Age’. Put simply, this can be read as a call for critical and (potentially) 
emancipatory projects of  the likes found within Marxian schools of  political economic 
thought that place concepts such as capitalism, production, labour and value at the centre of  
analysis. One such body of  literature that has risen to prominence over the last two decades is 
the Autonomous Marxist movement. This area of  literature has, since its inception, 
maintained a strong allegiance to the radical project of  critiquing and theorising 
contemporary social change through an understanding of  capitalism and its dynamical 
motion as a key driver of  such change. As such, it provides a useful point of  departure from 
the information society literature which, as has been demonstrated above, treats capitalism — 
for the most part at least — as a given and seemingly static backcloth to contemporary social, 
economic and technical transformations.   
 It is to this body of  literature that I shall now turn. 
2.2 — A Factory Without Walls: the Autonomous Marxist Account of  post-Fordist, or 
‘Cognitive’ Capitalism 
Autonomous Marxism originated with the development of  Italian ‘workerism’ (Operaismo) in 
the 1960s and 70s, primarily out of  a desire to understand changes in the composition of  the 
Italian ‘working class’, which, understandably, has resulted in this school of  thought 
emphasising the conceptual primacy of  Marx’s labour and value-related categories over the 
commodity. This emphasis upon labour and the production of  value within the Autonomous 
Marxist literature provides – as I intend to demonstrate – an analytical frame of  reference for 
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theorising contemporary social change that, though not without fault, does not suffer from 
the aforementioned lack of  conceptual exposition found within the works and intellectual 
lineage of  Bell and Castells. Indeed, it is precisely in connexion to the lack of  clarity and 
detailed attention given over to the concepts of  labour and capitalism in the work of  these 
sociologists that the Autonomist Marxist school of  thought provides a much-needed point of  
reference. Moreover, such an emphasis upon understanding contemporary social change 
through a theory of  capitalism as a systemic configuration that is characterised by processes 
of  labour and value production, sets this school of  thought apart from other important theorists 
of  social change whose principal focus lies upon the Marxian notion of  the commodity and 
its form, content, circulation, and consumption — points of  focus emphasised in the work 
of, for example, Baudrillard (1998, 2005) and Lyotard (1984). 
 At the outset Autonomous Marxism retains a strong dedication to Marxian principles 
of  political economic critique, most importantly of  which is the desire to outline and 
interrogate the current state and functioning of  capitalism as a social system that is both 
generative and reproductive of  the social relations of  labour and production. Important 
Autonomous Marxist thinkers such as Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri (2000, 2004, 2009), 
Maurizio Lazzarato (1996), Franco “Bifo” Berardi (2009), Carlo Vercellone (2007, 2010), 
Paulo Virno (2004), and Christian Marazzi (2008, 2011a, 2011b) have all dedicated themselves 
to critical re-readings of  Marx’s work in light of  socio-economic transformations taking place 
throughout the 1970s onwards — often referred to within this area of  literature as the 
transition to post-Fordist production and the rise of  ‘cognitive capitalism’. To this end, a 
range of  sensitive and innovative analytical concepts have developed out of  this body of  
literature, such as ‘Multitude’ (Hardt and Negri, 2004), ‘immaterial labour’ (Lazzarato, 1996), 
and the ‘social factory’ (Terranova, 2004). Interestingly, however, it is not Marx’s magnum 
opus, Capital (Marx, 1983), that these thinkers have turned to in order to develop their 
respective accounts of  the political economic order; rather, it is the arguments and concepts 
to be found within Marx’s Grundrisse (1973) that have captured the attention and imagination 
of  these thinkers. In particular, the notion of  ‘general intellect’ found within the sections of  
the Grundrisse (Marx, 1973) on machinery has become a central analytical category for 
Autonomous Marxists (see for example: Negri, 1992; Lazzarato, 1996; Virno, 2007) that 
captures — at least in part — the changes and transformations that have taken place in 
labour processes and the organisation of  economic production since the early 1970s. In part, 
this re-reading of  Marx’s Grundrisse has come about from a need, in much the same vein as 
Bell (1973), to more directly engage with the question of  the role of  technology, machinery, 
and knowledge in processes of  socio-economic change. 
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 In what follows, I want to provide a preliminary outline of  the core arguments and 
concepts put forward by prominent Autonomous Marxist thinkers in order to provide a 
necessary backcloth to a consideration of  the issues, problems, and possibilities for a research 
agenda on labour and the production of  value within an ‘informational’, or ‘post-Fordist’ 
economy. The key concepts mobilised by these thinkers that provide such a backdrop are: 
‘immaterial labour’, sometimes interchanged with ‘cognitive labour’, which derives directly 
from a protracted consideration of  Marx’s notion of  the ‘general intellect’ outlined within the 
Grundrisse (1973); and the ‘social factory’, which, whilst closely related to the former concept, 
attempts to capture what is perhaps the most prevalent and all-pervading aspect of  socio-
economic change in the last few decades – that is, the propagation of  economic forms of  
value-production out beyond the factory walls and into social life itself  that has come about 
in tandem with the widespread diffusion of  new, digital and social media. The following shall 
deal with these concepts and their attendant postulations regarding socio-economic change 
and new media technologies. 
2.2.1 — Immaterial Labour: or, the Reconceptualisation of  What Constitutes Work 
Although the most popularly known works in this field are those of  Hardt and Negri on 
Empire (2000), Multitude (2004), and Commonwealth (2009), the most in-depth and referred-to 
texts on the notion of  immaterial labour and its relation to the general intellect are those of  
Carlo Vercellone (2007), Paolo Virno (2004, 2007), and Maurizio Lazzarato (1996) – the latter 
of  these being the first to provide an explicit and detailed analytical breakdown of  what this 
concept implies. According to Vercellone (2007), the pertinence of  Marx’s notion of  ‘general 
intellect’ for understanding contemporary socio-economic change can be traced back to the 
crisis of  the Fordist mode of  mass production throughout the late 1960s and 70s. Since then 
– and this appears at first to be a homologous argument to that of  Castells and Bell – 
capitalism has been characterised the ever more central role of  knowledge, information, and 
the cognitive dimensions of  labour. However, an important and crucial backdrop to this is 
that the centrality of  knowledge is not “new” to capitalism, but the question remains as to 
what extent we are witnessing – or have witnessed – an increased role for knowledge in 
economic production and, more importantly, what the nature of  its relationship to 
transformations in the capital/labour relation might be (Vercellone, 2007). Following this vein 
of  thought, Vercellone posits the deficiency of  the information and post-industrial society 
paradigms (he refers to these as the ‘new liberal theories’ of  the knowledge-based economy) 
with the following:  
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‘An understanding of  the meaning at stake in the current mutation of  capitalism cannot 
be reduced to the mere constitution of  an economy founded on knowledge, but in the 
formation of  a knowledge-based economy framed and subsumed by the laws of  capital 
accumulation’ (2007: 14). 
 In short, the primary emphasis for any analysis of  contemporary socio-economic 
changes must be placed upon understanding how these are framed and subsumed by capitalist 
imperatives ab initio. As such, the notion of  general intellect, though similar on a surface level 
to the notion of  a knowledge-economy, refers more directly to a gravitation of  knowledge and 
cognitive dimensions of  labour towards the core of  capitalist production processes than it 
does to some form of  radically “new” and totalising system-change – the difference here, 
then, being the implied continuity of  capitalism as the social system, as the framing reference 
point for understanding contemporary socio-economic change. The key question, for 
Vercellone (2007), that arises from this perspective is the degree to which it is possible to find, 
in Marx’s notion of  the general intellect, elements that allow for an identification of  the 
contradictions and antagonisms that traverse the contemporary capitalist order; such a 
reading would thus provide an initial basis for taking both the continuities and discontinuities 
of  the present socio-economic configuration into theoretical consideration for the purposes 
of  both analytical and political thought. As a preliminary answer to this, Vercellone (2007) 
suggests that Marx’s notion of  the general intellect, along with its attendant concepts of  
immaterial labour and cognitive capitalism, are useful in constructing a theoretical 
identification of  the significance of  the current turning point in the dynamics of  capitalism. 
For the purposes of  initial clarification, André Gorz (1999) — although not directly an 
Autonomous Marxist thinker — provides some pithy, yet useful comments on what exactly 
the notion of  ‘general intellect’ entails for an understanding of  the connections between 
contemporary socio-economic change and the capitalist social system. For Gorz (1999), work 
done directly within the traditional remit of  production is now merely one aspect among 
others of  the processes we can define as working for capital. Now we are witnessing, according 
to Gorz, the insertion and application of  intellectual labours of  thought, consultation, 
information exchange, pooling of  observation and knowledge, and — most importantly — 
the mobilisation of  ‘general social knowledge’ as the basis for a wide range of  activities that 
are entering into the capitalist production process as ‘a direct force of  production’ and wealth 
accumulation (Gorz, 1999: 27-32). This, at heart, is an opening formulation of  the link 
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between this Autonomous Marxist notion of  general intellect (or, general social knowledge) 
and what I have referred to above as the marginalised question of  capitalism. Indeed, to refer once 
again to Gorz (1999), this idea of  a ‘general intellect’, central as it is to Autonomous Marxist 
interpretations of  the dominant form labour power is taking on in the current configuration 
of  capitalism, represents an ideal model formulation of  post-Fordist enterprise — that is, it 
provides the basis for one to start thinking about what characterises ‘post-Fordist capitalism’. 
 From this notion of  the general intellect, many Autonomous Marxist writers arrive at 
the proposition that the crisis of  Fordism was followed by the emergence of  a post-Fordist 
mode of  production characterised by an increasing emphasis upon knowledge, information, 
and a general preponderance of  cognitive, or ‘immaterial’ dimensions of  what is considered 
to be a general and all-pervading labour process – especially in relation to the rising prevalence of  
computing and new media – over the segmented labour of  the mass-manufacture assembly 
line (see: Lazzarato, 1996; Marazzi, 2008; Virno, 2004, 2007). This leads to a systemic 
emphasis that, for many Autonomous Marxists, can best be described as ‘cognitive 
capitalism’, in which the relation of  capital to labour is marked by a hegemony of  knowledge 
– that is, a diffuse and general intellectuality – which in turn is manifest in the increasingly 
immaterial, computational, emotional and ‘cognitive’ character of  labour (Berardi, 2009; 
Vercellone, 2007). Accompanying this post-Fordist shift in emphasis toward cognitive and 
immaterial dimensions of  labour is a crisis of  the ‘traditional labour law of  value’, wherein 
the value of  the commodity is determined by the quantity of  labour-time that went into its 
production; from this crisis emerges a contradiction between, on the one hand, a productive 
process that rests primarily upon the qualities of  knowledge, cognitive skills, and immaterial 
labour processes, and, on the other, a unit of  measure that still coincides with the quantity of  
labour-time incorporated in the outputs of  this process (Vercellone, 2007; Virno, 2004, 2007). 
For Autonomous Marxists such as Virno (2004), this contradiction between the post-Fordist 
mode of  production being based upon a diffuse general intellect – that is, upon knowledge, 
cognitive skills, and various immaterial forms of  labour – and the manner in which these are 
subjected to measure, constitutes nothing less than the empirical realization of  Marx’s 
“Fragment on Machines” (Marx, 1973), in which he outlines the impact immaterial forms of  
work and production will have upon the industrial capitalist system and the inherent 
contradictions that will arise from such a development.  
 This purported crisis of  the labour law of  value forms a crucial part of  the 
Autonomist Marxist schematic of  cognitive capitalism, demonstrating as it does a 
fundamental contradiction between the current immaterial emphasis of  the labour process and 
the means through which it is subjected to quantitative measurement and valorisation as a 
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source of  value. For writers such as Hardt and Negri (2004), Lazzarato, (1996), Negri (1999) 
and others, the crisis of  the labour law of  value and the seeming inability of  capitalism to 
adequately impose a “new” regime of  measurement upon immaterial forms of production 
signals a supposedly emancipatory point at which the predominant forms of  production 
within society are “beyond value” and thus openly available to appropriation by the diffusely 
connected masses – or ‘multitude’, if  one employs the rhetoric of  Hardt and Negri (2000, 
2004). This seemingly utopian vision of  the implications of  this ‘crisis of  the law of  value’ 
and the apparent inability of  capital to impose a regime of  measure upon immaterial labour 
provides a point of  departure at which Autonomist Marxist thought becomes open to 
interrogation and critique. However, before proceeding to open up such a discussion in detail, 
I want to briefly focus in upon the hitherto under-discussed notions of  immaterial labour and 
the social factory – both of  which provide substance for firming up an understanding of  the 
role of  new and digitally interconnected information technologies in the post-Fordist 
machinations of  cognitive capitalism. Indeed, although this Autonomous Marxist 
conceptualisation of  the transition to what has been referred to here as cognitive capitalism 
retains an explicit commitment to understanding both its continuities – in terms of  it being a 
system with a consistent commitment to the imperative of  profitable production – and its 
dissimilarities from its antecedent form, it nonetheless must provide some form of  
description of  the labour process that it claims has the general intellect as its base. Such a 
description is found within the literature dealing more precisely with the notion of  
‘immaterial’, or ‘cognitive’ labour – notions which, for the most part, are treated equivocally . 5
 As has been shown so far, the notion of  general intellect found within the Grundrisse 
has served as a pivotal springboard for Autonomous Marxism’s conceptualisation of  the shift 
in emphasis away from mass manufacture and manual production (in short, Fordism) and 
towards the cognitive, immaterial properties of  post-Fordist labour. The most notable and 
widely referenced source on the concept of  ‘immaterial labour’ is Maurizio Lazzarato’s essay 
published in English in 1996. Here he discusses at length what the term refers to and how it 
both relates and builds up to other important concepts in the Autonomist Marxist lexicon. 
For Lazzarato (1996), the diffusion and widespread adoption of  information technologies 
and new media has led to a need for a reconceptualisation of  what “work” is and the power 
relations it implies; for this he proposes the term immaterial labour as a means of  expressing 
both the technical and subjective-political composition of  this work. Lazzarato defines 
 It may be of  interest to point out here that more recent Autonomous Marxist-inspired writings employ the 5
term ‘cognitive labour’ (see for example: Berardi, 2009), whilst the notion of  ‘immaterial labour’ seems to have 
predominated in the late 1990s and early 2000s (see for example: Hardt and Negri, 2000; Lazzarato, 1996).
  40
immaterial labour as ‘the labour that produces the informational and cultural content of  the 
commodity’ (1996: 131), which, accordingly, encapsulates two different dimensions: firstly, the 
‘informational content of  the commodity’, which refers to changes taking place in workers’ 
labour processes where skills involved in direct labour are increasingly involving cybernetics 
and various forms of  computer control; and secondly, the ‘cultural content of  the 
commodity’, which Lazzarato (1996) vaguely suggests is a series of  activities that are not 
normally recognised as work. A key problem with such a definition is evident in the clear lack 
of  a dedicated consideration of  what, if  it is to be treated as a singular form, the properties 
of  the commodity produced through immaterial labour are. Indeed, throughout much of  the 
Autonomous Marxist literature the importance of  the commodity as an analytical concept of  
Marxian political economy appears to be marginalized in favour of  labour and work-related 
concepts, which, as previously mentioned, serves as both an important point of  departure 
from theorists whose work emphasises the former. Nevertheless, Lazzarato (1996) – in a 
similar vein to Virno and Vercellone – goes on to situate the start of  the emergence of  this 
type of  labour in the 1970s at the crisis-point of  Fordism and the emergence of  post-
Fordism. After this point in time, Lazzarato writes:  
[t]he old dichotomy between “mental and manual labour”, or between “material labour 
and immaterial labour”, risks failing to grasp the new nature of  productive activity, which 
takes this separation and transforms it. The split between conception and execution, 
between labour and creativity, between author and audience, is simultaneously 
transcended within the “labour process” (1996: 132). 
 For Lazzarato, it is through the proliferation of  ICTs and various forms of  new 
applications of  digital media that ‘capitalism seeks to involve even the worker’s personality 
and subjectivity within the production of  value’ (1996: 134). Berardi – although adopting the 
term ‘cognitive labour’ – provides a simple summary of  this transformation of  the labour 
process and its relation to the production of  value when he states that: ‘cognitive labour is 
essentially a labour of  communication, that is to say communication put to work’ [my own 
emphasis] (2009: 86). Further elaborating upon this definition, Berardi directly links this 
apparent transformation of  the basic characteristics of  labour to what he describes as the 
introduction of  microelectronic technologies, the digitalisation of  machinery and the 
computerisation of  productive processes — all of  which have facilitated what he terms the 
‘general intellectualisation’ of  labour. Importantly,  and for the sake of  clarity, this notion of  
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the ‘general intellectualisation’ of  labour is largely equivocal with Berardi’s further summation 
that ‘[i]n high tech production cognitive faculties are in fact put to work, and personal 
peculiarities seem to be valorized’ [my own emphasis] (Berardi, 2009: 96). Thus, it is the 
foregrounding of  the ways in which computerisation and new, digital, and social media 
technologies have centralised cognitive capacities as labour processes that is of  paramount 
importance to the Autonomist Marxist accounts of  immaterial labour and the general 
intellect. 
 From this it is clear that, for the Autonomous Marxists, the notion of  immaterial 
labour is intended to signpost the ways in which capitalism has sought to take what is learned, 
experienced and consumed in the time of  traditional non-labour time and incorporate this 
into cycles of  value-production; this then becomes part of  labour-power and thus a profitable 
resource that is today becoming ever-more prevalent with the profusion of  new and 
networked media technologies that enable this process to become ever more diffuse 
throughout quotidian social life. However, as Virno (2007) is at pains to point out, what is at 
stake here is not simply just highly specialised and scientific knowledge, as Bell’s post-
industrial society formulation postulates; rather, the more generic attitudes of  the mind come 
to the fore as productive resources, such as the faculty of  language, the disposition to learn, 
memory, the capacity to relate and abstract, affective and emotional states, and the now 
mundane communicative capacities made possible through the functionalities of  new, digital, 
and social media. All of  these become part of  an ‘immaterial labour’ process that, founded 
upon Marx’s notion of  the general intellect, constitutes one of  the defining features of  post-
Fordist production. Indeed, for Virno, ‘[g]eneral intellect needs to be understood literally as 
intellect in general’ (2007: 6); only then does the scope and ubiquity of  ‘immaterial labour’ as 
a predominant configuration of  production become apparent. Importantly, these notions of  
general intellect and immaterial labour may seem, at face value, to be equivocal to Bell’s 
theory of  the knowledge class. However, a key point of  difference can be discerned in the 
scope of  these notions. The Autonomous Marxist suggestion of  a mode of  production based 
upon general intellect does not refer to any specific class or group of  knowledge or 
informational workers — it refers to a more general and, to some extent, totalising process 
whereby knowledge, information, and communicative sociality are subsumed into processes of  
capital accumulation. Thoburn (2001) provides some useful points of  clarification here in his 
reading of  Marx’s ‘Fragment on Machines’ and the concept of  general intellect contained 
therein. For Thoburn, the radical thesis contained within this text points to a situation 
wherein:  
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‘it is no longer the distinct individual entities of  the productive workers that are useful 
for capitalist production, nor even their ‘work’ in a conventional sense of  the word, but 
the whole ensemble of  sciences, languages, knowledges, activities, skills that circulate 
through society’ (2001: 81).  
 The importance of  this interpretation, when placed in juxtaposition to Bell’s notion 
of  a discrete and distinct ‘knowledge class’, cannot be overstated in terms of  the difference it 
affords in conceptualising the relations and nature of  capitalist production; in place of  a 
notion of  productive spheres of  knowledge and informational work, the concepts of  general 
intellect and immaterial labour point to a broader systemic configuration wherein the 
practises of  social individuals in general emerge as work (Thoburn, 2001) — that is, the 
general capacity of  sociality is put to work for capital in the creation of  surplus value. It is not 
then, as Thoburn points out, that a pure or discrete form of  scientific knowledge becomes 
productive, but that a whole series of  capacities and knowledges are made productive and 
exploitable, signifying a process moving toward ‘the greater expansion of  the content of  life 
that can count as work’ (2001: 84). One cannot help but imagine the now behemothic social 
media platforms such as Facebook as archetypes of  this process whereby general sociality is put 
to work for capital and, more specifically, subjected to processes of  valorisation .  6
 Nevertheless, over the last decade the Autonomous conception of  ‘immaterial labour’ 
has been increasingly employed and critiqued by scholars interested in interrogating the form 
and expressions of  contemporary political economic configurations, some of  which are 
noticeably dedicated to understanding labour and production within the context of  new, 
digital and social media technologies and their attendant economies (Dyer-Witheford, 1999; 
Terranova, 2000, 2004). Some commentators within this field suggest that the question of  
labour – a question which has become marginal at best for media and Cultural Studies when 
compared with questions regarding the political economy of  ownership, the nature of  the 
commodity, and cultural consumption – demands serious attention if  we are going to make 
sense of  the ways in which new media and cultural industries are intersecting in ways that 
place prevailing understandings of  labour, production processes, and capitalist dynamics into 
question (Terranova, 2004). As I have pointed out thus far, the idea or notion of  a putting to 
work of  the social — that is, sociality in general — is a central theme that has underpinned the 
development of  the concepts of  ‘immaterial labour’; there is, however, another contribution 
 This putting to work of  general sociality is a key a point to which I shall continuously return over the course of  6
this investigation as it serves as one of  the most important contributions of  the Autonomous Marxist school of  
thought.
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found within Autonomous Marxist literature that builds upon and unites these observations 
about the putting to work of  everyday sociality under a single heading —  the ‘social 
factory’ (Terranova, 2004). 
2.2.3 — The Social Factory: or, a Factory Without Walls 
A core consideration of  the Autonomous Marxist formulation of  immaterial labour is that it 
encapsulates – is perhaps predominated by – a variety of  activities that combine to constitute 
production processes that are both organised within computerised and multimedia networks 
such as the internet (Lazzarato, 1996). Moreover, given their ever-increasing ubiquity in 
everyday social life, it is through an understanding of  the operation and organisation of  such 
multimedia networks that we must configure our understanding of  cycles of  production and 
processes of  labour (Lazzarato, 1996). The prevalence of  forms of  immaterial production 
based around the application of  computers, digital technologies, and collection of  data – for 
example, audio-visual production, Internet advertising, the production and use of  software, 
or cultural and social activities embedded within data collection platforms like Facebook or 
Twitter – forces, according to Lazzarato (1996), a severe questioning of  classic definitions of  
work and workforce, or the distinction between labour and non-labour. As shall be noted in 
detail in the following chapter, the need for this questioning of  what counts as labour versus 
non-labour, can be more fully appreciated in its urgency if  one considers that it is not the 
concepts of  labour or work that, considered in isolation, are problematic; rather, it derives 
from a discrepancy between, on the one hand, traditional understandings of  the connexion 
between the organisation of  labour as an expression of  valorisation processes and, on the 
other, the emergence and proliferation of  modes of  value-creation are not easily captured by 
these traditional understandings — I am, of  course referring specifically here to the ‘labour 
theory of  value’ and the traditionally Fordist understanding of  how labour and value were 
socially organised into what is often referred to as the ‘wage-labour’ relation (Gorz, 1999). In 
short, this need to question what counts as labour in contemporary society derives from a 
particular problem: the need to understand how and in what ways value is being produced, 
created, recognised, reproduced and extracted from modes of  social life today; only after this 
has been interrogated can we then arrive at a more full understanding of  what counts as 
labour or work, since, as Marx (1983) so clearly demonstrated in volume one of  Capital, value 
and the configurations of  its creation is the foundational starting point for a theory of  labour, 
the commodity and capital more generally. In many respects the Autonomist Marxist 
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literature interrogates this question at significant length through the concept of  the ‘social 
factory’ (Arvidsson, 2006; Terranova, 2004). 
 More recent writings in the literature on cognitive capitalism have started to use the 
term to emphasise the socio-economic changes ushered in with the Internet as a platform for 
digital interconnectivity and user-creation, which, according to Peters and Bulut, has impacted 
heavily upon the mode of  production and nature of  labour to the extent that: ‘cognitive 
capitalism is centred on digital labour processes that produce digital products cheaply utilizing 
new information and communications technologies’ [my own emphasis] (2011: xxv). The 
recent work of  Berardi also emphasises what he refers to as ‘the digital transformation’ (2009: 
88) when discussing contemporary changes to the labour process. For Berardi, the integration 
of  digital technologies into the social fabric of  everyday life has captured work inside the 
network, which is to say that ‘the coordination of  different labor fragments in a unique flow 
of  information and production [is] made possible by digital infrastructures’ (2009: 88). Here it 
becomes clear that the notions of  cognitive or immaterial labour refer in most part to those 
forms of  value-creation that are emerging around the organised application of  digitally 
networked media, such as advertising or user-generated content. Bringing this recognition of  
digital technologies and their impact upon the modalities of  productive labour back to the 
theme of  general intellect in Marx’s Grundrisse, Berardi points out that: ‘[t]he introduction of  
microelectronic technologies, the digitalization of  machinery and the computerization of  
productive processes led rapidly to a transformation of  the characteristics of  labor and to its 
general intellectualization’ (2009: 94). This focus upon digital media and computerisation as 
key components in immaterial/cognitive labour processes has become a core theme for many 
writers influenced by the Autonomist Marxist school of  thought; in particular, there has been 
a recent explosion of  literature regarding the ways in which the Internet, so-called Web 2.0, 
social media, and a whole host of  related phenomena – often encapsulated by the term 
‘digital economy’ – are emblematic of  the socio-economic processes outlined in Autonomist 
Marxist thought.  
 The term ‘digital economy’ emerged in the 1990s as a way to describe the ways in 
which new information and digital technologies were coming to intersect with cultural 
industries based around media content production and distribution – a defining feature of  
this economic configuration being the capacities of  digitized information such as its ease of  
copying and low costs of  replication/sharing (Terranova, 2004). An obviously important 
component of  the digital economy is the connectivity and communicative capacities brought 
about the rapid spread of  the Internet and its various applications during the last two 
decades, especially social networking and so-called Web 2.0 technologies. However, as Tiziana 
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Terranova (2004) has demonstrated in her discussion of  what she refers to as ‘free labour’, 
many of  the debates that have developed around the digital economy have tended to overly 
focus upon the questions it poses to understandings of  (intellectual) property and ownership, 
leading to a marginalisation of  questions regarding the kinds of  labour and work that 
produce and perpetuate it. Attempting to remedy this marginal position of  questions relating 
to labour, Terranova (2004: 73-97) proposes the aforementioned notion of  ‘free labour’ to 
describe, not only the kinds of  value-creation on the Internet, but production in the cultural 
economy at large as an important yet largely unacknowledged source of  value in ‘advanced’ 
capitalist societies. 
 This notion of  free labour, which is directly derived from a consideration of  the 
Autonomist notion of  immaterial labour, refers to activities on the Internet that are 
simultaneously voluntarily given and unwaged, enjoyed and exploited, such as the building of  
websites, modification of  software, reading and participating in discussion forums or virtual 
spaces, and contributing to websites based around user-created content such as YouTube or 
Facebook – all of  which form part of  a process whereby production and consumption are 
reconfigured into forms of  labour that we do not immediately recognise as such due to their 
being part of  a broader unfolding of  a value logic that does not rely on the exploitation of  
formally employed labour forces. On the contrary, this value logic relies on the productive 
capacities of  ‘active consumers’ whose ‘knowledgeable consumption of  culture is translated 
into excess productive activities that are pleasurably embraced and at the same time often 
shamelessly exploited’ (Terranova, 2004: 78). In this sense, the digital economy can be 
understood as an important area of  experimentation with value-creation out of  freely-given 
cultural activities as mundane as chat, real-life story telling, and amateur authorship that 
themselves come to be productive as part of  a current ‘process of  economic experimentation 
with the creation of  monetary value out of  knowledge/culture/affect’ (Terranova, 2004: 79). 
 In order to make sense of  the way in which production within the digital economy is 
based upon a form of  mass consumer participation, Autonomist Marxist-inspired theorists 
have elaborated the notion of  the ‘social factory’ (Lazzarato, 1996; Terranova, 2004). Because 
of  value-creating activities such as participation in social networks or the creation and 
maintenance of  website content, it becomes increasingly difficult to distinguish between 
leisure time – that is, the time of  non-production – from the time when activities are put to 
work in the creation of  value and profit – that is, labour or work time. In a sense, life 
becomes inseparable from work as the location of  the logic of  the factory – that is, production 
– is found increasingly out in society at large. The difficulty, then, for social theory becomes 
articulating as clearly as possible how ‘[t]he organization of  the cycle of  production … is not 
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obviously apparent to the eye, because it is not defined by the four walls of  a 
factory’ (Lazzarato, 1996: 137). In his discussion of  what Autonomist Marxists refer to as the 
‘multitude’ , Paolo Virno (2004) puts forward a series of  theses on post-Fordism that relay 7
this notion of  the social factory in a manner that is fully importable to a consideration of  the 
digital economy. For Virno, one of  the primary characteristics of  post-Fordist production is 
that ‘every qualitative difference between labor time and non-labor time falls short’ [original emphasis] 
(2004: 102). This is a crucial point to consider with respect to forms of  production that 
characterise the digital economy because, as the prevalence of  consumer- or user-centric 
creation demonstrates, there is nothing or very little that distinguishes labour – in the value-
creating sense – from the rest of  human activities (Virno, 2004). 
 An important corollary to this dissolution of  a distinction between labour and non-
labour time that relates it directly to the idea of  a social logic of  production, a social factory, is 
found within Virno’s sixth thesis on post-Fordism: ‘In one way, post-Fordism is characterised 
by the co-existence of  the most diverse productive models and, in another way, by essentially 
homogeneous socialization which takes place outside of  the workplace’ (2004: 105). It is this 
notion of  an essentially homogeneous socialization that takes place outside of  the workplace 
– but which is nonetheless part of  the production processes of  capital – that captures how 
the digital economy constitutes an emblematic example of  the social factory thesis. Indeed, 
this characterisation of  the contemporary mode of  production provides a useful way of  
conceptualising how labour and value-creation within the digital economy is based upon 
networked mass participation and collaboration rather than a formally compartmentalised 
division of  labour like that found within the Fordist factory. The example of  the digital 
economy highlights how, as Peters and Bulut write, ‘prosumption, co-creation and co-
production of  knowledge and information goods are the new norms’ (2011: xxxiii). 
Moreover, these notions and the social processes they relate to all point toward a seemingly 
social and cooperative or collaborative (hence co-creation, co-production and the like) 
dimension of  the value-production — that is, they point toward the socio-economic 
configuration described hitherto as the ‘social factory’. This notion of  a ‘social factory’ is an 
important component to a Marxian theorization of  the digital economy – and post-Fordist 
production in general – for two primary reasons. Firstly, it captures the diffuse and informal 
 The ‘multitude’ (see: Hardt and Negri, 2004; Virno, 2004) is the main concept employed in the Autonomous 7
Marxist literature to denote a notion of  a social class consonant with that of  Marx’s conception of  the 
Proletariat. The notion of  the multitude is, for the most part, used to outline the supposed political potentialities 
inherent within the dispersed masses of  immaterial labourers and, as such, does not necessarily constitute a core 
category of  analysis with regard to an Autonomous Marxist outline of  the production logic of  post-Fordist 
capitalism more generally. It is, rather, and in keeping with Marx’s methodology, a political — or politicising — 
concept that arises from the critique of  society from the standpoint of  labour and value-production.
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character of  much of  the production of  online content and other related media that rely on 
consumer participation, amateur enthusiasm, and formal/informal collaboration for the 
creation of  valuable innovations. Secondly, and as Terranova (2004) points out in her initial 
mapping of  the ways in which the digital economy can be theorised through an emphasis on 
labour, the concept of  the social factory stands out as a contrasting alternative to the 
mainstream sociological notion of  a privileged ‘class’ of  ‘knowledge’, or ‘informational’ 
workers. Although the notion of  a ‘knowledge class’ – like that found within the 
aforementioned writings of  Bell (1973) or Castells (2010a) – is immediately complicated by its 
stubborn resistance to quantification, it is even more problematic that the acknowledgement 
of  a shift from factory to office work, from manufacture to services, has not been followed 
by a degree of  unanimity regarding who qualifies as a ‘knowledge worker’ and who does not 
(Terranova, 2004: 82). Indeed, an overview of  the sociological literature on the ‘knowledge 
class’, most of  which derives either directly or indirectly from that of  Daniel Bell, quickly 
reveals that the notion is often used to denote a privileged, somewhat hazily conceived of  
demographic of  scientific specialists and technical experts. For Terranova (2004), a more 
interesting and viable analytical move is possible if, instead of  looking for a ‘knowledge class’ 
within quantifiable parameters, one concentrates instead on the concept of  ‘labour’ and its 
attendant notions – one of  which being the idea of  post-Fordist production as a social factory, 
whereby the increasingly networked practice of  everyday life itself  becomes freely-given 
labour. Through such a focus on labour and its social configuration it becomes possible to go 
beyond parochial understandings emphasising the predominance of  particular classes, such as 
the ‘knowledge class’, and demonstrate that it is a form of  activity of  every productive 
subject within post-Fordist societies. ‘The dispersal of  immaterial labour … problematizes the 
idea of  the ‘knowledge worker’ as a class in the ‘industrial’ sense of  the word. As a collective 
quality of  the labour force, immaterial labour can be understood to pervade the social 
body’ (Terranova, 2004: 83). 
 What I have attempted to demonstrate so far is that theorising post-Fordist capitalism 
through a focus upon labour and work demonstrates, first and foremost, the difficulty in 
applying any traditional understandings of  these concepts to activities that are productive of  
value, especially if  one considers the ways in which the Internet and new media industries 
generate wealth. Such an observation does, of  course, flow directly from a recognition of  
how important freely-given productivity is to (new) media industries where work is in no way 
equivalent to employment (Terranova, 2004). Compared to the aforementioned analyses of  
Bell and Castells, such an interpretation of  socio-economic changes brought about with the 
rise of  information technologies and new media is far removed from assertions regarding a 
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predominance of  employment in informational and knowledge-based work. The key point of  
departure here being that, unlike the occupation-centric analyses of  Bell and Castells, the 
Autonomist Marxist notions of  immaterial labour and the social factory allow one to move 
beyond an equivocation of  labour with employment and consider the ways in which activities 
outside and beyond traditional understandings of  work are being put to work in the production 
of  value and wealth. 
 Internet-based activities such as user-creation on social networking sites, online game-
world participation, and content — video, image, text, music etc. — sharing highlight how the 
value of  innovations in the digital economy relies upon continuous, updateable work carried 
out by ‘users’ under the guise of  leisurely consumption. The notion of  a social factory, then, 
highlights above all the idea that the productive activities of  Internet users’ and participants in 
the wider digital economy can be considered as a generalizable labour process that is 
generative of  surplus-value. As Terranova succinctly puts it, for digital entrepreneurs: 
‘the best way to keep your site visible and thriving on the Web is to turn it into a space 
which is not only accessed but somehow built by its users. Users keep a site alive through 
their labour, the cumulative hours of  accessing the site (through generating advertising), 
writing messages, participating in conversations and sometimes making the jump to 
collaborators’ (2004: 91). 
 However, it is important to acknowledge that these processes described here under 
the notion of  the social factory are far from being confined to the structural trends of  new 
media industries and the digital economy; rather, for the Autonomous Marxists, they are a 
direct and hegemonic expression of  the logic of  post-Fordist capitalism, characterised as it is 
by a diffusion of  freely given labour and productivity that operates throughout the Internet, 
new media industries, and beyond. As Nicholas Thoburn points out in his overview of  the 
origins of  the social factory thesis in the Italian ‘workersim’ (operaismo) movement of  the 
1960s and 70s, the overall notion lying behind this concept was ‘that the social was becoming 
increasingly subordinated to capitalist regimes of  production’ [original emphasis] (Thoburn, 
2001: 78). Indeed, for Mario Tronti, a key figure in the early development of  this idea in the 
1960s, it was becoming increasingly possible to perceive the development of  a vast plane of  
capitalised social activity — this he referred to as the ‘Social Factory’, in which:  
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 ‘[S]ocial relations become moments of  the relations of  production, and the whole 
society becomes an articulation of  production. In short, all of  society lives as a function 
of  the factory and the factory extends its exclusive domination over all of  
society’ (Tronti, 1962, quoted in Cleaver, 1992: 137, quoted in Thoburn, 2001: 78).  
It is precisely this idea of  the whole of  society becoming an articulation of  production — of  
social life in general becoming the arena not only of  giving patronage to capital, but where 
productive assemblies of  value-generation emerge and develop — that lies at the heart of  
much of  the Autonomous Marxist school of  thought. Moreover, given the relevance of  such 
a conceptualisation to the aforementioned need to reopen and develop what I have hitherto 
referred to as the marginalised question of  capitalism in contemporary sociology, the social 
factory thesis I have outlined above shall serve as a foundational starting point from which 
this investigation into labour, value, values in the video-games industry shall develop. 
2.3 — Into the Social Factory: Between Autonomous Marxism and Cultural Studies 
As has been discussed above, immaterial labour and the social factory bring some interesting 
points of  discussion to the fore when considering the problem of  conceptualising post-
Fordist transformations through a focus upon work, production, and new media; more 
importantly, however, they are critical concepts that – contra mainstream sociological readings 
of  a ‘post-industrial’ or ‘network’ society characterised by ‘knowledge classes’ – retain a 
sensitivity to understanding these socio-economic transformations through a direct 
engagement with what i have referred to as marginalised question of  capitalism. In light of  this, 
these notions provide a much-needed groundwork from which to begin interrogating the 
extent to which contemporary socio-economic changes constitute a significant departure 
from pre-existing logics of  production, labour, and wealth creation; they allow one to begin 
questioning wether or not we are witnessing new and novel ways of  organising social life, or 
simply a set of  mutations in the operative logic(s) of  capitalist (re)production. Rather than 
rely on mainstream sociological accounts grounded in a post-Marxist desire to formally 
describe a supposedly “new” era predominated by a class— or classes, whichever 
interpretation one takes – of  knowledge workers, or informational labourers, the Autonomist 
Marxist perspective retains a sharp focus on interrogating how contemporary socio-economic 
developments are both continuous with the past – in the sense that they are underpinned by 
capitalist imperatives – and represent transformations of  sorts in the social relations through 
which wealth is both generated and reproduced on a perpetual basis. In particular, the critical 
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project of  Autonomous Marxism provides a much-needed means to initiate an interrogation 
of  the political economy of  new media industries and their attendant modes of  production 
and value-creation.  
 However, a few points of  differentiation are necessary here for the sake of  both 
critical distance and conceptual clarity. Whilst the Autonomist Marxist notions of  immaterial 
labour and the social factory provide an important contribution to social theory through a 
focus on the dispersal of  work beyond the factory gate and the continued prevalence of  
capitalist imperatives as drivers of  socio-economic change, there are some notable issues one 
must confront if  these concepts are to be employed and made sensitive to particular avenues 
of  analysis. This point is made especially clear when one considers how they may — or may 
not, whatever the case may be — adequately describe forms of  work, free labour, and the 
production of  value as they take place within the specificities of  certain contexts, within 
certain (new) media industries (Gill and Pratt, 2008). Furthermore, the notion of  immaterial 
labour, when considered as an operational concept, is rather ill-defined and not sharp enough 
to see the ways in which cultural work and free labour are both like and not like other forms 
of  work (Gill and Pratt, 2008). In other words, the notion may very well tell us something 
about large-scale socio-economic changes regarding the contemporary character of  the 
labour process, but it is not a sensitive concept to understanding difference and variation in 
the actual manifestations of  this process in everyday social life. For Banks (2007), the 
contribution of  Autonomist Marxists such as Hardt and Negri and Lazzarato can be 
understood in much the same way. Their conceptualisation of  the immaterial labourer as 
being subsumed, not simply by local managerial/production interests, but by the systematic, 
all-pervasive notion of  technically driven ‘informatized’ and networked social production is 
considered to be insufficient in addressing the diverse range of  action and practices that take 
place on the ground (Banks, 2007). There are some important dimensions to this critique of  
Autonomous Marxism — which, for the most part, derives from what Gill and Pratt refer to 
as ‘the recent ‘turn to labour’ in Cultural Studies’ (2008: 17) — that I want to draw attention 
to here before clarifying the position taken up in the remainder of  this investigation into 
labour and value-creation within the video-games industry. Moreover, what I want to 
demonstrate here, above all else, is that the substantive dimensions of  this ‘cultural critique’ 
of  Autonomous Marxism constitute a resurfacing (of  sorts) of  the arguments that came to 
the fore in the Colloquy of  1995 between representatives of  Cultural Studies and Political 
Economy (Babe, 2009) — and that, if  one is to successfully navigate an analytical position on 
the back of  this critique, one must carefully consider the merits and pitfalls of  the arguments 
laid bare by this dialogue between these two intellectual schools of  thought. Indeed, it is 
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through a careful reading between political economy and cultural studies that I have arrived at 
the position taken up within the remainder of  this investigation.  
 Earlier in this chapter I pointed to Webster’s (2005) critique of  British Sociological 
research into information technologies and social change and how it has been unable to 
match the scale and scope of  information society thinkers such as Daniel Bell and Manuel 
Castells — something which Webster (2005) attributes to the proliferation of  the Cultural 
Studies approach to information and media technologies, which retained a strong emphasis 
on small-scale uses and particular appropriations of  such technologies. This criticism levelled 
at Cultural Studies’ echoes many of  the core concerns that came to the fore in the mid-1990s 
when a notable split developed between Cultural Studies and Political Economy, evidenced 
most clearly in the exchanges between two key proponents of  these fields, Lawrence 
Grossberg (former) and Nicholas Garnham (latter) (Babe, 2009). The main points of  
contention that came to the fore over the course of  this Colloquy between these two fields 
revolved around the issues of, one the one hand, (a) political economy being overly 
reductionist in its supposedly one-sided concentration upon economic factors that are 
presumed to determine the cultural uses and effects of  media and, on the other, (b) the danger 
within Cultural Studies approaches of  slipping into uncritical modes of  interpreting culture 
and, more specifically, consumption through an over-emphasis on — and often unbridled 
celebration of  — the difference and differentiation of  cultural expressions and identities that can 
be found within decidedly local, particular contexts.  
 The latter of  these two points shares a high degree of  consonance with those of  
Webster above — that Cultural Studies’ focus on the small-scale and decidedly local has led to 
a marginalisation within British Sociology of  more macroscopic modes of  inquiry into 
contemporary socio-economic change. As Babe points out in relation to this critique, it is not 
the case that Cultural Studies as a whole is responsible for this disjuncture — rather, it is has 
been the proliferation of  poststructuralist Cultural Studies in particular, with its emphasis on 
hermeneutics, deconstruction, semiotics, rhetoric and a preoccupation with understanding 
social life as a  melting pot of  different expressions and identity politics (Babe, 2009). 
Crucially, however, such a preoccupation can, as Babe eloquently points out, ‘cause one to 
misconstrue oppression as pluralism, persuasion as democracy, and elite control as popular 
freedom’ (2009: 5) and it is this possibility that has left advocates of  political economy 
sceptical of  Cultural Studies research into new media and information technologies.  The 
main issue here, then, is a fundamental disjuncture between two modes of  analysis: one that 
emphasises — and to some extent celebrates — the variation of  social life and, in particular, 
its expression through consumer cultures; and one that emphasises the need to inquire into 
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broader social trends, indices of  inequality, and patternings of  dominance and subordination. 
Both of  these approaches — the former being that of  poststructuralist Cultural Studies, the 
latter Political Economy — are charged with slipping into “isms” by their respective other: it 
is a case of  cultural difference versus economic determinism.  
 However, Babe provides some very useful points for consideration in light of  these 
charges levelled at these two approaches, noting in particular that claims regarding the “strict 
determinisms and necessities” of  political economic approaches are easily overcome if  one 
considers: ‘that political economy does presume “soft determinisms”, which means that life is 
not totally random, that there are patterns that can be detected, areas that can be researched, 
findings attained, and conclusions drawn’ [original emphases] (2009: 108). Garnham’s  (1997) 
discussion regarding what he terms ‘the political economy of  culture’ elucidates this position 
extensively, highlighting that, if  we are to consider culture and its (re)production, we must 
also acknowledge that the capitalist mode of  production has certain core structural 
characteristics — most importantly, that labour and exchange constitute people’s necessary 
and unavoidable conditions of  existence. In light of  this, Garnham (1997) goes on to suggest 
that cultural studies (more specifically, poststructuralist cultural studies), with its stress on 
experience, the local and the everyday, has found it difficult to confront problems such as the 
division of  labour in and surrounding the production of  culture. The main point of  
contention that arises here for those swayed toward the concerns of  political economy, then, 
is: 
‘how, within a capitalist social formation, one can study cultural practises and their 
political effectivity — the ways in which people make sense of  their lives and then act in 
light of  that understanding — without focusing attention on how the resources for 
cultural practise, both material and symbolic, are made available in structurally 
determined ways through the institutions and circuits of  commodified cultural production, 
distribution, and consumption’ [emphasis added] (Garnham, 1997: 72). 
In a recent work entitled Digital Labour and Karl Marx, Fuchs (2014) points to the 
disappearance of  Marxism from cultural studies and the intimations of  a current return of  
Marx as a foundational resource for thinking about the interrelations between new media, 
information technologies, and capitalist dynamics. For Fuchs (2014), it is clear from the 
Colloquy between Garnham and Grossberg that something fundamentally changed in cultural 
studies since the times of  writers such as Stuart Hall, Raymond Williams and E.P Thompson 
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(all of  which were critically engaged with elements of  Marxist thought), ‘namely a profound 
move away from Marx, Marxism and the analysis of  culture in the context of  class and 
capitalism’ (Fuchs, 2014: 60). This move away from Marxism is discussed at length by Stuart 
Hall (1996) in his reflections upon the development and direction of  Cultural Studies, and 
British Cultural Studies more specifically. For Hall (1996) there are many different directions 
that Cultural Studies has taken and it is clear that there have been many intellectual 
splinterings; however, of  significance here is what Hall describes as the development of  
British Cultural Studies in the 1970s within the problematic of  Marxism and Marxist critique, 
a problematic that, in the 1990s, became less prevalent as a theoretical framing device for 
problematising social life. By way of  example, hegemony — a concept derived from the 
works of  Italian Marxist Antonio Gramsci — played a key role in Cultural Studies over the 
course of  the 1970s and 1980s, especially in the works of  Hall (Thoburn, 2007). However, as 
Thoburn (2007) has clearly demonstrated, there has been a marked decline in the perceived 
utility of  the theoretical frameworks that lie at the heart of  the hegemony thesis and its 
conception of  the social and modes of  domination.  
 As such, the discrepancy between critical political economy and poststructuralist 
cultural studies that the above outlines leads one to consider how one might go about 
navigating some form of  middle ground — one that incorporates a concern for the ways in 
which both the culturally particular and the systemically capitalist can be placed into relational 
dialogue with one another and understood in terms that emphasise the need for critiquing 
current modes of  production in — and the reproduction of  — social life. As I have pointed 
out above, the Autonomous Marxist school of  thought has provided some particularly 
interesting conceptual formations and considerations that — at the very least — constitute 
considerable food for thought regarding the systemically capitalist aspects of  contemporary 
socio-economic change and what expressions these might find in everyday social life 
(transformations in what constitutes work/labour, the valorisation of  everyday sociality and 
so on). Their focus upon (immaterial) labour and the social factory, I have argued, provides a 
much-needed groundwork to consider processes of  production, labour, and their enmeshing 
with new media technologies within an overall framework for understanding capitalist 
dynamics; as for the possibility of  understanding the culturally particular in tandem with this, 
there is considerable debate about the compatibility of  these positions if  one is to turn to 
cultural studies as a key resource. As Fuchs suggests, the question of  labour remains a 
perennial blindspot in cultural studies (Mosco, 2011, cited in Fuchs, 2014).	
	 However, in the last decade or so there has been a noticeable burgeoning of  literature 
that, though not entirely couched within cultural studies traditions, does indeed constitute 
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what Gill and Pratt (2008) refer to as a recent ‘turn to labour’ in cultural studies. Put 
somewhat generally, this area of  literature has coalesced around a desire to interrogate the 
modalities and processes of  production within specific ‘creative industry’ contexts — 
sometimes referred to as ‘cultural industries’ (Beck, 2003; Hesmondhalgh, 2002) — such as 
the music (Banks, 2007), fashion (McRobbie, 1998, 1999; Neff, Wissinger and Zukin, 2005), 
film (Kong, 2005), and, increasingly, the video-games industry (see: Deuze, 2007: 201-232). 
Importantly, however, within this literature there is an explicit engagement with the 
Autonomous Marxist literature as a body of  social theory from which to draw inspiration for 
the analysis and problematisation of  ‘cultural work’ and production within the ‘creative 
industries’ (Gill and Pratt, 2008; Hamilton and Heflin, 2011). Acknowledging the distinct lack 
of  a consideration for labour and the production process in cultural studies of  media, Banks 
(2007) equally acknowledges that this charge can be equally applied to certain strains of  
critical theory, noting that there has been a considerable ‘lack of  attention paid to social 
relations of  production in post-Adornian cultural and media studies’ (Banks, 2007: 27), in 
which the commodity figures as the primary unit of  analysis . From here Banks (2007) goes 8
on to suggest that the works of  Autonomist Marxist thinkers such as Negri and Lazzarato — 
whilst providing a very important contribution through a focus upon the concepts of  labour 
and production as useful starting points to interrogate cultural work — tend to remain overly-
focused upon macro-level accounts of  broad trends in which corporations and capital exert 
their will upon a seemingly homogenised population of  social actors.  
With regards to the concept ‘immaterial labour’, Gill and Pratt (2008) indicate a number of  
ways in which — as an analytical device — it is perhaps a little too broad and ill-defined, 
suggesting that while it may be true that most work today is in some sense impacted by 
information and communications, the grandiosity of  such claims obscures potentially 
profound differences between different groups of  actors and activities that we may — or may 
not — want to consider as labour or labourers of  some form or another. Whilst these points 
of  critique are of  some import, they are not stated here as a justification to turn to the micro-
level of  everyday practises and particular contexts in favour of  an understanding of  the kinds 
of  broad trends Autonomous Marxism provides insight into; rather, it seems more reasonable 
given the above discussion to consider in what ways one might be able to find fruitful avenues 
of  dialogue between Autonomous Marxism and literature on cultural work. Indeed, as Gill 
and Pratt explicitly commend: ‘In the context of  the silence from most scholars about 
 This is a point of  departure that I shall discuss at greater length in the following chapter where I shall discuss 8
the implications of  taking either labour or the commodity as the starting point of  analysis.
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cultural labour, autonomist thinking and activism makes a major contribution in focusing on 
the role of  work in capitalism’ (2008: 20). 
 Clearly, then, there is a current dialogue taking place between this work-centred strain 
of  cultural studies and political economy as it is found within the Autonomous Marxist 
tradition. This dialogue and its potential for opening up fruitful avenues for analysing post-
Fordist labour and production processes is highlighted by Gill and Pratt (2008) through the 
concept of  ‘temporality’, which, whilst ringing with core aspects of  the Autonomist’s social 
factory thesis — i.e. the ‘takeover of  life by work’ (Gill and Pratt, 2008: 17) — it also 
resonates with research findings on the working hours and routines of  cultural labour. 
Through the concept of  temporality, Gill and Pratt (2008) argue that it becomes a real 
possibility to interrogate how and in what ways life is becoming governed by work, especially 
if  one considers how this may operate on the level of  time by evaporating everyday 
distinctions between work and leisure, production and consumption — in short, it becomes a 
real possibility to study the temporalities and timings of  the social relations and processes of  
production that point toward the takeover of  life by work, to the notion and possibility that 
we are indeed in a social factory. For Gill and Pratt (2008), the claim of  a blurring — or 
perhaps, elision — of  work and non-work time is a key feature of  the Autonomous Marxist 
account of  life under post-Fordist capitalism that can be intuited on the ground level of  
experience and cultural practise. Pointing to the example of  the ‘participation economy of  
Web 2.0’, Gill and Pratt (2008) invoke Terranova’s (2004) aforementioned notion of  ‘free 
labour’ as indicative of  the ways in which temporalities of  social life previously understood as 
‘free time’ — that is, the Fordist demarcation of  work and non-work, productive and non-
productive time — are becoming harnessed by capital as ‘people produce and upload content 
for Facebook, Bebo and Youtube, modify games for giant multinational corporations and 
leave data trails that are ‘informational gold mines’ on Google and Safari’ (Gill and Pratt, 
2008: 17). The concept of  temporality in this sense is useful — if  you will — for scoping into 
the social factory to see what is going on “inside”; in what ways is productive activity being 
(re)configured in terms of  its times and timings within the patternings of  social life in general. 
Such a consideration, however, is not absent from the preoccupations of  Marxian political 
economy; indeed, as I intend to elucidate in the following chapter, there are many facets to 
Marx’s (1977, 1983) works that place time and temporality at the epicentre of  analysis, not 
least his analytical formulation of  the relations between labour and value, absolute and 
relative surplus value, the working day, and the quantitative and qualitative dimensions of  
value — all of  which serves to demonstrate the temporal nature of  Marx’s core categories of  
political economic critique..    
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 Thus, in a similar same vein to Gill and Pratt (2008), I would like to emphasise that 
the Autonomous Marxist concepts outlined above highlight important issues regarding the 
organization, diffusion, and character of  labour, value and contemporary capitalist production 
that have not been high on the sociological register in recent years – in this sense, 
Autonomous Marxism does the important job of  re-instating what I have referred to above 
as the marginalised question of  capitalism. However, equally important is a recognition that, 
in order to understand the processes and practices that characterise the notion of  a social 
factory, one must not only consider the ways in which this is a generally applicable notion, but 
also the ways in which specific social relations, negotiations, and calculations on the ground 
can be weighed against the thrust of  this thesis. This may involve, as Gill and Pratt (2008) 
suggest, asking not only if  such socio-economic relations and practises are straightforwardly 
exploitative or oppressive, but how pleasure, affect, and playful engagement may bind us to 
such practices. In the case of  the new media industries and their attendant modalities of  
production, this must entail a close analysis of  both the specificities and generalities operating 
throughout. To understand and address issues relating to the ‘social factory logic’ of  new 
media industries it is necessary to both scope in on particular formations — such as, in the 
case of  this investigation, the video-games industry — whilst also retaining a central concern 
for how the modalities of  production and value-creation within such organisations can be 
understood as part of  a broader picture of  socio-economic change.  
 The purpose here in dedicating considerable effort to a delineation and juxtaposition 
of  the Autonomist Marxist school of  thought against (a) other macroscopic perspectives on 
the character of  contemporary socio-economic change and (b) the ‘cultural critique’ from the 
standpoint of  labour, has been to prepare for a focused investigation into specific facets of  a 
particular new media industry – that is, labour, value and valorisation in the video-games industry – 
with the primary purpose of  relating these back to the broader level of  investigating social 
life under post-Fordist capitalism. The aim here, then, has been to provide the theoretical 
backdrop required for such a focused, yet broadly aspiring investigation. What I want to 
suggest, however, is not a turn to one perspective or the other — i.e. not a straightforward 
adoption of  Autonomist Marxist concepts as they stand, or a turn toward the culturally 
particular as the start and end point of  analysis — but to use these points of  negotiation as a 
starting platform for exploring the core categories of  political economy and their potential 
for making sense of  the broad patternings of  socio-economic change and the ways in which 
such developments are expressed in certain spheres of  social life. With regard to the former, 
the social factory thesis is highly thought-provoking and, as scholars such as Terranova (2004) 
have shown, is considerably intuitive as a means for thinking through the relationships 
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between capitalist dynamics and new media phenomenon like the Internet, Web 2.0 or the 
digital economy. 
 As a final note, one may ask in light of  the above wether the notion of  a social 
factory is adequate on its own terms, or if  it might be desirable to open up its attendant 
proposition — that is, the whole of  society becoming an articulation of  capitalist production, 
the social being the subject of  capital’s modes of  appropriation — to a consideration of  other 
categories of  Marxian political economy. In other words, which concepts and theoretical 
formations in Marx’s analytical schematic may be interrogated in conjunction with the social 
factory thesis to sharpen its analytical import and investigative capacity as a category of  
political economic critique? Of  course, as I have attempted to demonstrate throughout the 
course of  this chapter, the Autonomous Marxist school of  thought places the concept of  
labour and its connexion to forms of  (surplus-)value generation at the centre of  
consideration when outlining the contours of  socio-economic relations that appear to 
constitute a takeover of  life by work, the formation of  a social factory, wherein the whole of  
society becomes and articulation of  production. Gill and Pratt’s suggestion of  focusing upon 
the themes of  temporality and timing provides a thought provoking supplement to such 
observations as a means to begin investigating what is happening within particular industries 
and making sense of  the ways in which work is, or is not, subject to regimentation and 
temporal compartmentalisation.. However, as I intend to demonstrate, questions regarding 
temporality and temporalities are intricately connected, within Marxian literature, to the 
concepts of  labour and value as core categories of  political economic analysis; indeed, even a 
brief  overview of  previous and prevailing Marxian literature reveals the importance of  time 
and temporality to discussions about the labour process (see: Marazzi, 2011b: 17-67; Marx, 
1983: 173-212), the working day (see: Marx, 1983: 222-226; Gorz, 1999: 27-55), the forms and 
rate of  surplus-value (see: Marx, 1983: 173-531), and what is often referred to as the ‘labour 
law of  value’ (see for example: Morini and Fumagalli, 2010; Vercellone, 2010). . 
Nevertheless, despite value and temporality being important explanatory concepts in 
Autonomist Marxist analyses — especially in the case of  the social factory thesis, where the 
time of  work versus non-work and the production of  value across all spheres of  social life 
are a paramount concern — there has been considerably more effort expended on the part 
of  critics of  this school of  thought toward the suggested changes in the qualitative 
dimensions of  the labour process as prevailingly immaterial or cognitive in nature. This 
preoccupation with one aspect of  the overall contribution of  the Autonomous Marxist 
literature is prevalent throughout the aforementioned work that Gill and Pratt (2008) refer to 
as the ‘cultural turn to labour’ and within the writings of  critics such as Camfield (2007) and 
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Wittel (2004). Within this literature, the central criticism levelled at the contributions of  the 
Autonomous Marxist school of  thought revolves around the apparent imprecision and 
apparent haziness of  ‘immaterial labour’ as a concept for describing changes in contemporary 
labour processes. However, as I have attempted to demonstrate throughout the latter part of  
this chapter, immaterial labour is one conceptual facet of  a complex and constantly 
developing set of  arguments and discussions both within and in dialogue with  Autonomous 
Marxist literature. This is most clear in the ways that consideration given to the concept of  
labour in Autonomous Marxist literature — notably Vercellone (2010) and Fumagalli (2011), 
among others — is often framed in close connexion with value, surplus-value and (social) 
forms of  production. One example of  such interconnections between the core concepts at 
work in Autonomous Marxist literature is the contention that immaterial and cognitive 
dimensions of  labour in post-Fordist capitalism are in direct contradiction with the quantified 
measure of  labour-time; this perceived contradiction is then often used as a basis for claiming 
that capital is not capable of  “capturing” emergent forms of  production as potential sources 
of  (surplus-)value, and that this has led to a crisis of  the labour law of  value and a return of  
rent (Vercellone, 2010) — a scenario sometimes described as an incommensurability (Marazzi, 
2011b) between capital’s logics of  appropriation and the kinds of  networked production that 
have emerged in tandem with new, digital, and social media . As such, it seems important to 9
highlight here that claims regarding the insufficiency of  concepts such as ‘immaterial labour’, 
while valid on their own terms (i.e. as positing a need for more detailed and fine-tuned 
analyses of  production processes on the ground) are of  little import to the overall framework 
of  concepts and considerations offered up by Autonomous Marxist literature. This is 
particularly evident when one takes into account the significance of  the connexions between the 
concepts of  labour, (surplus)value and work/non-work time that the social factory thesis 
draws together.  
 Attempts to distance analysis away from a consideration of  the relations of  labour to 
value production in post-Fordist capitalism have levelled similar criticisms at the Autonomous 
Marxist school of  thought. For example, Arvidsson (2009) claims in his attempt to formulate 
a ‘post-capitalist theory of  value’ through an analysis of  ‘social production’ , that the 10
 This is an important area of  discussion that I shall return to in the following chapter when discussing the 9
implications of  retaining a close connexion between the concepts of  labour and value when attempting to make 
sense of  capitalism today. 
 This term has become a widely-used means of  describing the ways in which the production of  10
(predominantly user-generated) ‘immaterial wealth’ is becoming strategically central — through the increasing 
mediatisation of  the social — to both short-term profits and long-term economic strategies (Arvidsson, 2009).		
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question of  value and its logic is noticeably marginal in the accounts of  most Autonomous 
Marxist observers, primarily because it is assumed that: 
‘value must, per definition, be connected to (some form of) investment of  labour time. 
Since this ‘labour theory of  value’ hardly applies to social production, in which labour 
power is for all means and purposes abundant and hence without value’ (Arvidsson, 
2009: 15). 
For the most part, according to Arvidsson (2009), the question of  value and its logic within 
post-Fordist capitalism is not considered to be an open question requiring explanation or 
possible exploration. Instead, Arvidsson claims, the concept of  labour and its expression in 
immaterial and cognitive forms is particularly privileged as an explanatory device for 
elucidating the core features of  post-Fordist capitalism, and, as I have shown, this contention 
is also the subject of  much critique and criticism (Gill an Pratt, 2008). However, as I am at 
pains to point out here, there are a number of  important Autonomous Marxist contributors 
and concepts that are grappling with this very problem — that is, the changing nature of, and 
relations between, labour and value production and the implications of  this for a systematic 
understanding of  the socio-economic condition we find ourselves in today (see especially: 
Fumagalli, 2011; Morini and Fumagalli, 2011; Vercellone, 2010). At present, the argument I 
am attempting to put forward here is that — whilst it is important to acknowledge the 
limitations of  the various aspects of  Autonomous Marxist thought outlined above, especially 
with regards to the need for focused analyses and a sensitivity to specific conditions and 
circumstances — this area of  literature still remains one of  (if  not the) most important 
contributions that addresses what I referred to earlier as the marginalised question of  
capitalism in sociological literature. Moreover, the import of  the social factory thesis cannot 
be understated as it provides an important convergence point for making sense of  not only 
changes in labour processes and the dissolution of  the dichotomy between work and non-
work time, but also changes in the ways in which we can make sense of  labour as a value-
generating process and the production of  value as a hallmark of  labour — in other words, the notion 
of  a social factory entails a dedication to understanding both changes in what constitutes 
labour and changes in the way that (surplus-)value is generated, maintained, and intensified as 
parts of  the same analytical framework for making sense of  capitalism today. 
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 But what would an in-depth consideration of  the concepts of  labour and 
(surplus-)value provide as the foundations from which to orientate an analysis of  the video-
games industry?? In order to shed some light on this possibility, I shall return to the 
beginning — to Marx’s theory of  labour and (surplus-)value — and  proceed through the 
works of  a number of  eminent Autonomous Marxist-inspired scholars  with the aim of  
exploring the possibilities for supplementing the social factory thesis outlined thus far; through 
such an exploration one may be able to elucidate — among other things — some of  the ways 
in which the video-games industry is (or is not — whatever the case may be) emblematic of  
the developments and machinations described above as a social factory, wherein work and 
non-work time is elided, where everyday sociality and mundane activities become articulations 
of  production and value-creation.  
  61
3. Into the Social Factory: Labour, Value and the Sociality of    
 Production 
In this chapter I want to provide a three-part outline of  the conceptual framework that 
underpins and informs this investigation into the video-games industry. For the most part, 
this shall entail an extension and finer-grained unpacking of  the themes and concepts 
developed within the previous chapter – most notably those of  what constitutes labour and 
value creation/appropriation today, and the notion that processes of  production are 
increasingly taking the form of  a seemingly ubiquitous ‘social factory’ that pervades all social 
life, rendering previous understandings of  the division between work and non-work 
problematic. However, the task here is not a simple case of  a need to recount those concepts 
and issues; rather, it is to focus in on a specific set of  arguments and problems that have 
emerged directly from a need to: (a) understand and make sense of  contemporary capitalism 
and capitalistic processes, and (b) given the wealth of  scholarship on this topic in Marxian 
and Marx-inspired literature, consider how this can be effectively mobilised to make sense of  
the ways in which labour and value-creation/appropriation are configured (and periodically 
re-configured) as core elements of  capitalistic production. The previous chapter has pointed 
to two main concerns regarding these needs: firstly, an apparent marginalisation of  questions 
regarding capitalism in sociological literature on macro socio-economic change; and secondly, 
the importance of   contributions from the Autonomous Marxist tradition  for keeping 
questions regarding capitalism and changes in capitalistic processes clearly in view. More 
specifically, I have pointed to the pertinence and potential of  a constellation of  concepts that 
seek to address changes that have — and are — taking place with regards to processes of  
capitalistic production and accumulation, especially within what is referred to as the ‘digital’, 
or ‘new’ economy; the foremost of  these concepts being ‘immaterial labour’, the ‘general 
intellect’ and the notion that all social life is becoming an articulation of  the logic of  the 
factory (the social factory). In order to further unpack these concepts for the purposes of  
operationalising this investigation into the video-games industry, this chapter shall return to 
the writings of  Marx on labour and value and work forwards towards a discussion of  a 
particular set of  conceptual devices and problems preeminent within the current writings of  
scholars working within — and in dialogue with — Autonomous Marxism. As such, this 
chapter is divided into three key sections that shall highlight and discuss the importance of  
the relational connexion between labour and value, which, as shall be demonstrated in due 
course, is central to further elucidating the notion that all social life is, or is becoming, an 
articulation of  production — a configuration of  capitalistic value-production and 
appropriation. In short, this chapter is an attempt to delve further into the complexity of  
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relations, processes and changes that have given rise to the idea that contemporary capitalism 
is characterised by a social factory logic. To this end, Marx’s labour theory of  value shall be 
discussed as a starting point for considering what may, or may not, appear on the surface as 
activities and processes that are being put to work by and for capital — for asking “what, in 
light of  the social factory thesis, counts as labour?”. 
 The first section of  this chapter is dedicated to a discussion of  Marx’s formulation of  
the relationship between labour and value in general, with a particular emphasis on highlighting 
what some scholars have pointed to as a distinction within Marx’s writing between the 
quantitative and qualitative dimensions of  labour and value. This is a preoccupation that has 
been taken up by a number of  theorists and scholars from various generations and schools of  
Marxian literature; in particular, the writings of  Isaak Rubin, whose main work Essays on 
Marx’s Theory of  Value (2010), first published in 1924, was concerned with elucidating what he 
considered in his time to be a fundamentally misunderstood component of  Marx’s analysis of  
capitalism — that is, the qualitative dimensions of  Marx’s formulation of  the relations 
between labour, value and the commodity. Another thinker who has attempted to highlight 
the importance of  this aspect of  Marx’s work is Moishe Postone (2003) who, akin to the 
Autonomous Marxist school of  thought, turns to a reading of  the Grundrisse in order to 
demonstrate that Marx’s framework for understanding both the quantitative and qualitative 
dimensions of  capitalistic production constitutes, in the first and last instance, a social analysis 
of  production. Although there a number of  directions one can pursue from these 
considerations — particularly with regard to centrality of  commodity fetishism (see Rubin, 
2010: 5-60), the mystification of  relations of  production, and value as a mediating force over 
the social (Postone, 2003) — the emphasis in this section shall be upon the importance Marx 
and Marxian analyses of  production place upon the relationship between social relations, and 
abstractions about such social relations. Emphasising this element of  Marx’s labour theory of  
value paves the way to a discussion of  two fundamental concepts contained within the 
subsequent sections of  this chapter: Marx’s theory of  absolute and relative surplus-value; and, 
following this, cooperation as the qualitative social relation that forms the basis of  value and 
production in general. It is important to note at this early point that the purpose of  these 
discussions is to gravitate back toward the Autonomous Marxist literature on the social 
factory and, more specifically, a particular set of  arguments revolving around the notions of  
‘sympathetic cooperation’ (Terranova, 2014), biopolitical production (Hardt and Negri, 2000; 
Mornini and Fumagalli, 2010; Terranova, 2009, 2014), and the proposed incommensurability 
of  social production (Marazzi, 2011b; Vercellone, 2010). The overall objective in pointing to 
these notions and their attendant discussions is, put simply, to pave the way for a 
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consideration of  the sociality of  production as the foundational basis upon which the emerging 
social factory logic of  labour and value-creation/accumulation is becoming established, 
alongside the contradictions and problems encountered when one considers the following: 
how is (qualitative) sociality subjected to (quantified) capitalistic valorisation?  
 Of  central importance the first section of  this chapter is a two-fold discussion that 
starts with the relation between ‘concrete labour’ and ‘abstract labour’, and then moves to a 
particular aspect of  Marx’s labour theory of  value that carries his analysis forward to a political 
critique of  capitalist exploitation: this is, Marx’s theory of  surplus-value (Marx, 1983). As shall 
be demonstrated in due course, Marx’s theory of  absolute and relative surplus-value draws 
together the quantitative and qualitative dimensions of  his framework to form an analysis of  
how and in what ways labour (the qualitative capacities of  labourers as a value positing 
activity) is subjected to quantified means and methods for analysing and increasing productivity. 
In light of  this, I want to turn attention in the second section of  this chapter to how the 
concept of  surplus-value plays a central role in understanding the ways in which profit and 
capital accumulation are sought out through strategies founded upon quantifiable 
measurements of  — that is, abstractions about — the productive capacities of  working 
populations (what Marx refers to as ‘labour power’). In Marx’s (1983) own writings on 
surplus-value, these strategies and measurements are understood primarily through the 
concepts of  time (time and duration of  the working day) and productivity (of  labour). 
Nevertheless, the overall aim in discussing surplus-value and its attendant concepts in this 
section is to highlight a core underlying theme of  this project: the problem of  profit and the 
adaptability of  capital — what Hardt and Negri (2000), in their discussion of  surplus-value, 
refer to as the barriers that define the capitalist production process and the ways in which 
these are adapted to and overcome. The purpose of  this section, then, is to highlight and 
demonstrate the centrality of  Marx’s formulation of  absolute and relative surplus value as an 
element of  his analysis of  capitalism that draws together the qualitative and quantitative 
dimensions of  production into a framework for understanding the ways in which the former 
is subjected to the latter through an adaptive process that is underpinned by the problem, or 
need, of  profit — of  generating surplus. 
 The second section of  this chapter shall then move to discuss the themes highlighted 
in sections one and two in a contemporary context through a reading of  recent bodies of  
literature that are focused upon the problem of  understanding current socio-economic 
changes to production, labour, and value-creation processes that have developed in tandem 
with the proliferation and adoption of  digital/new media technologies into various spheres 
of  everyday social life. The first of  these areas of  literature to be discussed coalesces around 
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what is often referred to as ‘liberal theories of  social production’ (see for example: Benkler, 
2006; Leadbeater, 2009), much of  which has opened up important questions regarding the 
ways in which user-creativity and production undertaken through digital networks is 
challenging, or at least subverting, traditional monetary and commercial market models. The 
overall aim in providing an outline of  this area of  literature is to point toward the seemingly 
celebratory and emancipatory conclusions that thinkers such as Benkler (2006) and 
Leadbeater (2009) arrive at when considering how social and digital networking will affect 
socio-economic change. As such, my aim is to point to this area of  literature as an important 
stepping stone for making sense of  the centrality of  sociality to processes of  production and 
creativity within digital networks, whilst, at the same time, remaining critical of  perspectives 
that suggest we can make sense of  this sociality of production as the emancipatory power of  
new markets founded upon socially produced goods and innovations (Benkler, 2006; 
Leadbeater, 2009). Such perspectives suggest that socially produced goods — by virtue of  
their status as open and freely available resources — are without any traditional form of  
market value and that, therefore, the question of  value is of  little import to understanding 
new and emerging forms of  social production (for an overview of  this point see: Arvidsson, 
2009: 14-17).  
 Thus, following on from this I shall then move to discuss a constellation of  concepts 
more directly associated with the social factory thesis that attempt to unpack and elucidate the 
unfolding logic of  social production as a direct mutation — or adaptation — of  capitalistic 
valorisation processes. Drawing upon the works and readings of  Autonomous Marxist 
thinkers such as Lazzarato (2008; 2012), Morini and Fumagalli (2010), and Terranova (2014), 
the concept of  sympathetic cooperation and the constituent powers of  sociality in economic 
valorisation processes shall be pointed toward as a foundational counterpoint to the 
aforementioned ‘liberal theories of  social production’; a foundational counterpoint that shifts 
the focus of  attention directly onto the relations between capitalist processes of  
expropriation and the incorporation of  a generalised form of  social labour into cycles and 
circuits of  production and value-creation. In short, the concept of  sympathetic cooperation 
and the focus of  the above Autonomous Marxist thinkers on the centrality of  the social to 
current socio-economic developments, brings the overall trajectory of  this chapter and its 
preoccupation with delineating the relations between the qualitative and quantitative 
dimensions of  production back to a focus upon the social factory thesis, albeit with a 
renewed emphasis on the social as the focal point of  capitalistic valorisation processes.  
 Of  particular importance at this point in the chapter is the way in which a focus upon 
the social — of  sociality in general — as a foundational source of  value and valorisation can 
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be tied directly to a consideration of  the adaptability of  capitalistic processes and the ways in 
which this is underpinned by what I have hitherto only briefly referred to as the ‘problem of  
profit’ . In other words, such a focus opens up a line of  investigation that is distinctly lacking 11
within the literature pertaining to liberal theories of  social production: that is, capital’s means 
and methods of  attempting to capture the productive and creative power of  shared sociality. 
This final point has been put to discussion by numerous authors preoccupied with making 
sense of  recent socio-economic change through a focus upon capitalism and capitalistic 
processes. Framed as the problem of  the incommensurability of  the social authors such as 
Marazzi (2008, 2011), Gorz (1999), and Morini and Fumagalli (2010) have pointed toward 
two interrelated developments: firstly, what has been described as the ‘crisis of  the (labour) 
law of  value’ (Vercellone, 2011) and a general decline in waged-labour (labour-time) as the 
hegemonic expression of  the temporal social relations of  production under post-Fordist 
capitalism (Gorz, 1999; Marazzi, 2008); and secondly, the proposed “problem” of  subjecting 
the sociality of  production to capitalistic valorisation (Marazzi, 2011) — that is, the issue of  
quantifying the qualitative social relations, beliefs and values that, referring back to the 
aforementioned theory of  sympathetic cooperation (Lazzarato, 2012; Terranova, 2014), 
constitute a foundational element in processes of  capitalist valorisation. The latter of  these 
two issues — alongside the more general issue of  understanding emerging value-creation 
processes today — has become a central preoccupation of  recent sociological writings that, 
although not unified around an explicit concern for making sense of  contemporary capitalist 
production, have highlighted the need for empirical lines of  inquiry into issues coalescing 
around the conceptual importance of  value (Böhm and Land, 2012; Ruckenstein, 2011). This 
is particularly the case with regard to the themes of  measurement (Verran, 2012), metricization 
(De Angelis and Harvie, 2009; Kelly and Burrows, 2012), and the complex interrelations 
between capital’s ‘value logic’ and values (Skeggs, 2014).  
 The overall set of  considerations to emerge from the discussions contained within 
this chapter coalesce around a set of  problems that the case study of  this thesis seeks to 
investigate. The core issue that emerges from the considerations of  this and the previous 
chapter is that of  the ‘problem of  profit’  — that is, how and in what ways profit is sought — 
and the ways in which this has framed the socio-economic developments and changes in 
capitalistic dynamics that are evident today in the ways that, by way of  example, new, digital 
and social media industries’ commercial logics operate to attain value from freely given user-
 This notion shall be expanded upon and further developed throughout the course of  this chapter and, 11
particularly, chapter five, throughout which it serves as a central framing device for discussing case study data on 
the values and narratives of  video-game developers’ views on how the industry should generate profits from 
player-populations. 
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creativity and contributions. In the context of  the analysis developed in this chapter, this 
overarching question of  how profit is sought resolves itself  into two specific questions, with 
the former emerging out of  the discussions contained within section one, and the latter 
deriving from section two. These questions are: (i) how is (qualitative) sociality subjected to 
(quantified) capitalistic valorisation?; and, (ii) can capital capture the value of  sociality in 
general and, regardless of  outcome, how will this be attempted? The first of  these questions 
is centred around a consideration of  what, in Marx’s writings, can be summarised as the 
relations between the qualitative and quantitative dimensions of  production (Rubin, 2010) 
and, furthermore, the ways in which the former is accounted for and translated into 
economic value. Following on from this, the second of  these questions is framed around a 
more direct consideration of  the aforementioned problem of  the incommensurability of  
sociality and, more generally, how capitalistic valorisation processes adapt and change over 
time; ultimately, this directs the overall trajectory of  this chapter back to the social factory 
thesis as a theory of  the adaptability of  capitalistic valorisation processes.  
 In the final section of  this chapter I shall provide an outline of  the agenda and aims 
of  the following investigation into the video-games industry. From here, I shall draw together 
the theory and considerations outlined up to this point into a formulation of  the core set of  
research questions that underpin this investigation into the political economy of  the video-
games industry. Furthermore, this section shall outline the concrete aims and methodological 
approaches adopted in order to construct a case study with the overall objective of  
investigating the history, development and current transformations of  the video-games 
industry’s commercial valorisation processes. To achieve this a further refining of  the core 
theoretical research questions arrived at in the second section shall be undertaken, followed 
by a an overview and clarification of  the direction and explicit purpose of  the investigation 
both theoretically, and empirically. At this juncture I shall also provide important details on 
the research process, the collection and types of  data consulted, and the ways in which these 
were interrogated and put to use in an attempt to begin moving toward a critique of the 
political economy of  one of  the twenty-first century’s fastest growing and most profitable 
new media entertainment industries. 
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3.1 — Labour and Value in General: Marx’s Formulation of  the Qualitative and 
Quantitative  Dimensions of  Production 
It is particularly revealing that Marx’s analysis of  labour begins with a multidimensional theory 
of  value, with the most widely-known discussion of  this being chapter one of  Capital 
(volume one) where Marx details his schematic overview of  the underlying relations between 
the dimensions of  value and the labour embodied within commodities (see: Marx, 1983: 
43-88). Drawing upon this initial formulation found within Capital and key passages within 
the Grundrisse, the following shall discuss the social relations of  production and the role of  
abstractions about such social relations in the organisation and transformation of  what Marx 
refers to as ‘labour as capacity’ into ‘labour as a value-positing activity’ (Marx, 1973: 272-274). 
The passages within the Grundrisse that are of  import to this discussion are those pertaining 
to the concept of  ‘labour power’ and its modification into a ‘value-positing activity’ (see 
Marx, 1973: 272-274, 282-283 and 293-294). Overall, what I want to demonstrate with the 
following is that this core element of  Marx’s theory of  the qualitative and quantitative relations 
between labour and value provides a foundational springboard for considering and further 
elaborating upon the machinations and underpinnings of  the social factory logic as a complex 
of  contemporary capitalistic processes wherein aspects of  everyday social life are — and are becoming — 
valorised. More specifically, I want to draw attention to a particular set of  relations between the 
quantitive and qualitative dimensions of  production, whilst at the same time draw attention 
away from a particular set of  interpretations that have emerged out of  Marx’s theory of  value 
regarding the value-form, the centrality of  commodity fetishism (Rubin, 2010), and value as a 
form of  social mediation (Postone, 2003, 2004) — to this end, the following shall discuss 
elements of  these interpretations, primarily due to their focus upon the distinction between 
the quantitative and qualitative dimensions of  value in Marx’s writings. Nevertheless, I want 
to stress at this juncture that my aim in what follows is not to outline and adopt a novel or 
metaphysical theory of  value as a mediating force over the social. Rather, my aim is simply to 
highlight that contained within Marx’s work is a nuanced and fruitful distinction between the 
social relations of  working life and the systems of  abstractions about such social relations 
that constitute a core element of  capitalistic valorisation processes.   
 As such, I do not intend on putting forth any form of  exegetical analysis of  my own 
on Marx’s work. Instead, I shall begin with some of  the most well-known aspects of  Marx’s 
writings on production, labour, and value before moving to discuss a particular set of  points 
outlined by writers such as Isaak Rubin (2010) and Moishe Postone (2003) regarding the 
importance of  understanding Marx’s work as a ‘social analysis of  production’ focused upon 
the social relations that underpin capitalistic production processes. Alongside this, I shall 
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endeavour as far as possible to signpost points of  departure where these further develop their 
readings of  Marx’s social analysis into theoretical discussions regarding commodity fetishism 
and value as a social mediation force. This is an avenue of  analysis that I do not intend to 
follow beyond the discussion here of  Marx’s formulation of  the quantitative and qualitative 
dimensions of  production as it inevitability leads to a need to address questions regarding 
reification, embodiment, mystification and the metaphysical nature of  value as a social force 
in its own right. What I am intending to achieve here is much less concerned with processes 
of  mystification that can be gleaned from a reading of  Marx’s discussions on exchange value 
and commodity fetishism — much of  which has been a preoccupation within Frankfurt 
School writings such as Adorno’s essay On the Fetish Character in Music and the Regression of  
Listening (Adorno, 1998), and the discussion of  the fetish character of  the commodity and 
alienation found within Adorno’s The Culture Industry (Adorno, 2001: 38-39) — and more 
concerned with outlining how Marx’s conception of  production is founded upon an 
understanding of  the ways in which the qualitative capacities and co-operative social relations 
of  labour are operationalised as a source of  value. 
  
3.1.1 — Concrete and Abstract Labour: Marx’s Theory of  Labour as a Value Positing Activity 
There are many possible starting points for understanding Marx’s theory value and its 
attendant constellation of  concepts — use-value, labour-value, surplus-value and so on — yet 
this is not where he himself  began his analysis of  capital. Instead, Marx begins with an 
analysis of  commodities, through which he proceeds to develop a plethora of  labour and 
value-related concepts — the most widely-known and interpreted being his analysis of  the 
‘two-fold character of  the labour embodied in commodities’ where he details the difference 
between ‘use-value’ and ‘exchange-value’ (Marx, 1983: 48-53), which, importantly, map 
directly onto the distinction between ‘concrete’ and ‘abstract’ labour as ‘one of  the central 
points of  Marx’s theory of  value’ (Rubin, 2010: 131). In short, what Marx attempts to 
demonstrate with these concepts is that within the most visible and tangible form of  society’s 
wealth one can begin to reveal the complex relations of  production in a capitalist society. The 
commodity, for Marx (1977), was the opening into which a critique of  the social relations of  
capitalist production could enter and begin unravelling the complex connexions between the 
qualitative (concrete) processes of  production and the abstract means and methods through 
which these become value-creating for and generative of  capital.  
 Use-value in Marx’s opening analysis, denotes the basic characteristic of  commodities 
— that they ‘serve definite social needs and therefore exist within a social framework … [but] 
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… they do not express the social relations of  production’ (1977: 28). The first part of  this 
appears for Marx to be common sense, but the second postulation is particularly important as 
Marx makes reference to one of  his most debated and discussed concepts (see: Becker, 1977: 
19-39) — the social relations of  production. This is a particularly difficult concept to fully pin-
down within Marx’s own writing, as Postone (2003) observes, but its importance for 
understanding the purpose of  Marx’s lengthy discussions on commodities, labour, and value is 
far-reaching. From use-value, Marx then proceeds to intimate what is implied by this notion 
of  the social relations of  production by emphasising that: ‘As objectification of  social labour, 
all commodities are crystallisations of  the same substance’ (Marx, 1977: 29). What Marx is 
suggesting here is that, although it may seem on the surface level that say, a coat and a pen, 
are fundamentally different, there is in fact something that they both share in common — 
exchange-value, which is itself  an expression of  one of  the most important abstractions 
throughout Marx’s analysis, ‘labour-time’ (1983): ‘[r]egarded as exchange-values all 
commodities are merely definite quantities of  congealed labour-time’ (Marx, 1977: 30). It is 
already clear here that Marx’s theory of  value is intricately bound up within an expanding 
constellation of  concepts — labour, exchange, time and so on. Nevertheless, of  significance 
here is the connexion Marx establishes between the two-fold character of  the value of  
commodities (use-value and exchange-value) and the two-fold character of  the labour 
embodied within them (concrete labour and abstract labour).  
 An important point to emphasise here is the direct connection Marx establishes 
between (exchange-)value and time through the concept of  labour. For Marx, there is clearly a 
great range of  qualitatively different forms of  concrete labour that produce differing use-
values: yet how are they are rendered homogeneous and equalised so that one qualitative 
labour process may be quantitatively exchanged with another?  Put another way, in the 
Grundrisse Marx postulates this problem as one of  the need to distinguish between the 
capacities and capabilities of  the worker (or ‘labour as subjectivity’), and ‘objectified labour’ that 
is value-creating and productive for capital (Marx, 1973). The key to understanding this 
problem, according to Marx, is the distinction between concrete and abstract labour, for 
which the concept of  time is of  paramount importance: ‘[r]egarded as exchange-values all 
commodities are merely definite quantities of  congealed labour-time’ (Marx, 1977: 30). Labour 
time was, for Marx, the primary means through which the labouring capacities and qualities of  
workers came into a direct relation with capital as ‘[t]he use-value which confronts capital as 
posited exchange value is labour’ [original emphases] (Marx, 1973: 274), and that this relation 
is characterised by a form of  ‘exchange between capital and labour’ (Marx, 1973: 274). On the 
one hand workers sell their commodity, labour, ‘which has a use value, and as a commodity, 
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also a price, like all other commodities, for a specific sum of  exchange values, specific sum of  
money, which capital concedes’ (Marx, 1973: 274); on the other, ‘[t]he capitalist obtains labour 
itself, labour as value-positing activity, as productive labour; i.e. he obtains the productive 
force which maintains and multiplies capital’ (Marx,1973: 274). This exchange between capital 
and labour that transforms the labouring capacities and social qualities of  workers (as a 
workforce, a working population) into a value positing activity is, as Marx indicates, founded 
upon an exchange of  money (a specific sum of  exchange values) for a selling of  ones labour as 
a commodity — the calculation of  this sum of  money being itself  founded upon an abstract 
notion of  labour in general as a productive and value positing force that can be equalised, 
measured and calculated in terms of  time, hence labour time.   
 From this Marx explains that there is a general and abstract form of  labour in capitalist 
society that is revealed by the observation that commodities are made exchangeable and 
therefore of  measure against a common denominator, that there is a means of  quantifying 
and equalising the myriad use-values and products of  labour as a qualitative capacity. This 
abstract form of  labour, Marx (1983) explains, is only graspable if  we consider the problem 
of  how every commodity is capable of  being the measure of  all other commodities — so the 
question becomes, what is it that commodities all have in common. The answer for Marx is, 
of  course, labour since that is the concrete process through which commodities are made in 
everyday social life; the main point that Marx is at pains to point out to us is that this labour 
has been transformed into a particular  yet generalisable form of  measurable value — itself  
expressed in exchange-value — through a process of  abstraction, whereby the specific 
qualities of  ‘labour as subjectivity’ become quantifiable ‘labour in general’ (Marx, 1983). As 
Morini and Fumagalli point out, during the industrial era Marx was observing, the hegemonic 
unit of  measurement of  value was labour time: ‘[m]ore specifically, it was the temporal unit 
of  a day, as proposed by Marx in Das Kapital, marked by a clear distinction between working-
time and non-working time’ (Morini and Fumagalli, 2010: 248).  
 At this point in Marx’s discussion it becomes a little clearer what is meant by the 
‘social relations of  production’ and its connexion to his theory of  labour and value. Through 
the process outlined above, Marx explains that what constitutes a system of  measurable and 
quantifiable exchange for us  in our daily lives in a capitalist society is intricately bound up 
with — and to some extent derived and abstracted from — the relations of  people to the 
productive capacities of  one another. For Marx, this connexion between the qualitative and 
quantitative dimensions of  production leads into a number of  arguments and observations 
about the ways in which the processes involved here are obstructed or veiled in their 
appearance: 
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‘Lastly, it is a characteristic feature of  labour which posits exchange-value that it causes 
the social relations of  individuals to appear in the perverted form of  a social relation 
between things … only the conventions of  our everyday life make it appear 
commonplace and ordinary that social relations of  production should assume the shape 
of  things, so that the relations into which people enter in the course of  their work 
appear as the relations of  things to one another and of  things to people’ (Marx, 1977: 
34).  
From the above, it is clear that Marx is attempting to describe a peculiar and, in his terms, 
perverting process — one in which the productive social relations between individuals come 
to resemble a relationship between things to the extent that the former become ungraspable 
in everyday social life. Although my intention here is far from engaging in debates and 
discussion surrounding the mystifying and veiling properties of  capitalistic processes — 
much of  which has been examined and extrapolated at length through Marx’s theory of  
commodity fetishism by scholars such as Adorno (1998, 2001) and Rubin (2010) — an 
interesting characteristic of  the above quotation that I want to call attention to here, however, 
is the emphasis Marx places upon the relations into which people enter in the course of  their 
work.The more general point to make about this transformative process Marx’s outlines 
above, is that value is considered to be an expression of  social relations between individuals. In 
the above passage, exchange-value embodied in commodities is described as a “perverting” 
mediator of  the qualitative social relations between productive individuals, but note that Marx 
specifically formulates this transformative process with reference to ‘labour that posits 
exchange-value’, which, as I have indicated hitherto, constitutes abstract general labour, or, 
labour measured, quantified and equalised in terms of  time. In other words, it is clear to see 
here that the above passage from Capital refers directly to the overall connexion Marx 
establishes between the qualitative and quantitative dimensions of  production — the former 
being “the relations into which people enter in the course of  their work” and the latter being 
“labour which posits exchange value”. The crux of  the point I am heading toward here is that 
Marx’s formulation of  observations regarding the connexion between labour and value in 
capitalist society has, at its core, a relational distinction between (i) labour and value as general 
characteristics of  the social relations between people, and (ii) particular abstract forms of labour and value as 
characteristics of  capitalism. As has been demonstrated thus far, the connexion between these 
two ways Marx describes labour and value is one of  critical importance to his formulation of  
a general theory of  value that specifically avoids treating it as a category of  pricing and 
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exchange. This interpretation of  Marx’s categories of  value I am intimating toward is 
elucidated at great length by Isaak Rubin (2010). 
 For Rubin, it is crucial to point out that Marx did not treat value as a category of  
capitalist exchange in the first and last instance, but that he ‘had in mind an opponent who 
wanted to show that nothing exists except relative exchange values … This opponent was 
[Samuel] Bailey’ [original parentheses] (Rubin, 2010: 108). Rubin’s exegesis on this topic and 
its ramifications for understanding Marx’s theory of  value is multifaceted to say the least, so I 
shall attempt to point to the most pertinent aspects regarding labour and value as general 
expressions of  social relations and how these are related to what Marx identified as the 
particular abstract forms that arise in a capitalist system of  production.. Firstly, Rubin 
explains, Marx had to demonstrate, somehow, that ‘value must be revealed behind exchange 
value’ (2010: 109). To show this, Rubin explains that a key element of  Marx’s theory of  value 
was to show that it had qualitative and quantitative dimensions, and that the former of  these 
is often neglected in favour of  a focus upon calculation of  exchange-values and, thereby, 
prices (Rubin 2010). Moreover, Rubin emphasises on multiple occasions that one of  the most 
important oversights of  many interpretations of  Marx’s theory of  value is that he does not try 
to differentiate between different types of  value; rather, Marx was solely concerned with 
showing that his ‘subject was the analysis of  one and the same object: value’ (Rubin, 2010: 
112). In other words, despite Marx using a number of  differing terms to describe value — use 
value, exchange value, surplus value etc. — these are all part of  an overall analysis of  ‘value 
and its transformations and mutations throughout the complexity of  a capitalist system of  
production’ (Rubin, 2010: 115). 
 In this regard, an important, though fairly simple observation is made by Rubin 
(2010) — notably, that we must consider the various categories Marx uses to describe value 
and labour as indicating points in the same complex process of  transformation, in which the 
social relations between individuals become increasingly abstracted into particular categories 
and measurements — of  which, labour time is a hallmark example throughout Marx's 
analysis.. In fairly simple terms, there are three dimensions of value, and these appear in the 
following order in Capital: the substance of  value, which is expressed in the use-values 
produced through the labouring capacities of  workers; the magnitude of  value, which, for 
Marx, finds expression in a capitalist system as abstract labour-time; and, finally, the form of  
value, which is expressed in what Marx refers to as the capacity for exchange in general, and 
through which Marx’s theory of  commodity fetishism is fully developed into his critique of  
political economy (Rubin, 2010). Of  these three dimensions, Rubin dedicates considerable 
time to discussing the ‘form’ of  value, since this is the category that he claims political 
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economists of  Marx’s time overlooked, especially in terms of  its qualitative dimension. 
Nevertheless, as stated earlier, it is not my intention here to carry the current analysis of  the 
connexion between the qualitative and quantitative dimension of  production in Marx's work 
over into an exegesis on his theory of  commodity fetishism as the foundation of  the critique 
found within Capital (for a detailed outline of  this see: Rubin, 2010: 5-60) . Rather, the aim 12
thus far has been to demonstrate the importance Marx places upon the connexion between 
qualitative social relations and quantitative abstractions about such social relations within his 
overall analysis of  production within a capitalist system. More specifically, I have endeavoured 
to show the system of  thought and categories Marx works through in order to show how the 
capacities of  working individuals to create qualitatively differing use-value(s) are transformed 
into a general and abstractly equalised form of  labour that, to use Marx's term, ‘posits 
exchange value’ (Marx, 1973: 274). As is becoming clear, many of  Marx's categories for 
describing labour and value map onto this process Marx outlines and the distinct dichotomy 
he establishes between the qualitative and quantitative — indeed, this can be seen in the way 
the terms substance and magnitude of  value map directly onto (i) labour that produces a use value 
and (ii) abstract labour (labour time) that posits exchange value respectively. 
 Here it becomes clear, then, that at the core of  Marx’s critique of  political economy 
lies an observation regarding the valorisation of  multifarious social relations that produce 
use-values into a general system of  exchange — it is, to put it simply, a systematic unfurling by 
Marx of  the ways in which social relations and productive capacities in general become 
exchangeable (or equalised) in general.. To expand upon this: ‘labour which posits exchange-
value’ (Marx, 1977: 34) — founded as it is upon [a] the quantitative abstraction of  labour-as-
capacity-to-produce-use-value into labour time, and [b] the embodiment of  this ‘universal labour-time’ 
in the commodity as ‘exchange-value’ (Marx, 1977) —  is an expression of   the way in which 
qualitative social relations between working individuals are made equivocally exchangeable with 
one another in general through processes of  abstraction, and that this is most easily observed, 
according to Marx, in the buying and selling of  commodities.. This is very different from an 
analytical engagement with understanding what the units of  such systems of  abstraction are 
in the first instance, though Marx did consider this a necessary task of  his critique when he 
 Suffice it to say that, in his analysis Rubin demonstrates that, though they are related, there is a fundamental 12
difference between exchange-value and exchange as the form of  value — the former being an attempt to 
quantitatively measure, whereas the latter refers to a qualitative aspect of  value as it comes to appear to us. Rubin 
further elaborates this by explicitly pointing to what appears to be the subtlest of  differences in Marx’s 
terminology: ‘The social form of  commodities and the form of  value (Wertform), or form of  exchangeability (form der 
Austauschbarkeit) are, thus one and the same’ (2010: 115). This ‘form of  exchangeability’ Marx refers to does not 
refer to exchange-value per se; it refers to a much broader, transformational process whereby social relations between 
individuals take on the appearance of  a general form of  exchangeability — which is the same as, the social relations of  
individuals appear in the perverted form of  a social relation between things.
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set about his analyses of  surplus value and its particular forms (Rubin, 2010).Instead, it is 
Marx’s attempt to describe how abstractions about the comings and goings of  social life play 
a crucial role in the transformation and (re)organisation of  production that is of  import here; 
how, for example, labour time became the organising principle of  everyday working life and 
was expressed in terms of  hours, days, weeks and wages. Moreover, it is particularly revealing 
that at the foundation of  the theory of  labour and value outlined thus far lies a preoccupation 
with understanding the organisation of  capitalistic production through a framework that 
treats the problem of  “how the qualitative is quantified” as both central, and revealing in 
terms of  the processes and conceptual relations it opens onto. As has been demonstrated 
thus far, Marx’s theory of  labour and value is, in the first instance, a social theory of  
production that not only addresses the ways in which capitalistic economic life is founded 
upon labour as subjective capacities, but also the ways in which economic thought (abstraction) 
plays a pivotal role in the organisation/orientation of  such labour into a standardised value 
positing activity that, to use Marx’s terms, constitutes ‘the productive force that maintains and 
multiplies capital’ (1973: 274). The importance of  this aspect of  Marx’s work to his overall 
critique of  Capital is highlighted by Jean Baudrillard, who recognised this as the task of  
‘unmasking the “dialectic” of  quantity and quality, behind which hides the definitive structural 
institution of  the field of  value’ (1975: 25). 
3.1.2 —Surplus Value and Cooperation: the ‘Problem of  Profit’ and the Productive Power of  Labour 
A particular aspect of  Marx’s theory of  value that is examined at great length in volume one 
of  Capital (Marx, 1983) is his theory of  surplus value. At the outset it is worth noting that 
throughout the section of  Capital dedicated to surplus value Marx attributes a great deal of  
importance to the concept of  labour power as a means of  denoting what I referred to above 
as the subjective capacities of  workers which, when set in motion as a value positing activity 
for capital, becomes ‘labour power in action, a labourer’ (Marx, 1983: 173). Indeed, it is 
particularly telling that the section dedicated to surplus value begins with a detailed outline of  
the transition labour undergoes from a use value creating process to a ‘process by which the 
capitalist consumes labour power’ (Marx, 1983: 180) as a means of  obtaining a further 
dimension of  value — surplus. As shall be demonstrated throughout this section, the 
connexion between labour and value examined so far — that is, the between labour and use 
value(s) as fundamentally qualitative dimensions of  social relations and the ways in which 
these obtain quantified counterparts in a capitalist system of  production —  is brought 
forward and expanded in greater detail through Marx’s theory of  surplus value as he proceeds 
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to outline the creation of  a specific type of  value that is at the core of  the exploitative character of  
capitalist production.  
 Marx begins his analysis of  surplus value by identifying the first of  what he outlines 
as the two forms through which it can be understood; the first of  these being the production 
of  absolute surplus value. What is particularly striking at this point in Marx’s analysis is the 
way in which he begins with a detailed description of  the labour process as a fundamentally 
qualitative process of  creativity and application of  capacities, before he then moves to discuss 
how: ‘[t]he labour process … [is] turned into the process by which the capitalist consumes 
labour-power’ (Marx, 1983: 180). From here, Marx clearly explains that: 
‘We have now to consider this labour under a very different aspect from that which it 
had during the labour-process; there, we viewed it solely as the particular kind of  human 
activity which changes cotton into yarn; … Here, on the contrary, where we consider the 
labour of  the spinner only in so far as it is value-creating, i.e., a source of  value, his 
labour differs in no respect from the labour of  the man who bores cannon … Here, we 
have nothing more to do with the quality, the nature and the specific character of  the 
labour, but merely with its quantity’ [emphases added] (Marx, 1983: 183-184).    
From this quote — and considering the above outline of  what I have hitherto referred to as 
Marx’s formulation of  the qualitative and quantitative dimensions of  production — it is clear 
that, from the outset, Marx’s theory of  surplus value is intended as a direct continuation of  
his theoretical distinction between concrete and abstract labour, use value and exchange value, 
and the role of  labour time as an equalising abstraction that posits labour as a value-creating 
activity. As the above quote indicates, however, this continuation of  Marx’s analysis moves 
away from a joint consideration of  the qualitative and quantitative dimensions of  labour and 
value to a prioritisation of  providing more detail on the latter — in short, Marx moves to 
provide a systematic analysis of  what happens to labour when it becomes a value positing 
activity for capital that is set in motion as an abstract and equalised measure of  labour time. 
Indeed, the foundation of  this analysis of  absolute surplus value rests heavily upon the way in 
which, as Marx foresaw it, definite quantities of  product (commodities) come to represent 
nothing but definite quantities of  labour, that is ‘definite masses of  crystallised labour-
time’ (Marx, 1983: 184).  
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 The central problem that Marx put forward in his initial formulation of  the 
production of  absolute surplus value takes this consideration of  abstract labour time and the 
way in which it is embodied within commodities as a starting point for a further 
consideration: how can a commodity, which possesses a specific use-value and a general 
exchange value, become a source of  more value than the constituent components involved in 
its creation? For Marx, this problem is confined to the relation between capital and labour 
power and the way in which the latter becomes the origin point of  a commodity being ‘a 
source not only of  value, but of  more value than it has itself ’ (Marx, 1983: 188). This creation of  more 
value (surplus) than has been invested in the creation of  a given commodity is, for Marx, 
something which is confined entirely to the sphere of  production, where the labour power 
and capacities of  workers are combined with the necessary materials to convert ‘value, i.e., 
past, materialised, and dead labour into capital, into value big with value’ (Marx, 1983: 189). 
 This attribute of  labour power as the source of  commodities becoming generative of  
surplus  value beyond that which was required in their creation is of  central importance to the 
way in which Marx considers the process of  creating surplus value as a continuation — rather 
than a transformation — of  the production of  value examined so far. For Marx, the creation 
of  surplus value is nothing more than a continuation of  the process of  producing value (use 
value to exchange value) beyond a definite point (Marx 1983). As Marx elaborates:  
‘If  on the one hand the process not be carried beyond the point, where the value paid by 
the capitalist for labour-power is replaced by an exact equivalent, it is simply a process of  
producing value; if, on the other hand, it continued beyond that point, it becomes a 
process of  creating surplus value’ (1983: 189-190).       
Initially, this definite point at which the creation of  value becomes a generation of  surplus 
value is not clearly defined. However, Marx goes on to explain that the generation of  absolute 
surplus value — and the definite point at which this comes to pass from the general process 
of  creating value — is merely a question of  the time occupied by labour-power in doing the 
work necessary to produce a definite quantity of  commodities; that is, ‘of  the period during 
which the labour-power is usefully expended’ (Marx, 1983: 190). In other words, we return 
once again to the concept of  labour time and the importance of  this quantitative measure to 
the process of  capitalist production — of  producing capital. However, it is important to 
point out here that the point at which the creation of  value becomes generative of  absolute 
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surplus value rests, according to Marx, on a quantitative excess of  labour, ‘from a 
lengthening-out of  one and the same labour-process’ (Marx, 1983: 192) so that the expended 
labour power producing commodities is elongated, expended in excess; more time spent 
labouring in a given accounting period of  paid for labour power brings about a greater 
generation of  surplus value extracted from that labour power. Nevertheless, the main point 
of  significance here is the way in which Marx attributes, once again, a foundational 
importance to the role of  time as a quantitative measure of  labour and the value it produces. 
Indeed, it is particularly telling that Marx’s calculations of  the degree of  exploitation of  
labour power — or, the rate of  absolute surplus value — is primarily preoccupied with 
revealing the ways in which the expenditure of  labour power over the course of  a working 
day is both generative of  absolute surplus value and a site of  contestation with regards to the 
number of  hours it contains; that the determination of  “what is a working day” constitutes a 
focal point through which the means and quantitative calculations of  how surplus value is 
created are most easily observed. It is at this point in Marx’s analysis that the overarching 
problem of  how to generate profit becomes clearly placed at the centre of  his conceptual 
outlining of  the ways in which labour and value are subjected to systems of  quantified 
measure and abstraction. The generation of  absolute surplus value, as has been shown above, 
rests heavily upon the attribution of  quantified units of  measure of  the time taken by labour 
power to produce definite quantities of  product; and that this time must be elongated and 
applied in excess if  the rate of  surplus value is to be increased, given that the necessary labour 
time required to produce is constant and the length of  the working day is variable (Marx, 
1983). An important corollary of  this formulation of  the generation of  surplus value is that 
of  a distinction between necessary labour — that required to produce value equivalent to that 
expended on production — and the surplus labour remaining in a given working day beyond 
the point of  the former.  
The second form of  surplus value that Marx proceeds to discuss that is of  critical importance 
to his overall theory of  the exploitation of  labour power — that is, the labouring capacities 
of  workers. Up to this point of  consideration, the rate of  surplus value depended on the 
magnitude of  the prolongation of  the length of  the working day beyond the necessary labour 
time required for the generated value to be equivalent to expenditure on production. 
However, Marx poses yet another problem for consideration with regards to the generation 
of  surplus value beyond that which can be obtained by prolonging the working day — he 
poses, as it were, another problem of  how to a capitalist system of  production can generate 
capital, a ‘problem of  profit’. Denoting the portion of  the working day that falls beyond the 
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point of  necessary production as c, Marx asks: ‘How can the production of  surplus-value be 
increased, i.e., how can the surplus-labour be prolonged, without, or independently of, any 
prolongation of  c?’ (1983: 296).   
 The answer to this problem, as Marx saw it in his time, was made feasible via three 
possible means. The first of  these being a decrease in the wages provided to labourers for 
their expenditure of  their labour power; whilst the second means of  increasing the 
production of  surplus value lay in the reduction of  the costs of  goods required for the 
application of  labour power in processes of  production. Yet, these two means of  increasing 
the surplus yielded from a single working day can only be implemented up to definite points, 
beyond which either labour power becomes unsustainable through a continuous reduction in 
means of  subsistence (reduction in wages), or the production of  commodities becomes 
inhibited through a lack of  cheaper available resources to those currently in use. It is the third 
means of  acquiring and increasing relative surplus value to which Marx pays particular 
attention, and, for the purposes of  this investigation, are of  great significance to the 
following section of  this chapter on cooperation and the sociality of  production. 
 Given that the prolongation of  the working day is the means through which absolute 
surplus value is made possible, Marx explains that the only way to further transfer portions of  
this given period — be it 6, 9 or 12 hours etc. — over from the necessary labour required to 
meet expenditures on production to surplus labour time is to increase the productivity of  
labour. In Marx’s terms ‘[g]iven the length of  the working day, the prolongation of  the 
surplus-labour must of  necessity originate in the curtailment of  necessary labour-time’ (Marx, 
1983: 298). To explain this, Marx goes on to demonstrate that surplus labour time can be 
increased if  the intensity — and hence productivity, from the perspective of  capital — of  the 
labour process is increased then there will be a corresponding reduction in the necessary 
labour time required to meet expenditures on production and a corresponding increase in the 
quantity surplus labour-time throughout the working day. At this juncture a key insight comes 
to the fore that ties more directly into the overall understanding of  the adaptability of  
capitalistic valorisation processes that Marx’s analysis drives toward: that for this increase in 
the productivity of  labour to be achieved ‘the conditions of  production, i.e., his … [the 
labourers] … mode of  production, and the labour-process itself, must be 
revolutionised’ (Marx, 1983: 298). To understand this process, Marx explains that it cannot be 
the prerogative of  capital to simply prolong a given and absolute process of  production, but 
that the technical and social conditions (Marx, 1983) of  this process must be revolutionised and 
recreated ad infinatum in accordance with the seeking out of  greater rates of  surplus value. 
The significance of  this observation, as shall become clear, lies in the connexion that is made 
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here by Marx between what I have outlined above as the abstract properties attributed to 
qualitative labour processes and use-value(s) as quantified labour time and exchange-value 
(what Marx calls ‘the law of  the determination of  value by labour-time), and the means 
through which such qualitative processes can be modified and revolutionised in order to 
increase the quantity of  surplus-value they give rise to. For Marx, it is the pivotal role that the 
abstract notion of  labour time plays here in defining the limits of  capitalist production 
processes, and how these can be overcome through increases in measured productivity, that is of  
particular significance to understanding the generation of  relative surplus value. In order to 
contextualise and make sense of  the notion of  increases in productivity through a 
revolutionisation of  the technical and social conditions of  production, Marx then moves to 
discuss the role and value of  cooperation. 
 The theory of  surplus value discussed so far has detailed the ways in which the 
absolute and relative forms derive from calculative processes regarding the length of  working 
periods, expenditures, and the productivity of  labour. However, in order to elucidate the latter 
of  these processes and demonstrate exactly what is meant by a revolutionisation of  the 
technical and social conditions of  production, Marx moves to explain the importance of  
considering how capitalist production — and, more specifically, the creation of  surplus value 
— can only be understood if  we take into account the comparatively large numbers of  
workers involved in the labour process considered as a whole; that is, ‘when consequently the 
labour-process is carried on on an extensive scale and yields, relatively, large quantities of  
products’ (Marx, 1983: 305). Taking this into account, and considering the vast quantities of  
production and labour processes involved, Marx points out that a previously unconsidered 
source of  the aforementioned desire to increase productivity comes to light: the cooperative 
capacities of  labour power. For Marx, when numerous labourers work together in either one 
and the same process, or different but connected processes — that is, when workers work in 
co-operation — they give rise to a capacity to carry out labour that would be previously 
impossible, or, at least, only possible through a great expenditure of  time on the part of  a few 
labourers. As Marx puts it:  
‘[T]he effect of  combined labour could either not be produced at all by isolated 
individual labour, or it could only be produced by a great expenditure of  time, or on a 
very dwarfed scale. Not only do we have here an increase in the productive power of  the 
individual, by means of  cooperation, but the creation of  a new power, namely, the 
collective power of  the masses’ (Marx, 1983: 308-309).   
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A further connexion is established here between this collective power of  the masses and the 
generation of  surplus value through a revolutionising of  the social conditions of  production. 
As the above quotation demonstrates, it is of  great significance that the cooperative capacities 
of  workers en masse enables a greater efficiency in the work to be done — what is referred to 
above as “the effect of  combined labour”.  
 The significance of  this effect is highlighted by Marx in his description of  how a 
complicated labour process, if  it is carried out by a greater number of  cooperative labourers 
apportioned to different but connected operations, can be shortened in terms of  the labour-
time required to complete it (Marx, 1983). Through this, the cooperative capacities of  labour 
power can be understood to not only increase the efficiency of  the labour process in general, 
but also to simultaneously shorten — or, to use Marx’s term, truncate — the necessary labour 
time required to complete a task and increase the amount of  surplus labour time contained 
within a working day without the need to extend its duration in absolute terms (Marx, 1983). 
Rather, this capacity of  cooperative labour power is a means through which the productivity 
of  a given working day can be increased in relative terms — that is, generative of  surplus 
value. As Marx goes on to further explain, a single labourer cannot carve a working day of  
more than, say twelve hours, out of  a single twenty-four hour period; on the other hand, one 
hundred workers cooperating over a twelve hour period extends the overall duration of  the 
working day to one thousand two hundred hours. What we are confronted with then becomes 
what Marx calls ‘numerous combined working days’ (1983: 310) that produce, ‘relatively to an 
equal sum of  isolated working-days, a greater quantity of  use-values, and, consequently, 
diminishes the labour time necessary for the production of  a given useful effect’ (1983: 311).   
 We can see here that what Marx is pointing toward is not a specific calculation of  
surplus value or of  the labour time required to complete certain tasks; rather, Marx is 
pointing toward a general capacity of  cooperation as a qualitative attribute of  the sociality of  
labourers that, when considered within the framework of  an abstract system of  capitalist 
production, plays a pivotal role in the generative capacities of  labour power (more specifically 
‘co-operative labour power’) to create relative amounts, or quantities, of  surplus value — for 
Marx, this is, quite simply, a foundational element in a process whereby capitalist production 
acquires an increased productive power through the labour power (1983). The special 
productive power of  the combined working day as I have outlined it above is, according to 
Marx, ‘under all circumstances, the social productive power of  labour, or the productive power 
of  social labour. This power is due to co-operation itself ’ [emphases added] (Marx, 1983: 312). 
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In the industrial era Marx observed, the number of  co-operative labourers, or the scale of  
cooperation, depended primarily upon the amount of  capital that could be spared for the 
purchase of  labour power; that is, it depended on the quantity of  waged-labour employed in 
the process of  production — what Marx called the ‘material condition for the co-operation 
of  wage labourers’ (1983: 312). This is a crucially important point to bear in mind throughout 
the course of  this investigation as it lies at the very core of  how the theory outlined up to this 
point leads onto a revisiting of  the social factory thesis and sympathetic cooperation as a 
theory of  the adaptability of  capitalist valorisation processes. Indeed, as has been pointed out by a 
number of  theorists preoccupied with understanding recent changes and adaptations of  
capital, the labour-time/wage-labour relation upon which this system of  surplus value 
generation rests is — and has been — noticeably diminishing as the hegemonic organising 
principle of  capitalist production (see for example: Gorz, 1999: 88-93; Vercellone, 2010).  
 Nevertheless, my aim in pointing to this section of  the theory of  surplus value 
dedicated to cooperation has been to demonstrate — in keeping with the aims of  the above 
discussion on the qualitative and quantitative dimensions of  labour and value — that a central 
tenet of  Marx’s overall theory of  capitalist production rests upon a detailing of  the ways in 
which the capacities of  workers (considered either as individuals or, more importantly, as a 
social collective) are abstracted into general forms, labour time and exchange-value, that 
consequently provide the basis for a calculable and adaptive system of  value-creation beyond 
that which is necessary to reproduce or replicate it. Moreover, a crucial component in this 
theory is Marx’s emphasis on cooperation as a foundational basis for the ‘conversion of  
numerous isolated and independent processes into one combined social process’ (Marx, 1983: 
312-313). The centrality of  this social process to emphasised clearly by Marx when he states 
that: [h]ence, the productive power developed by the labourer when working in co-operation, 
is the productive power of  capital’ [emphasis added] (1983: 315). Clearly, then, social 
cooperation for Marx lies at the very core of  the productivity of  economic life and it is this 
seemingly qualitative attribute of  people brought together into a process of  production that forms 
one of  — if  not the — cornerstones of  value-creation for capital (that is, surplus value). 
Indeed, ‘[b]ecause this power costs capital nothing … it appears as a power with which capital 
is endowed by Nature — a productive power that is immanent in capital’ (Marx, 1983: 315).  
 Bringing this consideration of  cooperation back to bear upon the specific problem of  
surplus value outlined hitherto, Marx reiterates that the transformation of  the labour-process 
into a mass social process forms the method employed by capital for the more profitable 
exploitation of  labour; and that this is achieved precisely through the increase in labour’s 
productiveness that social cooperation — considered on an increasingly mass scale — brings 
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about (Marx, 1983). So, it is clear to see then that, for Marx, cooperation between labourers 
— that is, the social relations into which they enter as labour-power made productive for capital — 
forms the basis of  not only the mode through which capitalist production operates, but also 
the adaptability of  this process as it reforms and converts the social conditions of  
production. As a final point, and to reiterate, Marx postulates in the Grundrisse that: ‘it is, in a 
word, the development of  the social individual which appears as the great foundation-stone of  
production and of  wealth’ (1973: 705).  
What I have attempted to demonstrate in the above discussion thus far is that a general tenet 
of  Marx’s theory on the qualitative and quantitative dimensions of  production is, firstly, that 
labour and value are intricately connected within and across both of  these dimensions. 
Further, I have highlighted the importance Marx places upon the way in which labour and the 
use-value it produces takes on an abstract general form in a capitalist system of  production 
where productivity — in Marx’s time of  writing — is subjected to means of  measure and 
calculation in terms of  time, hence labour-time. Secondly, I have attempted to show that 
Marx’s theory of  absolute and relative surplus value is a direct continuation of  his theory of  
the qualitative and quantitative dimensions of  production that moves to demonstrate the way 
in which the abstract forms of  labour(-time), (exchange-)value, and productivity  play a 
crucial role in the organisation and exploitation of  labour power and its cooperative capacities 
— this point was emphasised above through a discussion of  Marx’s treatment of  the working 
day. A general, yet highly significant point to emerge from this was the way in which an 
understanding of  surplus value and the exploitation of  labour power was presented by Marx 
as a problem that can be overcome through various means. This problematising of  the way in 
which a capitalist system of  production seeks out surplus value was framed in terms of  “how 
to increase productivity” in Marx’s analysis, at which point the notion of  cooperation became 
a central explanatory device. Social cooperation, for Marx, constitutes a central organising 
principle upon which the productivity and adaptability of  surplus value creation rests — 
cooperation, in Marx’s terms, ‘ever constitutes the fundamental form of  the capitalist mode 
of  production’ (1983: 317). 
 To sum up, from the above two general points become evidently clear; and from 
which the following section shall orientate. The first of  these is the way in which Marx moves 
from a discussion of  the ways in which labour and value take on general abstract forms in a 
capitalist system of  production, to a more specified detailing of  the role such abstractions 
play in the problem of  “how to increase productivity”, “how to generate surplus” — that is, 
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the problem of  “how to profit ”. The second point, which is in no way separated or distinct 13
from the former, relates to the primacy Marx places upon the role of  social cooperation as a 
foundational basis upon which such productivity can be increased; this was detailed through a 
reading of  how a given labour process, or processes, can be increased through a 
multiplication of  simultaneous, cooperative working days. The importance placed upon the 
role of  social cooperation and the problem of  “how to profit” are central preoccupations of  
the following section, which shall now return to the previously discussed notion of  the social 
factory and a more recent set of  arguments revolving around the notion of  ‘sympathetic 
cooperation’ (Lazzarato, 2008; Terranova, 2009, 2014).  
3.2 — From Social Production to Sympathetic Cooperation: a Return to the Social 
Factory Thesis 
Retaining the above considerations clearly in mind, I want now to turn to a discussion of  the 
contemporary context of  socio-economic production and the previously discussed notion of  
a social factory — or, a factory without walls. As shall become clear, the concepts outlined in 
the above section on Marx’s theory of  the qualitative and quantitative dimensions of  
production, surplus value, and the role of  social cooperation in the productivity of  capitalistic 
production are great significance to current debates addressing changes to labour and value-
creation that have developed in tandem with the proliferation and adoption of  digital/new 
media technologies into various spheres of  everyday social life. In particular, the 
aforementioned emphasis Marx places upon social cooperation in his formulation of  the 
productivity of  capitalist production and surplus value generation is particularly apposite with 
regards to a collection of  literature closely connected to that previously discussed on the 
social factory logic of  contemporary capitalism — that is, a currently emerging body of  
literature on social or ‘sympathetic cooperation’. 
 However, discussion reviving around the social character of  production in todays 
world of  new and digital media networks is not limited to that deriving either directly or in 
relation to Autonomous Marxist writings on the social factory, immaterial labour and the 
general intellect. There is, in fact, a well established area of  literature that seeks to detail the 
ways in which traditional market systems based around the buying and selling of  labour and/
or commodities is currently being challenged by the proliferation of  digital ‘networks of  
 Note here that I am not referring to profit in a specific sense as distinct from interest, ground rent and so on. 13
Rather, I am pointing toward the notion of  profit in general — that is, to gain more from a process than was 
expended on the setting in motion of  said process. 
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social production’ (Benkler, 2006). It is to this literature that I shall now turn before moving 
to discuss the ways in which these socio-economic processes and adaptations are being 
considered through a theoretical lens with questions of  capitalism firmly in view.    
3.2.1 — Social Production: a Prevailing Perspective on the Sociality of  Production Today 
The emergence and proliferation of  digital an new media networks of  information sharing 
and content creation have become the subject of  a great deal of  literature. For example, there 
are those concerned with the legal implications of  free content sharing, user-creativity, and 
copyright issues (Lessig, 2006). One particular area of  literature that has garnered a 
considerable amount of  attention, however, concerns the ways in which computer 
technologies and networked media have radically changed the organisation and processes of  
socio-economic production to such an extent as the render previous understandings of  
labour, value, commodities etc. either completely obsolete, or at the very least highly 
problematic. One such writer in this area is Yochai Bencher who, in his widely cited book The 
Wealth of  Networks: How Social Production Transforms Markets and Freedom, provides a highly 
detailed and systematic analysis of  the ways in which technological developments has brought 
about an era in which we are beginning to see radical changes in the organisation and 
implementation of  socio-economic production (2006). Benkler outlines a number of  key 
interrelated developments in relation to this that all, in his view, have come together to 
transform the ways in which in markets operate and socio-economic processes of  exchange, 
development and production are carried out on a daily basis.  
 The first of  these developments, as Benkler and many other scholars argue, is a move 
away from an economy based on material products and commodities as the hegemonic mode 
of  production, and a trend towards ‘an economy centred on information (financial services, 
accounting, software, science) and cultural (films, music) production, and the manipulation of  
symbols (from making sneakers to branding them and manufacturing the cultural significance 
of  the Swoosh)’ (Benkler, 2006: 3). Benkler, akin to scholars working within the ‘information 
society’ literature outlined in chapter two, refers to this development as the emergence of  the 
‘networked information economy’ (Benkler, 2006), within which we find an increasingly 
complex system of  production founded upon the development and manipulation of  
information that is rapidly displacing the industrial economy thinkers such as Marx observed 
in their day.  
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 The second development Benkler points to in his analysis is the move toward a 
communications environment that is highly accessible, courtesy of  the cheapness and 
availability of  computation capabilities, and that interconnected in a pervasive network of  
connectivity (2006) — in short, what is commonly referred to as the Internet. This second 
development of  particular significance to Benkler and other theorists of  social production as 
it purportedly ‘allows for an increasing role for nonmarket production in the information and 
cultural production sector, organized in a radically more decentralized pattern than was true 
of  this sector in the twentieth century’ (Benkler, 2006: 3). The implications of  such an 
increased role in non-market production are, for thinkers such as Benkler, far reaching and of  
crucial importance to what he refers to as the political connection between an economy of  
networked information and the ethic of  liberal, democratic societies (Benkler, 2006). 
 At this point the role and importance of  social cooperation is emphasised as a 
foundational element of  the hitherto outlined rise of  “new” a socio-economic mode of  
production based upon non-market models of  exchange. For thinkers such as Benkler, what 
characterises the networked information economy is not ownership and propriety over the 
means through which informational goods can be produced, but rather a decentralised 
individual action — ‘specifically, new and important cooperative and coordinate action carried 
out through radically distributed, nonmarket  mechanisms that do not depend on proprietary 
strategies’ (Benkler, 2006: 26) — comes to occupy a central role in the production and 
reproduction of  an economy that is characterised by freely available and open-to-all 
information. This purported negation or shift away from proprietary markets is having, 
according to thinkers such as Benkler (2006) and Leadbeater (2009), a profound effect on the 
political ethos that underpins everyday socio-economic activity. The rise of  effective, large 
scale cooperative efforts to create, say, open-source software such as LINUX, exemplifies 
what is considered to be a democratising ethos that many ‘liberal theorists of  social 
production’ such as Benkler (2006) point toward as a result of  a networked information 
economy founded upon the freely-given and freely-accessible cooperative efforts of  peer 
production. The overall political implications of  this, for Benkler, are the rise of  a socio-
economic system of  production that not only incorporates, but is founded upon an increasingly 
robust ethic of  cooperative open sharing that forces us think ‘about how individual need and 
creativity drive innovation at the individual level, and its diffusion through networks of  like-
minded individuals’ (Benkler, 2006: 5). 
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Although this perspective emphasises the important and foundational role social cooperation 
plays in processes of  production, there a few points of  critique that come to the fore when 
one considers the further implications of  adopting such a view as a means for understanding 
what is — and, by extension is not — continuous between this “new” and “emerging” logic 
of  socio-economic life and the system of  capitalist production prevalent in the nineteenth 
and twentieth centuries. Are we to assume from the outset that, as Arvidsson suggests, 
‘[s]ocial production has … been greatly empowered, and liberated from direct capitalist 
command’ (2009: 14)? Moreover, and as Arvidsson points out in his critique of  Benkler’s 
liberal perspective on social production, is it really the case that the growth of  social 
production will entail a growing amount of  resources changing hands outside of  market 
mechanisms, and that by definition such resources will be freely available and hence without 
value (Arvidsson, 2009) 
 Another, more in-depth point of  critique is offered up by Terranova (2009) that 
acknowledges the importance liberal theories of  social production such as Benkler’s place 
upon social cooperation, whilst at the same time demonstrating the limits of  this perspective 
in offering up an outline of  a definitive alternative to the kinds of  capitalist market logics it 
purports to provide. For Terranova (2009), it can be argued that liberal theories of  social 
production such as that outlined by Benkler do not offer up an alternative logic of  
production to those characterised by capitalist markets, and that this can be demonstrated 
through the way in which it does not significantly break with the overall economic rationality 
profitable productivity. Even if  we take it as a given that non-market production is based 
upon social cooperation, Terranova argues that is still becomes economically effective — it 
still becomes endowed with the status of  an economic phenomenon — because ‘it increases 
the overall productivity in the sectors where it is effective . . . and presents new sources of  
competition to incumbents that produce information goods for which there are now socially 
produced substitutes’ (Benkler, 2006: 122, quoted in Terranova, 2009: 252). As such, it would 
seem plausible to suggest that social cooperation — as a productive force — ‘would thus 
simply correct some inefficiencies inherent in the mechanisms of  economic competition, 
satisfy those needs that are not catered for by markets and even feed directly into 
them’ (Terranova, 2009: 252). This point is further expanded by Terranova, who 
demonstrates that social production, as described by thinkers such as Benkler, can become 
measurably effective and thereby acquire the abstract value of  an economic phenomenon ‘only 
as long as it manages to spur innovation and hence competition in the market 
economy’ (Terranova, 2009: 252). This last point os of  particular importance here as it 
provides a basis for suggesting that social production can become, perhaps only in certain 
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instances, subjected to abstract systems of  capitalistic calculation, measure, and thereby 
control — the likes of  which I have endeavoured to outline above through a detailed reading 
of  Marx’s formulation of  the qualitative and quantitative dimensions of  production and the 
generation of  surplus value. In light of  this, it seems apposite to pose the question of  how 
and in what ways can we conceptualise and make sense of  the role social cooperation plays in 
contemporary socio-economic life without abandoning — or, at the very least, diminishing 
— the importance of  querying the ways in which capitalist processes of  valorisation may, or 
may not, be of  significance to such an understanding. Indeed, for Terranova, once passed 
through the ‘reflective prism’ of  political economy, social production ‘seems destined to 
remain subaltern to the logic of  capitalist markets as a whole’ (2009: 252). 
3.2.2 — Sympathetic Cooperation: on the Constituent Powers and Proposed Incommensurability of  the 
Social 
A general theme that has been developing over the course of  this chapter — from the initial 
discussion on Marx’s formulation of  the quantitative and qualitative dimensions of  
production, to the current preoccupation with the notion of  social production — is the 
emphasis placed upon the role of  cooperation in economic production throughout. In the 
previous chapter, I dedicated considerable time to outlining the social factory thesis and its 
merits as a much needed counterpoint to social analyses of  socio-economic change in which 
the question of  capitalism was distinctly lacking. It is to this social factory thesis that I want 
to now return, but in a renewed light: through a focus upon the ways in which the concept of  
cooperation has been recently developed by scholars working within and in dialogue with the 
Autonomous Marxist tradition. In particular, I want to play particular attention to the notion 
of  ‘sympathetic cooperation’ as it as been outlined and discussed by Terranova’s (2009; 2014) 
readings of  Maurizio Lazzarato’s Puissances de l’invention: la psychologie économique de Gabriel Tarde 
contre l’économie politique and Les Revolutions du Capitalism. My overall aim in doing so is to bring 
the current discussion regarding labour, value and social production back to a focus upon the 
social factory thesis as a postulation of  life in general becoming the domain of  capitalistic 
valorisation — albeit with a renewed emphasis on, and elucidation of, the social .  
 The concept of  ‘sympathetic cooperation’, as developed by Lazzarato, denotes not 
only the collaborative and collective efforts of  workers undergoing a labour process; rather, 
what is encapsulated by this term is the autonomous, independent and creative cooperation 
of  people in general as they go about their everyday social lives, and it is this that forms the 
‘premise of  the production economic value and of  the division of  labour’ (Lazzarato, 2002: 8, 
  88
quoted in Terranova, 2009: 252). To further elaborate, the source of  wealth as we understand 
it today is not reducible to land, labour, capital or utility but within invention and association as 
relational properties of  cooperation in general between people. As such, sympathetic 
cooperation forms the basis of  economic value ‘once the latter is understood in terms of  the 
production and diffusion of  the new’ (Terranova, 2009: 252-253). From this perspective, it is 
the emergence of  new economic, social and aesthetic relations that — through cooperative 
associations — forms the basis of  economic value, labour processes and the division of  such 
labour processes. As Terranova points out, it is of  course possible to be caught within a 
division of  labour in the workplace, but this does not negate the possibility of  simultaneously 
being part of  different networks or associations (2009) that are themselves also productive of  
new economic and social relations. Considered in this way, we arrive at a notion of  
cooperation that further expands upon the way in which Marx considered the socially 
cooperative capacities of  labourers to be the foundation of  increases in productivity. Instead 
of  a notion of  cooperation restricted to economic processes of  production and the 
collaborative creation of  use-values, we have here instead a broader notion that treats 
cooperation as the relational basis upon which the general productivity and creativity of  social 
life is founded. As such, the engine of  social production would not lie within the subjective 
interior of  any given individual and their capacities to work but within the in-between of  the 
social relation (Terranova, 2009).  
 Clearly, from the outset, the emphasis of  this notion of  sympathetic cooperation lies 
upon the relational capacities that form and reform social and economic life, that catalyse 
moments of  creation, invention, and diffusion. To consider labour and value through this 
lens allows one to suggest that the production of  economic value in particular does not 
presuppose the optimisation and standardisation of  bodily and mental processes, ‘but the 
invention and diffusion of  new values and new forms of  life’ [emphasis added] (Terranova, 
2009: 254). This notion of  sympathetic cooperation, as Terranova suggests:  
‘appears of  particular value inasmuch as it makes it possible to think of  social co-
operation as the a priori of  all economic processes, rather than one particular form 
among others or an a posteriori reconciliation of  economic and social life. It argues, in 
fact, that economic life cannot be considered as a distinct domain from the social life 
that underlies it’ (2009: 254-255).  
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Inasmuch as this can be placed into juxtaposition with the previously discussed notion of  
cooperation  found in Marx’s own writings, the notion of  sympathetic cooperation makes it 
possible to think of  the productivity of  social life in general — which, here, is indistinguishable 
from economic life — in relational action (Terranova, 2009) and association rather than 
definite and predefined processes of, say labour or consumption. 
 Considering the more specific question of  the current production of  value within 
todays context of  information networks, digital content sharing and user-creativity, the notion 
of  sympathetic cooperation makes it possible to think about economic value as a measure 
that only partially captures the more general processes of  production that unfold in the in-
between of  social relations (Terranova, 2009). Of  crucial importance here being not only the 
the production of  uses — or, utilities in an economic sense —  but also the creation and 
sharing of  common beliefs, desires and affects and so on. The core point that I am aiming 
toward here is that of  an expanded notion of  value that, similarly akin to Marx’s treatment of  
it as retaining both a qualitative and quantitative dimension, treats general sociality between 
people as they build, create and reimagine forms of  life as the foundational element upon 
which defined and distinct forms of  value are made possible. Such an understanding rests 
upon a consideration of  social cooperation ‘as the key mechanism in the production of  as 
value that cannot only be considered abstractly economic — but is inseparable from 
subjective, social values such as truth-values, aesthetic value, utility-values, existential-
values’ (Terranova, 2009: 256). 
 Coupled with the previously outlined social factory thesis — and its attendant 
postulations regarding the ways in which capitalist valorisation processes have come to 
incorporate, or capture, the generality of  social life as a source of  economic value — this notion 
of  sympathetic cooperation provides us with a further refinement of  thinking through what 
is (and perhaps is not) subsumed by capitalism, that is what the sources of  the production of  
value are. As I have previously indicated, the concept of  sympathetic cooperation is, as 
Terranova clarifies, related to the post-workerist assumption that capitalism is forced today to 
incorporate a generalised forms of  social labour into the cycles of  production and value-
creation — cycles which are not confined to a wage-labour relation, but performed by society 
as a whole, as a kind of  social factory (Terranova, 2014). If  we consider sympathetic 
cooperation — as it has hitherto been discussed — as being at the core of  the developments 
that have given rise to the notion of  society becoming a social factory, it becomes evident that 
concerns regarding the character of  labour and the source(s) of  value must be directed at the 
production of  subjectivity; the production of  desires, beliefs, aspirations, knowledges, ways 
of  living and so on. In other words, the notion that we are today witnessing the rise of  a 
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social factory appears in a new light whereby the emphasis on the social denotes the centrality 
of  the ‘constituent powers of  the socius’ for the economic process of  valorisation (Alliez, 
quoted in Terranova, 2014: [online]). Through such an understanding, it becomes possible to 
consider the ways in which the constituent powers of  the social are characterised by a 
sympathetic cooperation that is founded upon the drawing together of  individuals through 
their beliefs, desires and affects. Indeed, individuals are not endowed with a working 
knowledge of  the world; instead, they are predisposed to action within the world through a 
series of  shared and cooperatively produced beliefs and desires. ‘Without this cooperation, 
without the effectuation or actualisation of  a social world, there could be no division of  
labour and no production altogether, because nothing new would be there to be ‘reproduced’ 
’ (Terranova, 2014: [online]).  
 Returning once again the stated issue of  making sense of  what is exploited or 
expropriated by contemporary capitalism — that is, the issue of  what, exactly, are the sources 
of  value within the framework of  understanding contemporary capitalism as a social factory 
— this notion of  sympathetic cooperation and its attention to the role of  beliefs, values and 
worldviews provides us with a renewed point of  focus. It allows us to begin unpicking and 
questioning the ways in which contemporary capitalism is expropriating value from ‘the 
associative dynamics through which individuals … capture each other’s attention, compose 
every-varying new beliefs, desires and forms of  association, and constitute a socius by 
continuously re-actualising the world’s possibilities’ (Terranova, 2014: [online]). That is, we 
can begin questioning the ways in which capital can — and thereby cannot — capture the 
productive powers of  cooperation through methods of  intervention that harness the capacity 
of  such cooperation to produce not just objects or subjects, but worlds to live in (Terranova, 
2014). Through this understanding we are faced with a situation in which the logic of  the 
social factory as an adaptation of  capitalistic valorisation processes does not appear as a singular logic 
to be applied across all of  social life, but rather a logic of  adaptability rooted in the potentialities and 
creative capacities that social cooperation gives ever-renewed rise to. The question now becomes one of  
the way in which capital intervenes to harness the productive powers of  sympathetic 
cooperation and the potentialities it gives rise to. Terranova elucidates this through the 
example of  the smart phone:  
‘[O]ne does not so much use a smart phone, a search engine or a social network, but one 
becomes part of  its constitution – but under the direction and management of  the 
corporation who ‘own’ the operating system, the algorithm or the servers and has 
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control of  the proprietary technology. Cooperation is harnessed by digital media, put to 
work by communicative capitalism (made to adapt to the rhythms of  the post-industrial 
production line, whether by means of  ‘nuggets of  enjoyment’ or the blackmail of  
precarity)’ (Terranova, 2014: [online]). 
Thus far I have only hinted at the ways in which such an understanding of  the productive 
power of  cooperation presents capital with what a number of  writers have described as the 
problem of  incommensurability. For the most part, this proposed problem derives from what 
writers such as Morini and Fumagalli describe as a need, on the hand, for capital to 
accumulate for which the measure of  value is fundamental; on the other hand, there is an 
apparent inability on the part of  capitalistic processes of  valorisation and measure to fully 
realise the value of  subjectivity and cooperation, what they refer to as ‘the potentiality of  the 
subject’ (Morini and Fumagalli, 2010: 236). Because the source of  value and exchange is no 
longer abstract labour in the sense Marx described it — as measurable labour-time — but 
rather the experiential, relational and creative dimensions of  subjectivity, Morini and 
Fumagalli postulate that the production of  wealth is becoming increasingly based on 
‘intangible ‘raw materials’, which are difficult to measure and quantify since they directly result 
from the use of  the relational, emotional and cognitive faculties of  human beings’ (2010: 
235). Indeed, writers such as Andre Gorz also point toward this problem that faces capital as 
it shifts away from a mode of  production founded upon the measure of  labour-time, 
productivity and the wage, and toward an attempted valuation of  intangibles that have their 
root in the capacity of  ‘social individuals’ to make use of  knowledge, information and 
computing power through their own self-organised cooperation (Gorz, 1999).  
 Certain writers operating out of  the Autonomous Marxist school of  thought have 
also pointed to this problem of  the incommensurability of  social production that is 
concomitant to a ‘crisis of  the labour law of  value’ (Vercellone, 2010). What is at stake, 
according to Marazzi, is the current need for capital to search for rules of  social production 
and the measuring unit that defines these rules, much like labour-time and productivity were for 
the industrial model of  capitalist production (2011b). This situation brings capital to a point 
in which the implications concerning ‘the question of  measure’ (Marazzi, 2011b) are of  
paramount concern if  a system of  surplus value accumulation is to be established. As 
subjective difference and the cooperative capacities of  people going about their daily social 
lives become increasingly incorporated into technical systems that attempt to capture their 
value, so too is capital presented with a problem measure. It is, for writers such as Marazzi, 
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the very qualitative processes of  cooperation and creativity that form the basis of  the 
productivity of  social life in general that confront capital ‘with incommensurable criteria of  
valuation’ (2011b: 79). Vercellone provides some further comments of  clarification on this 
point in his description of  the way in which financial markets procure rent: 
Despite the torsion introduced by terms like “intellectual capital”, “intangible capital” or 
“human capital”, such capital is nothing other than collective intelligence. It 
consequently escapes any objective measurement. Its value can’t be anything but the 
subjective expression of  the expectation for future profits effectuated by financial markets 
who procure themselves rent in this way’ [emphases added] (Vercellone, 2010: 110).      
Again we can see here the role attributed to beliefs, desires and subjective values — 
themselves the product of  what has been outlined here as ‘sympathetic cooperation’ — as 
Vercellone refers to the value instantiated by subjective expectations for future profits in 
financial markets.  
 Nevertheless, the overall point I am attempting to demonstrate here is that there is a 
current preoccupation with making sense of  the ways in which the qualitative dimensions of  
production today are subjected to quantified measure; and that, for some writers, this is a 
central problem facing capitalist processes of  valorisation as it attempts to expropriate 
measurable value from immeasurable differences in subjectivity. There is, in other words, a 
preoccupation with the very same problem Marx outlined in his analysis of  surplus value 
generation — the problem of  profit — the main difference being that capital is confronted 
with purportedly immeasurable differences in subjectivity rather than homogenous masses of  
predefined labour processes. For writers such as Vercellone, this problem of  profit manifests 
itself  today as a fundamental tension between the social character of  production and the 
private character of  appropriation (2010). Here, I want to frame it as the issue of  quantifying 
the qualitative social relations, beliefs and values that, referring back to the aforementioned 
notion of  sympathetic cooperation, constitute the foundation basis of  the productivity of  life 
in general.  
 It seems pertinent to point out at this point that the issue of  understanding emerging 
value-creation processes today has become a central preoccupation of  recent sociological 
writings that, although not unified around an explicit concern for making sense of  
contemporary capitalist production, have highlighted the need for empirical lines of  inquiry 
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into the conceptual importance of  value (Bohm and Land, 2012; Ruckenstein, 2011). This is 
particularly the case with regard to recent sociological writings on the themes of  
measurement (Verran, 2012), metricization (De Angelis and Harvie, 2009; Kelly and Burrows, 
2012), and role of  values in the creation, reproduction and reinforcement of  capital’s ‘value 
logic’ (Skeggs, 2014). Indeed, it is particularly striking that the theme of  measurement is one 
that a significant portion of  the preceding coalesces around, especially when one considers 
the concepts discussed so far — abstraction, time, productivity and so on.  
 To sum up, the overall set of  considerations that have emerged from the discussions 
contained within this chapter coalesce around a set of  problems that the following 
investigation seeks to investigate through a case study of  the video games industry. The core 
issue that have emerged from the theoretical trajectories contained within this and the 
previous chapter is that of  the ‘problem of  profit’  — that is, how and in what ways profit is 
sought — and the ways in which this has framed the socio-economic developments and 
changes in capitalistic dynamics that are evident today in the ways that, by way of  example, 
new, digital and social media industries’ commercial logics operate to attain value from freely 
given user-creativity and cooperation more generally. In the context of  the analysis developed 
in this chapter, this overarching question of  how profit is sought has resolved itself  into two 
questions, with the former emerging out of  the discussions contained within section one, and 
the latter deriving from section two. These questions are: (i) how is (qualitative) sociality 
subjected to (quantified) capitalistic valorisation?; and, (ii) can capital capture the value of  
social cooperation in general and, regardless of  outcome, how will this be attempted? The 
first of  these questions is centred around a consideration of  what, in Marx’s writings, can be 
summarised as the relations between the qualitative and quantitative dimensions of  
production and, furthermore, the ways in which the former is accounted for, abstracted and 
translated into economic value. Following on from this, the second of  these questions is 
framed around a more direct consideration of  the aforementioned primacy of  sympathetic 
cooperation to the production of  social life in general and, more specifically, the problem of  
the proposed incommensurability of  said cooperation.  
Thus, taken as whole, the overall preoccupation of  the preceding, and the framing device for 
the following can be summarised thus: how is (qualitative) sociality subjected to (quantified) capitalistic 
valorisation?  
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3.3 — Into the Social Factory: the Case of  Labour and Value in the Video-Games 
Industry 
Much research on production in the video-games industry has tended to focus, in line with 
Cultural Studies research, upon the conditions of  “working-life” within spheres of  ‘direct 
production’ — that is, within companies and organisations formally geared towards video-
game production (publishers, developers, designers etc.). Indeed, there is very little research 
that considers the broader patterning of  production processes and value-creation that video-
games industry encapsulates as a complex of  developers, publishers, players, enthusiasts, and 
so on — all of  whom can be understood as contributors to value of  the industry as a whole.   
 The issue I wish to stress here, then, is that of  how to make sense of  production 
within the video games industry in light of  the now widespread observation that, as a general 
configuration of  productive processes, it is based not upon relations of  formal employment, 
wage-labour, and the corporate and proprietary creation of  commodities, but upon an 
accumulation of  wealth that derives directly from the mass inputs – information, content, 
data, values, beliefs and so on – of  a whole plethora of  people ranging from player 
populations to hobbyists and enthusiasts. More specifically, how can these relations of  
production within the video-games industry be understood through the preceding theory 
that, at one and the same time, emphasises with the ways in which production is both 
founded upon qualitative social relations and organised, measured, and ultimately monetised into 
quantitive value? Put simply, what are the relations of  the production and monetisation of  
labour and value within the video-games industry, and how can these be understood as part 
of  a broader picture of  contemporary socio-economic change that is sensitive to both 
enduring continuities, and substantial shifts in capitalist valorisation processes toward an all 
pervading social factory in which sympathetic cooperation and qualitative difference form the 
basis of  production and creativity in general?  
 The specific issues I wish to turn to here, then, are those regarding the organisation, 
measurement and monetization of  labour and perceived sources of  value within the video-
games industry and how such processes might be understood in terms of  the ways in which 
they attempt to harness the cooperative capacities of  developers, creators, players and so on. 
In order to address these issues, the following research questions have been employed as a 
base point for both data collection and analysis: 
(v) “what have been the sources of  labour and value in the video games industry throughout 
its historical and commercial development?”  
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(vi) “what are the sources of  labour and value in the video games industry today, and how, if  
at all, have these changed over time?” 
(vii) “what are, and have been, the means of  valorisation in the modern video-games 
industry?”; and,  
(viii)“how and in what ways is value being identified and valorised within the video-games 
industry today?” 
In order to go about formulating an investigation into framed around these questions I have 
divided the case study into two distinct chapters — distinct both in terms of  the subject 
matter, and the data and methods employed throughout the course of  analysis. The first 
section constitutes an historical narrative of  the video-games industry that seeks to outline 
key moments in its development as a commercial capitalist enterprise. Specific attention is 
paid at each “moment” in this history to the sources of  the labour and value that constituted 
it at the given time under discussion. Moreover, there are a number of  key moments on the 
video games industry where it becomes clear from the proceeding analysis that the value of  
the labour and creative processes involved in producing video-games was founded upon attempts 
to harness the creative and cooperative capacities of  people who’s actions and values appear 
more akin to a play ethic, rather than a work ethic. The primary sources of  data for this 
chapter consist almost entirely of  historical and documentary writings — both academic and 
journalistic — that consist of  accounts and narratives provided by leading figures within the 
video-games industry and researchers of  its trajectory and development.    
 The second section of  this case study constitutes an attempt to interrogate and 
analyse a selection of  key trends taking place within the video-games industry today with 
regards to the ways in which value is being recognised, sought out, and measured through 
various processes that combine both technical/knowledge developments and and appeals to 
ethical values; both of  which are considered here as means of  overcoming the problem of  
profit. The two main trends in the video-games industry that are interrogated are those of  
monetisation and measurement, with the first of  these being a significantly complex process 
of  appeals to ethical values regrading “the need to profit”, and the second being particularly 
revealing of  the ways in which the general sociality of  players is becoming increasingly 
metricised and abstracted in the seeking out of  new sources of  value — that is, the ways in 
which the cooperative, relational and associative networks that constitute the everyday life of  
video-game players is becoming increasingly subjected to systems of  quantitive measurement 
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and valuation. The sources of  data utilised in this part of  the investigation are numerous and 
varied. Firstly, over a three year period a number of  industry-led bulletins and email lists were 
accessed and signed up to in order to collect a vast amounts of  daily data on what was being 
discussed within the games industry between publishers, designers, investors and so on. As 
shall become clear, the issue of  monetisation — how to make money, where from, and 
through what means — constituted a prolonged and highly debated issue of  discussion over 
the three year period of  data collection. The second section on measurement was based upon 
a compilation of  data and resources obtained through publicly available research papers, 
company advertisements, and instruction manuals on how to design, implement, and profit 
from games analytics and metrics systems. Much of  the data obtained for this phase of  the 
research consisted of  highly technical and specialised knowledge on how to create and utilise 
segmentation and automated transactional data on player usage and behaviours in-game to 
formulate strategies for monetising in-game content in accordance with the predicted desires 
of  potential “customers”. Overall, the research and data gathering process of  this section was 
primarily treated as an exercise of  immersion in the cycles and circuits of  knowledge 
production and debate within the video games industry — the aim of  which was to find 
instances where the valorisation processes of  the industry were either brought into question 
and discussed through appeals to values and beliefs, or discussed in terms of  their technical 
development.     
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Section II 
The Present Investigation: Labour & Value in the 
Video-Games Industry 
‘We understand that the most valuable thing that each player 
possess is his time’ — Victor Kislyi, Founder of  Wargaming 
Public Co. Ltd. (quoted in Peterson, 2012: [online]). 
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4.  A History of  Labour and Value(s): The Video-Games Industry  
Since the 1960s, video-gaming has rapidly proliferated from a minor hobbyist culture into one 
of  the largest forms of  commercial entertainment. Over this period of  time, increasing 
numbers of  people from around the globe have adopted and appropriated various forms of  
computerized gaming as an activity in their everyday lives, making it one of  the most 
profitable and rapidly expanding culture industries of  the 21st century. However, like all 
culture industries, gaming has a protracted history of  development, which, as this chapter 
aims to demonstrate, is punctuated by significant changes in the configurations of  production 
that have underpinned both its formation and commercial perpetuation. In order to present 
this history, the following chapter shall take the form of  a literature-informed narrative 
concerning the economic and commercial development of  computerized gaming from its 
origins in 1960s ‘hacker culture’ (Donovan, 2010; Kline et al., 2003; Hjorth, 2011) to its 
present day condition as a digital entertainment industry that is underpinned by complex 
configurations of  production and profit-accumulation strategies. The purpose here in framing 
the history of  computerised gaming through a focus on its economic and commercial 
development into an entertainment industry is, following Kline et al., to attempt something 
other than a ‘chronology of  technological marvels, or an anecdotal celebration of  
entrepreneurial smarts’ (2003: 82).   
 As demonstrated by Hjorth (2011), games have many parallel and intertwining histories. 
The one to be outlined here, however, shall centre upon particular processes within both the 
industry and its audience cultures that, throughout the last few decades, have led to significant 
changes in the forms of  labour through which computerised games are produced, 
commodified, and made commercially profitable on a perpetual basis. Although this is but 
one of  many histories of  games and gaming, it is nonetheless important for opening up a 
critical discussion of  the forms and relations of  productive work upon which digital play is 
both founded and made possible. Indeed, developments within this area over the last decade 
have led a variety of  scholars to begin questioning core categories of  analysis regarding the 
modus operandi of  the gaming – and other – culture industries, especially with regard to the 
ways in which commercial products are (co-)constructed , (re)appropriated, and open-endedly 
built upon in ways not easily captured by prevailing understandings of  industry production, 
labour processes, the commodity form, property ownership, and the ways in which these are 
related to the economic production of value (see for example: Banks and Deuze, 2009; Banks 
and Humphreys, 2008; Humphreys, 2005; Potts, Cunningham, Hartley and Ormerod, 2008; 
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Taylor, 2002; Yee, 2006). Thus, following this vein of  inquiry into the modus operandi of  
contemporary culture industries, the following shall centre upon the historical trajectory of  
the computerised games industry and, in particular, the changes and transformations in its 
economic organisation that have occurred over the course of  its commercial existence.  
In order to provide a sense of  chronology and impose a time-frame upon this narrative of  
transformations in the economic logic of  the games industry I have organised this chapter 
into two main sections. The first section outlines the trajectory and development of  
production processes within what is typically understood as the games industry – that is, 
collectives of  people formally employed to create game-related hardware and software. 
Beginning with its origins in 1960s ‘hacking culture’ (Donovan, 2010; Hjorth, 2011; Kline et 
al., 2003), this trajectory follows the games industry’s commercial development through the 
70s, 80s and 90s, which, through multiple phases of  change and crisis, has entailed a relatively 
continuous expansion and (re)organisation of  its economic infrastructure into a multi-billion 
dollar industry of  ‘global production networks’ (Johns, 2005; Kerr, 2006). Following on from 
this, the second section proceeds to discuss key developments that began to take place 
beyond the conventional boundaries of  the games industry in the early 1990s, wherein player 
corpuses became subtly incorporated into processes of  production and commercial value-
creation. The most notable of  these developments are ‘modding’ – the alteration of  
programmed game code by players of  PC games that came to prominence in the 1990s 
(Postigo, 2003; Dyer-Witheford and de Peuter, 2009) – and the introduction of  ‘user-created 
content’(Donovan, 2010; Hjorth, 2011) as a key feature of  game design architecture. Finally, 
the chapter concludes by opening up the question of  how gaming audience cultures – and the 
ways in which they have become productive of  commercial value – have been subjected to 
further monetisation processes since the turn of  the millennium. Of  particular note in this 
regard is the need for in-depth insight into the recent emergence of  various forms of  (often 
quasi-legal) monetised exchange practices within ‘massively multiplayer online 
games’ (MMOGs) and virtual worlds – often referred to as ‘gold farming’ or ‘real-money 
trade’ (RMT) (Dibbell, 2007; Dyer-Witheford and de Peuter, 2009; Heeks, 2010; Jin, 2006; 
Lehdonvirta, Wilska and Johnson, 2009) – and how these are developing in new directions 
within the wider digital economy today. As a final note, it is emphasised that an historical 
outline of  the video-games industry and its economic organisation is of  the utmost 
importance if  one is to begin investigating the kinds of  labour and value-creation processes 
that currently underpin its commercial success.  
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4.1 Genesis of  a New Media Industry: Hackers, Workforces and the Value of   
 Creativity 
The rise of  computerised games to the forefront of  21st century commercial entertainment 
has been both rapid and turbulent, with major changes, crises, and innovations occurring over 
the fifty year period since their inception in the early 1960s. The following shall go back to 
this decade and work through the 70s and 80s with a view to unpacking the ways in which the 
innovations of  key actors and research groups became subject to processes of  
commercialization, venture capital speculation, and corporate organization. Indeed, the games 
industry – with its beginnings in the U.S. ‘military-industrial complex’ of  Cold War research 
and playful ‘hacker culture’ (Kline, Dyer-Witheford and de Peuter, 2003: 84-108) – has a far 
from straightforward history of  technological and commercial development that, when laid 
out, reveals a great deal about the lineage of  its economic organization and, moreover, how 
this is reflected by key developments in the ways labour and processes of  value-production 
have been profitably (re)configured.  
Although a great deal has been written on the history of  the games industry, much of  
this has tended to focus upon what can be loosely termed the ‘genealogy of  technological 
innovations’ – that is to say, much of  this literature emphasises the chronology and people 
associated with the invention of  gaming technologies (see for example: Herz, 1997; Hjorth, 
2011: 19-25; Kent, 2002; King, 2011; Poole, 2000, 2004). As Kerr surmises, this literature is 
useful to the extent that it organises and classifies an otherwise messy set of  events into neat 
temporal boxes (2006); however, it provides little in the way of  a critical understanding of  the 
historical connections between the invention of  gaming technologies and the wider contexts 
of  cultural and economic change within which they emerged and became subject to 
commercial forces. In particular, scant attention has been paid to the historical 
interconnections between (a) the practices and innovations of  key figures and organizations 
involved in the invention of  gaming technologies, and (b) the establishment of  commercial 
configurations of  production and lines of  profit-accumulation – in short, the 
interconnections between the formation of  the games industry and broader developments 
within the organisational logic of  capitalism over the latter half  of  the twentieth century . 14
An important theme for such an analysis to adopt, as Kline et al. make clear, is an 
interrogation of  the ways in which the logic of  capital has moulded, managed, and 
 The work of  Kline, Dyer-Withford and de Peuter (2003), along with the more recent work of  Dyer-14
Witheford and de Peuter (2009) is, to the best of  the author’s knowledge, a sole case in point here. However, the 
recent work of  Donovan, entitled Replay: The History of  Video Games (2010), provides brief  glimpses of  such an 
interconnecting analysis amongst what can best be described as a flurrying and disjointed glut of  journalistically 
organised information.
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appropriated the emergence of  digital play and its possible futures (2003) through a potent 
dialectic of  financial venture and speculation on the one hand, followed by phases of  economic 
development and (re)organisation on the other — the result, of  course, being what can only be 
described as a relatively continual growth of  the games industry over the last half  a century. 
   
4.1.1 — Origins: Hackers, Creativity, and Speculative Valuation 
Although there is some debate over what constituted the very first interactive game to be 
played electronically, it is generally agreed that the genesis years of  this new medium were the 
decade between 1958 and 1968. Over the course of  this decade there were a handful of  key 
figures in the U.S. that – under the auspices of  military-funded research centres such as the 
Massachusetts Institute of  Technology (MIT) – developed what would become a family of  
related technological forms known collectively as the ‘video-game’ (Kline et al., 2003). The 
first figure in this early history of  the video-game had, prior to his forays into electronic 
entertainment, worked on the Manhattan Project manufacturing the timing switches that 
enabled nuclear bombs to be detonated at the correct moment. After the war, William 
Higinbotham  went to work at a U.S. government-funded research facility in Brookhaven 15
National Laboratory (BNL) where, in 1958, he designed a tennis game – aptly named Tennis 
for Two – that was played on the screen of  an oscilloscope; the game, however, did not garner 
much attention beyond its public display at the BNL and was dismantled the following year 
for its parts to be used in other projects (Donovan, 2010).  
The second key instalment in the early years of  video-games’ lineage emerged 
between 1961 and 1962 with the creation of  Spacewar! by a group of  graduate students at MIT 
who referred to themselves as the Tech Model Railway Club (TMRC); this group was 
particularly well-known at the time for its ‘playful programming spirit’ that ‘saw merit in 
creating anything that seemed like a fun idea regardless of  its practical value’ (Donovan, 2010: 
10). This group epitomised what was referred to at the time as ‘hackers’; “computer 
virtuosos” who enjoyed exploring the limits and possibilities of  programmable computer 
systems, expounding credos such as “information wants to be free” and “always yield to the 
 It must be noted here, for the sake of  fair treatment, that Higinbotham became disillusioned with what he 15
had contributed to during his time on the Manhattan Project – the timing switches he had helped to 
manufacture were used to detonate the nuclear bombs above the cities of  Hiroshima and Nagasaki (Donovan, 
2010). Higonbotham went on to spend much of  his post-war life campaigning against the diffusion of  nuclear 
science by founding the ‘nuclear non-proliferation group’ known today as the Federation of  American Scientists 
(FAS).
  102
Hands-On Imperative” (Kline et al., 2003). The innovation of  Spacewar! by the TMRC was the 
result of  what could best be described as a seemingly paradoxical intersection between this 
playful ‘hacker ethic’ and the Cold War research programme funded by the military; indeed, 
the MIT “Artificial Intelligence” (AI) department, of  which the TMRC students were a part, 
was a prime benefactor of  the Pentagon’s Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA) – a 
prime example, as Kline et al. note, of  how the ‘military-industrial-academic complex’ 
provided the financial and institutional soil upon which the games industry was conceived 
(2003). Spacewar!, emerging out of  this context in 1962, was a radical innovation that – due to 
it incorporating navigation interface controls and a display that became a graphic input to the 
player (Kline et al., 2003) – laid the foundational design of  computerised gaming that would 
be built upon by hardware and software developers over the following decades. Another 
important feature of  Spacewar! was that, as news of  its creation spread among users of  PDP-1 
(the computer Spacewar! was programmed for), it disseminated out beyond the confines of  
MIT and into the already-booming culture of  computing. However, although it became 
decidedly popular, Russell and the TMRC decided to not attempt a commercial effort since 
the PDP-1 machine needed to play Spacewar! cost around $120, 000 at the time, making it 
practically impossible to market (Donovan, 2010). Nevertheless, the playful efforts of  the 
TMRC – alongside other ‘hacker developments’ of  the 1960s – had demonstrated that 
computers could be seen and appropriated as a source of  entertainment and diversion 
alongside “serious” applications, such as those being developed in line with the ARPA-funded 
Cold War research effort. 
In 1966 another important figure in the history of  computerised gaming invented 
what would go on to become a major commercial revelation. Ralph Baer, who, at the time 
was head of  instrument design at New Hampshire-based military contractors Sanders 
Associates, set about developing a video game platform with a clear business plan for it to be 
‘a $19.95 game-playing device that would plug into a TV set’ (Donovan, 2010: 12). This 
approach by Baer was important for the obvious reason that it attempted to lay the 
foundations for the commercialisation of  this emerging new medium, something which he 
considered to be realisable through the appropriation of  surplus television sets. After 
securing a small amount of  funding from the Sanders Associates directors, Baer set about 
developing a prototype under the military-inspired codename ‘Brown Box’. At the end of  
1967, TelePrompter Corporation – a cable television company – showed an immediate 
interest in the prototype and entered into negotiations to buy the rights from Sanders 
Associates for its commercial production (Donovan, 2010). However, the negotiations rapidly 
broke down and the Brown Box, still classified as a military training device, was left to gather 
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dust until the start of  the next decade. Nevertheless, Baer’s invention had connected 
electronic gaming with the most pervasive mass media of  the era – the television, which was 
already heavily commercialised and epitomised the mass consumption of  media that games 
would soon join (Kline et al., 2003). 
The above summary of  these key figures and their game innovations during the 1960s 
highlights more than just a series of  technological developments that, in some miraculous 
fashion, would “inevitably” become the stuff  of  mass commercialisation. Rather, these key 
figures – Higinbotham, Russell, and Baer – exemplify the constitution of  a wider mobilisation 
from which creative innovations in computing and network technologies emerged. Indeed, all 
three were part of  ‘the highly educated techno-scientific personnel recruited to prepare, 
directly or indirectly, for nuclear war with the Soviet Union’ (Dyer-Witheford and de Peuter, 
2009: 7). The forays these military-funded hackers and research personnel took into 
computerised entertainment were not, as their stories of  dismantlement and “dust collection” 
attest, prefigured – or, better still, predestined – for mass commercialisation. However, as the 
following decade reveals, the idea externalised by these innovations – that computing 
technology could be utilised for play and divergence – was not bound to a life of  bohemian 
counter-cultural circulation; it was to become appropriated by commercial forces as a new 
and vibrant source of  profit that would demand the mobilisation of  both formalised 
workforces and mass consumer markets. At the centre of  these commercialising processes 
was a US company named Atari who, through the adoption of  a “work-as-play” approach to 
the creative work of  designing games and gaming hardware, configured the first large-scale 
labour force dedicated the profitable production of  computerised play. This establishment, 
however, took place during a period of  immense change in the ways in which economic 
production is both organised and made profitable on a perpetual basis. For the emerging 
games industry, these changes in economic organisation would come to entail a delicate 
balancing act between the established mantras of  Fordist mass production on the one hand, 
and the playful, creative ethos underpinning the computer programming cultures from which 
games had come.   
4.1.2 — The Atari Era and its Demise: Fordist Labour in Crisis 
The 1970s were, as David Harvey (1989; 2007) and others suggests, a period of  revolutionary 
developments in the world’s social and economic history. Indeed, it is widely acknowledged 
that over this period there were a series of  major cultural and economic changes, in which the 
appropriation and diffusion of  ICTs played a central role. An important facet of  these major 
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shifts – and in which the role of  networked ICTs cannot be understated – was the increasing 
organisation of  industry around what has been referred to by different commentators as 
‘informational’ (Castells, 2000), ‘knowledge’ (Bell, 1973), or ‘immaterial’ (Hardt and Negri, 
2000, 2004; Lazzarato, 1996) forms of  production. These notions, although divergent in their 
details, point toward a general trend: that labour and employment within economies subject 
to these shifts have become increasingly organised around the production of  non-material 
goods such as services, communications, knowledge and information. One way in which 
these developments have been summarised is as a shift from an industrial to a ‘post-industrial’ 
era (Bell, 1973); from economies based on Fordist mass production, to a ‘post-Fordist’ model 
of  flexible employment structures and reflexive product cycles based increasingly around 
knowledge, signs, and services (Castells, 2000; Harvey, 1989; Kline et al., 2003; Virno, 2004). 
Within this period the technologies of  computerised play emerging out of  the hacker/Cold 
War research culture in the previous decade came to prominence as a realised source of  
commercial profit that, placed within the broader cultural and economic shifts taking place, 
would come to epitomise the emerging logic of  post-Fordist capitalism. Computerised play 
has come to epitomise, in particular, a reflexive product cycle in which social cooperation by 
members of  the gaming community is harnessed to generate new developments in game 
design, and to generate and then capture additional value from the gaming product . 
Reflexivity in this context  involves action by gamers being used to develop new forms of  
technology/improvements in game design and thereby to generate value. Reflection is not by 
companies designing the games per se - it is provided by the community. The net result is that 
the gaming industry is able to harness social cooperation by members of  the gaming 
community to improve and refine its products and to make them more profitable, and to 
generate additional value. 
Over the course of  the 1970s, games developed along two main trajectories towards 
commercialisation that culminated in the establishment of  the first multi-million games 
company – Atari. The first of  these trajectories was the development of  coin-operated 
machines that were placed within public arcades and bars across the U.S., which started with 
the reinvention of  the TMRCs Spacewar! into a game called Computer Space. Funded by a 
company that primarily manufactured educational technologies for the U.S. Navy (Nutting 
Associates), Nolan Bushnell developed this game and placed it within various bars across the 
U.S. (Donovan, 2010). Initially, Computer Space garnered enough public attention for it to be a 
profitable success, although much of  this was traceable to the high proportions of  students 
that frequented the bars in which it was placed; interestingly, as Kline et al. point out, this was 
an important outcome of  games being introduced into public space because it provided a test 
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bed for how the soon to develop industry would come to rely on a feedback loop of  detailed 
information regarding customer preferences and demographics, all of  which could be 
discerned from reports of  the takings from specific machines (2003). This is an early example 
of  social cooperation being relevant to gaming design and the generation of  enhanced value. 
However, although Computer Space was heralded by some as the successful instalment of  
computerised games into public spaces, it was not seen by Nutting Associates as a 
groundbreaking development to further invest in; with this, Bushnell decided to form his own 
company, Syzygy Engineering (Donovan, 2010), which would later go on to become the 
behemoth of  1970s computer game capitalism known as Atari.  
Around this time another major trajectory for the commercialization of  gaming was 
developing: the home gaming console. Starting in 1971 with the purchase of  Ralph Baer’s 
‘Brown Box’ by the consumer electronic company Magnavox, the home gaming console was 
quickly transformed from what was seen as a radical idea into a marketable product. 
Launched in August 1972, the ‘Magnavox Odyssey’ was the first commercial gaming device to 
be introduced into domestic homes, but it was not until Bushnell’s Atari Electronics ventured 
into this market that computerised gaming would become a multi-billion dollar industry. 
Bushnell’s initial venture with the arcade game Computer Space had sold too few units to attract 
major commercial investment. However, prior to the launch of  the Magnavox Odyssey, 
Bushnell went to see a public demonstration of  its wares at the Airport Marina in California 
where he sampled its capacity to simulate a simple tennis game in a similar vein to 
Higinbotham’s Tennis for Two a decade previous (Donovan, 2010; Dyer-Withford and de 
Peuter, 2009). Inspired by this demonstration, Bushnell went on to produce the first majorly 
successful arcade game entitled Pong, which, following a momentously successful debut in a 
small collection of  Californian bars, went on to become a global phenomenon as companies 
in Japan, France, and Italy began creating imitation versions under license from Atari 
(Donovan, 2010). The arcade trajectory of  video games’ commercialisation burgeoned rapidly 
after the success of  Pong, and by 1974 an estimated 100,000 units were in operation across the 
U.S. generating an annual revenue of  around $250 million (Donovan, 2010). Pong, however, 
was not uncontroversial in its success. It sparked a protracted intellectual property dispute 
with Magnavox – who believed the idea had come directly from the Odyssey home console – 
that would later be settled out of  court in 1976 (Dyer-Withford and de Peuter, 2009). 
Nevertheless, by this time Atari had become the central player in games production, forming 
part of  the broader Silicon Valley computer culture that emerged around this time as a crucial 
source of  innovation and entrepreneurialism, which, as Dyer-Witheford and de Peuter point 
out, provided capital with a much needed supply of  profit-accumulation strategies during a 
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period when traditional businesses, such as the automobile industry, were suffering an 
economic crisis (2009).  
Atari’s success was not straightforward. In 1975 the company began its venture into 
the home console market by turning Pong into a television gaming device. In order to 
manufacture this device on a scale large enough to meet projected consumer demand, Atari 
needed to invest in a bigger and more advanced production line. This expansion was 
eventually financed by a $20 million investment from venture capitalist Don Valentine, 
founder of  Sequoia Capital (Donovan, 2010). With this investment Atari mobilised a 
workforce consisting of  highly educated “computer creatives” to develop new and innovative 
gaming technologies on the one hand, and an assembly of  routinized, minimum-wage 
workers to build arcade machines and consoles on the other. The former segment of  this 
workforce, as Dyer-Witheford and de Peuter suggest, constituted part of  the new stratum of  
techno-scientific creativity emerging out of  Silicon Valley founded upon an ethos of  
freewheeling, unregimented, creative innovation (2009). By 1977, with its workforces 
mobilised and configured, Atari was fully operational as the dominant manufacturer of  
gaming technologies, creating hugely successful home consoles such as the Video Computer 
System (vcs) 2600 capable of  displaying a wide variety of  games stored on interchangeable 
cartridges (Kline et al., 2003) – a key development that facilitated the growth of  game 
programming as an independent employment market from console and hardware design.  
Towards the end of  the 1970s the industry was burgeoning rapidly, companies were 
expanding, and game development was increasingly becoming the subject of  large corporate 
investment. Games ‘were no longer just a technological novelty; they were becoming a 
cultural industry’ (Kline et al., 2003: 96). The labour force underpinning this period of  rapid 
expansion was comprised of, on the one hand, minimum-wage assembly line workers who 
put together gaming hardware and, on the other hand, venerated software designers and 
programmers, who became increasingly important as game development came to place 
greater emphasis upon innovative play dynamics and “entertainment value”. Salaries in the 
region of  $50-60,000 were given to these irreplaceable creative workers responsible for 
developing the all-important “fun factor” of  computerised entertainment (Kline et al, 2003). 
To fit the bohemian ways of  these creative workers, companies such as Atari promoted a 
fusion between corporate capitalism and hacker techno-counterculture within the 
employment environment; this manifested itself  as a “play-as-work”, or “work-as-play” ethos 
characterised by a renowned lack of  bureaucracy and high degrees of  autonomy for 
programmers and developers to create what they wanted (Dyer-Witheford and de Peuter, 2009) 
– such was the ideological underpinning of  this workforce and its managed mobilisation into 
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a highly creative source of  profitable production. The mobilisation of  this workforce and the 
ethos that underpinned it exemplified the way in which the creative computer culture 
emerging out of  Silicon Valley in the late 1970s was “put to work” by venture capitalist forces 
as a vibrant, flexible, and potentially fecund source of  innovation. 
However, this productive admixture of  “work-as-play” and corporate business was 
not without its problems, and this became manifest in developments within the division of  
game labour in the late 1970s and early 80s when giant media corporations began to wade 
into the market. In 1978, Atari – who needed major cash investment to manufacture their 
new home console – were sold to the media corporation Warner Communications for $28 
million, with Bushnell personally making $15 million in the deal (Kline et al., 2003). Following 
this take over, it became apparent to Warner Communications that Bushnell’s lack of  
discipline over his creative workforce would need correction if  Atari was going to run a tight 
industrial regime of  cost-benefit practices and calculatedly managed production. Bushnell was 
dismissed and replaced as manager by a Warner-installed executive with a background in 
textile manufacture (Dyer-Witheford and de Peuter, 2009). Key programmers, unhappy with 
the new regime antithetical to their “work-as-play” ethos, expressed their discontent by 
defecting to start their own game companies such as Activision in 1979. Activision primarily 
developed game cartridges to play on Atari’s hardware and, since Atari was manufacturing this 
hardware at a loss and making profits through sales of  software alone, it was threatened by 
this strategy. Although Activision became the perpetual subject of  Atari legal action, the 
company was a huge success and signalled the establishment of  a whole new division within 
the structure of  the computer games industry known as “third-party” game development 
(Dyer-Witheford and de Peuter, 2009), which, importantly, marked the separation of  console 
manufacture from game software development. This as Kline et al. note, constituted nothing 
less than the formation of  a new digital labour force who – with increasing levels of  public 
attention, the publication of  treatise on game design, and incredible commercial success – 
demonstrated the ‘growing confidence and sophistication of  multimedia artists who were 
coming to recognise their essential role in a new and booming cultural industry’ (2003: 99).  
This success, however, inevitably attracted the attention of  many business giants and 
corporations looking to cash-in on this new market of  computer creativity and soaring 
profits. By 1982 the worldwide home sales of  the console market were about $3 billion, with 
the arcade business grossing around $8 billion (Kline et al., 2003). In the U.S., still the 
dominant player in the emerging global picture of  the games industry, Atari controlled 
around 80 per cent of  the industry (Kline et al., 1983). Nevertheless, the consequence of  the 
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industry’s success was a flurry of  corporate repositioning to take advantage of  this emerging 
market. An increasingly desperate situation started to emerge in which: 
‘Bootlegged software – an ineradicable legacy of  hacker culture – was rampant, quality 
control nonexistent, and the mounting involvement of  Hollywood studios and giant toy 
companies resulted in a series of  embarrassing failures, the most notorious being the 
bathetic ET video game based on the film by Steven Spielberg’ (Dyer-Witheford and de 
Peuter, 2009: 13). 
Maintaining the pace of  innovation was difficult for companies such as Atari who – 
through appointing project managers from military and industrial environments whose 
imposed regimes were completely at odds with the “play-as-work” ethic of  their employees – 
failed to come up with a coherent strategy for managing the creativity of  game designers 
(Kline et al., 2003). Atari, now owned by Warner, refused to give their designers royalties or 
recognition for the games they created, which was seen by many as ‘a clear move to reduce 
the bargaining power of  a workforce whose strange technical powers its managers could 
barely comprehend’ (Dyer-Witheford and de Peuter, 2009: 10). This situation rapidly 
deteriorated into an imbroglio of  employee discontent, rushed game development, 
overproduction, and massive consumer indifference as the content of  newly manufactured 
games became as repetitive and monotonous as the minimum-wage, assembly-line labour that 
churned them out. As ‘the founded, rushed product-development cycles became the norm 
amidst a digital gold rush atmosphere’ (Kline et al., 2003: 104), new games began to flood the 
market in a constant stream of  unimaginative reconstitutions of  previous releases. In 1983 
this situation came to a head when Atari failed to reach its projected profits and its stock 
plummeted. The speed of  economic decline was astonishing as Atari’s sales of  $2 billion in 
1982 dropped 40 per cent by the following year, reporting a total loss of  around $539 million; 
this situation worsened towards crisis point ‘because companies had leveraged capital in 
anticipation of  constantly escalating sales’ (Kline el al., 2003: 105), only to find that the speed 
of  growth prior to 1982 was being completely outstripped by the pace of  decline.  
By 1984 revenues had plummeted to half  that of  1982 and, with this, the large media 
corporations who had invested venture capital in the gaming market began to withdraw; 
Warner, the corporate owners of  Atari, laid off  several thousand workers before selling off  
the company in what was one of  the most full-blown disasters of  recent business industry – a 
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clear demonstration of  the volatility of  the emerging digital economy (Dyer-Witheford and 
de Peuter, 2009) that was being built upon a formula of  perpetual commodity-innovation 
fuelled by the profitable, yet seemingly uncontainable mobilisation of  workforces whose 
valuable creativity was founded upon the autonomy to engage in playful experimentation. In 
many ways the games industry pioneered techniques for managing perpetual-innovation 
markets, but although Atari and its imitators had profitably captured the playful genius of  
creative computer hackers required for such a market, ‘it failed to find the organizational and 
disciplinary forms to contain it: that discovery would have to come from somewhere 
else’ (Dyer-Witheford and de Peuter, 2009: 14).  
As can be seen from the above, the capacities and creativity of  computer hackers was 
a foundational source of  value to the commercial formation and profitability of  Atari. It was, 
to refer back to the theoretical trajectories developed in chapter 3, their ethic and beliefs in 
playful, non-regimented creativity and cooperation that was the source of  the inspiration 
required to creative unique and, as Terranova (2014) puts it, new ideas about the content and 
design of  video games as a form of  entertainment. This is a clear and perhaps early example 
of  the ways in which the core characteristics of  sympathetic cooperation — as shared beliefs, 
desires and capacities to create and recreate the new and novel — became a source of  abstract 
economic value; the main problem for Atari, was how to bring this creativity under the 
control of  a regimented system of  measured productivity. This innovation in the valorisation 
logic of  the video games industry would be revisited in later developments by a Japanese 
company called Nintendo.  
4.1.3 — Re-engineered in Japan: the Pioneering of  a Post-Fordist Industry 
The mid-1980s saw the rise of  the company that would achieve not only a complete revival 
of  the games industry from its crash in 1983, but reconfigure it into one of  the largest 
transnational cultural industries of  the late twentieth century. This revival was not achieved 
from inside the U.S., but came from Japan. Nintendo – originally a Japanese toy firm founded 
in 1889 – had, by 1985, already become a major player in computer games market of  its home 
country, mostly due to the hugely successful release of  the domestic system known as the 
Family Computer, or Famicom for short (Donovan, 2010). The design of  this home game 
system reflected the development of  a novel repertoire of  business strategies that Hiroshi 
Yamauchi, the chairman of  Nintendo, employed in order to revolutionise the ways in which 
the games industry was both productively organised and brought under corporate control.  
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 The Famicom, later released in the U.S. and Europe as the Nintendo Entertainment 
System (NES), contained what was effectively a “lock-and-key” device consisting of  two 
patented chips – one in the console hardware and the other embedded within the 
interchangeable game cartridges – that were encoded using a copyrighted program known as 
‘IONES’; this made it impossible to play games on the Famicom and NES that had not been 
subjected to Nintendo’s approval processes (Kline et al., 2003). This technology effectively 
enabled Nintendo to control production within the third-party software development division 
of  the industry that had emerged in response to Atari’s Warner-implemented regime a few 
years previous. Instead of  trying to expand rapidly to meet consumer demand, Nintendo 
utilised this “lock-and-key” technology as a means to open up negotiations with third-party 
developers over the rights to make games for the Famicom and NES. The resulting licensee 
contracts operated heavily in Nintendo’s favour who, in return for allowing for third-party 
developers to make games for their widely dispersed consoles, demanded money upfront to 
manufacture the cartridges, a percentage of  profits from sales, and the right to decline the 
release of  any game based upon its newly-imposed evaluation methods (Donoavan, 2010). 
This business strategy for controllably managing games production for their hardware proved 
to be highly profitable for Yamauchi’s Nintendo; indeed, it effectively turned the games 
industry into a client state, whose third-party licensees were the willing subjects of  Nintendo’s 
managerial criteria. 
 A key lesson that Nintendo’s Yamauchi had taken from Atari’s dramatic crash was 
that, in order to ensure competitive success, one must not only manufacture a recognisably 
attractive hardware system; the same must also be the case for the games it runs, and since the 
decoupling of  these two aspects of  computer game production in the late 1970s, the profit 
logic of  the industry has been in a state of  mutation. Nintendo’s implementation of  the 
aforementioned ‘lock-and-key licensee’ method was a clear reflection of  Yamauchi’s response 
to these relations of  game production, which he saw as being in need of  tighter and more 
stringent corporate control if  Atari’s failings were not to be repeated. Profits, according to 
Nintendo’s new business strategy, were not to be made from selling consoles (hardware); it 
was more lucrative to generate them through the sales of  a continuous stream of  gaming 
software that, in order to prevent overproduction and market saturation could be subjected to 
calculated management strategies. In line with these lessons gleaned from what was by now 
gaming industry history, Nintendo adopted the strategy of  establishing a large customer base 
– through initial console sales – that, in turn, attracted the services of  third-party developers 
whose games encourage further console sales; a strategy that Kline et al. describe as building 
the customer base in a spiral of  ‘increasing returns’ (2003).  
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 By 1987, Nintendo had successfully revived the games industry, establishing itself  as 
the dominant player in both the Japanese and U.S. whilst also beginning its foray into Europe. 
Game publishers in both countries were now subject to the controlling measures of  one 
company alone who, with licenses to develop games for their NES console so high in 
demand, were able to impose remarkably rigid conditions on licensees (Kline et al., 2003). The 
stipulations of  these Nintendo licenses required all developers to submit their creations for its 
seal of  approval, set a limit upon the number of  games a licensee could annually produce, 
prohibited them from making games for other hardware systems for a two year period, 
outlined the royalties figures in percentage of  sale (amounting to around five dollars per game 
cartridge), and demanded that a minimum order of  ten thousand cartridges be bought from 
Nintendo and paid for in advance (Kline et al., 2003). According to Donovan, ‘[f]ew game 
publishers minded. Most were happy to trade creative and business freedom for the huge 
profits to be made from NES games’ (2010: 170). This system yielded unparalleled profits in 
the history of  the games industry whilst also bestowing Nintendo with the single-handed 
ability – through direct management of  the relations of  game hardware and software 
production – to control the supply, variety, and saturation of  the increasingly global market it 
was carving out of  the rubble left by Atari. Nintendo had swathes of  creative software 
designers making games for its hardware under license all across the U.S., Japan, and Europe. 
One particularly successful NES licensee company was Rare, a UK, Leicestershire-based 
developer whose titles sold millions in the U.S., making them one of  the most successful 
game designers of  the late 1980s (Donovan, 2010). Nintendo's strategic approach to the 
organization of  new game development and licensing also anticipated the need of  ludic 
capitalism to generate value out of  the most intimate yet socially focused aspects of  
subjectivity — that is, the creative capacities of  cooperation and collaboration. This 
anticipated a number of  more recent developments, as we shall see. 
 The release of  Super Mario Bros 3 in 1990 proved to be the commercial culmination of  
Nintendo’s reconfiguration of  the games industry onto a global scale. Following a meticulous 
pre-publicity campaign that included both a feature-length film entitled The Wizard and a 
commercial deal with McDonald’s to offer Mario Happy Meals, Super Mario Bros 3 sold more 
than 17 million copies worldwide, generating around $550 million and marking Nintendo’s 
rise from a Japanese toy maker to a global video game giant (Donovan, 2010). Shigeru 
Miyamoto, the designer of  Super Mario Bros 3, became a world-famous celebrity as Nintendo 
publicly celebrated his talent and creativity – another clear demonstration that Nintendo had 
learned from the mistakes of  Warner, in this case their denial of  name recognition or status 
for their game makers. Nintendo had reconfigured the games industry onto a global level, 
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established a licensing hardware-software business blueprint that would be carried over for 
every subsequent console system, and implemented an entirely new set of  strategies for 
managing production and profit-accumulation, through which it achieved what can only be 
described as monopolistic market control. It is somewhat ironic, as Dyer-Withford and de 
Peuter point out, that ‘games were rescued not by the military-industrial complex from 
whence they had sprung but by the victims of  its atomic bomb’ (2009: 14). Nevertheless, of  
importance here is that Nintendo had carved out a much more sophisticated model for 
managing the playful labour of  game designers by (a) acknowledging the value of  their 
creativity with the implementation of  a business model that emphasised profit through 
software (game) sales, and (b) paying much greater attention to quality control and market 
management – reflected in the technological “lock” inserted into Nintendo-approved games 
cartridges. 
 At this point it becomes clear that the strategies employed by Nintendo in their 
treatment of  the creative capacities of  their game designers paid particularly close attention to 
the value these playful workers placed upon their autonomy as creators of  new and novel ideas. As 
such, these creators of  the new and novel were not subjected to strict regimes of  productivity 
measurement and control; rather, Nintendo realised the need to foster and retain this value of  
its creative game designers, whose talents and skills derived not from a perfection of  a 
predefined labour process, but from the most intimate aspects of  their subjectivity — their 
imaginations.  
 Thus, the solutions needed to the hard lessons learned by Atari regarding the pace, 
volatility, and unpredictable nature of  the games industry and its playful contingent of  
creative labourers were engineered by a company that – through the implementation of  
carefully calculated forms of  financial control and production management – moulded 
computerised gaming into a transnational cultural industry that, to a large extent, is still 
characterised by ‘Global Production Networks’ (GPNs) (Johns, 2005) based upon the 
hardware/third-party software division of  labour established by Nintendo’s licensee model 
(Kerr, 2006). Indeed, Johns’ relatively recent research provides evidence to suggest that while 
console hardware production is organised by manufacturers using truly global network 
strategies, the development of  software is far more geographically bounded – primarily within 
the three major economic regions of  Western Europe, North America, and the Asia Pacific 
(2005). 
 Within these formally defined boundaries of  the games industry’ GPNs the “work-as-
play” ethic is still very much in place as an ideological foundation of  game labour, or 
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‘gamework’ (Deuze, Martin and Allen, 2007). Moreover, a growing collection of  academic 
literature and research has emerged over the last few years that attempts to address issues 
regarding the conditions, relations, and (professional) identities bound up with forms of  
labour – especially software development – within the formal remit of  the games industry 
(see for example: de Peuter and Dyer-Witheford, 2005; Deuze et al., 2007; Dyer-Witheford 
and de Peuter, 2006; Martin and Deuze, 2009). 
 However, it is to a different set of  developments – emerging in the 1990s – that this 
thematic history shall now turn its attention. The 1990s saw the computer games industry 
develop in a variety of  directions. The predominance of  Nintendo within the global market it 
established was challenged by the Japan-based company Sega, sparking what some 
commentators have referred to as the Sega-Nintendo ‘console wars’, symbolically represented 
by their rival mascots Sonic and Mario respectively (Dyer-Witheford and de Peuter, 2009; 
Kline et al., 2003). This “war” between the competing corporations of  digital play in the early 
1990s was primarily acted out in the fields of  intensified marketing and ever quickening 
technological innovation in the form of  “races” to release the next most high-powered 
console, measured in terms of  their 8-, 16-, 32-, and 64-bit capabilities (Kline et al., 2003). 
throughout this corporate war for market dominance, computerised gaming developed at a 
breakneck pace both in terms of  technological (console) innovation and the speed at which 
products cycled from one iteration to the next. 
  
4.2 Instances of  ‘Playbour Power’: Players Productively Mobilised 
Concomitant with the rapid changes in the home console market was the development of  
another direction for the video-games industry. This was the speculative evaluation of  the 
home console’s 1960s military-industrial relative, the personal computer (PC), as a potential 
platform for a relatively “new” and innovative commercial method for delivering game 
content and fostering gaming communities. As Kline et al. (2003) note, the lineage of  the 
home consoles produced by Atari, Nintendo, and Sega is shared by the personal computer; 
both emerged out of  U.S. hacker culture in the 1960s and were commercially converted in the 
1970s from the military-industrial mainframe into household mediums — in essence, the 
commercial consoles of  the 70s, 80s, and 90s were simplified versions of  PCs, albeit with 
their entire functionality dedicated to the single capacity of  gaming. PC gaming, although 
existent throughout the 80s, became an alluring prospect for major commercial investment in 
the mid-90s with the increasing popularity and diffusion of  the Internet, which, since around 
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1987 had doubled in size year-in-year out — a process which was further accelerated with the 
establishment of  the World Wide Web in the early 90s. 
 The key trends throughout the 1990s to be outlined here orbit predominantly around 
the establishment of  the Internet-enabled PC as a central conduit for the dissemination and 
networked connectivity of  video-gaming culture. From around 1989 to the mid-90s arcade 
gaming declined in popularity with the introduction of  mobile consoles — notably the 
Nintendo gameboy and SEGA gamegear — and the establishment of  what Hjorth (2011) 
refers to as the fourth generation of  gaming technology. In these years there was a marked 
turn towards the PC as a major platform for the commercial delivery — and, as we shall seee, 
cultivation — of  game content. Two important and interrelated developments for the PC in 
this period were the commercial success of  games delivered by means of  CD-ROM hardware 
and a rise in popularity of  various forms of  multiplayer games hosted on the Internet —
generally referred to as ‘online games’. Thus, throughout the early to mid-90s PC gaming 
transformed from a marginal preoccupation of  hobbyists into a prime target for corporate 
investment, partly due to the widespread belief  that the Internet held the potential for 
establishing industry revenue models that would not rely solely upon the sale of  hardware in 
high-street shops, making it possible for gaming to be based around forms of  subscription or 
other rent-based methods of  profit-accumulation — something which Rifkin (2000) has 
identified as a generally observable process in post-Fordist (he employs the prefix hyper-) 
capitalism, where everything becomes a “paid for” experience. This belief  in the Internet as a 
commercially viable method for distributing PC-games was further cemented by the 
realisation that it could also be an important meeting place for masses of  gaming 
communities (Kline et al., 2003); this, it was hoped, would “empower” gamers to share 
knowledge of  their experiences and issues, build support and guidance systems for other 
players, and create additional content for established game franchises — all of  which would 
generate a whole host of  ancillary gaming cultures and, in the process, add considerable value 
and longevity to successful products of  the industry. 
The commercial establishment of  online gaming in the 1990s brought in its train a whole 
range of  re-configurative developments that changed the ways in which games and their 
content were (re)produced and moulded into profitable sites of  popular culture. One of  the 
central threads tying these re-configurative developments together is the various ways in 
which online player-audiences were mobilised into productive communities — that is, in a 
variety of  ways, gamers were subtly mobilised into producers of  the games they played, 
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becoming directly involved in what might be described as a processes of  continuous 
valorisation and profit-accumulation. These developments have been summarised by some 
scholars as the emergence of  a profitably productive fusion between play and labour, 
encapsulated by the neologism ‘playbour’ (Hjorth, 2011; Kückluch, 2006). For Hjorth (2011), 
however, the concept of  playbour refers to a general trend that extends far beyond the 
activities of  video-game players to the types of  labour that users of  many varieties of  new 
media are performing as part of  broader shifts in consumption/production paradigms. An 
important aspect of  these broader shifts in production/consumption that playbour has 
emerged from is the development of  what is often referred to in the business and marketing 
world as “Web 2.0” — the increasing prevalence of  user-created and user-generated content 
(UCC and UGC respectively) architectures on the Internet. The ways in which these 
architectures can be described as encapsulating a fusion between play and labour (playbour) 
that is productive of  economic value for businesses is described by Tim O’Reilly, who 
suggests that Web 2.0 is ‘a platform in which customers play an active role in building one’s 
business’ (2004, cited in Hjorth, 2011: 50). But is it possible to probe a little deeper from the 
surface-level conceptualisations of  labour and production/consumption as general terms to 
describe a process whereby productivity — of  some form or another — is becoming 
indistinguishable from non-productivity. How, exactly, might we attempt to delve into the 
political economic complexity of  such processes through a focus upon, say, labour, value and 
valorisation?  
 Nevertheless, for the purposes of  providing context to the following, it is of  crucial 
importance here to mention that these developments in the so-called production/
consumption architecture of  new media and the rise of  Web 2.0 are inseparable from the 
emergence and uptake of  online video-gaming during the 1990s, which, as the following shall 
detail, was marked by the subtle mobilisation of  online player audiences into productive 
communities reminiscent of  what Marx (1983) described in his analysis of  large-scale 
industry as ‘labour-power’ — that is, the collective capacities and socially co-operative 
properties of  workforces that is free and or no cost to capital. As was discussed in chapter 3, 
Marx considered the cooperative capacities of  labour-power to be the foundation stone of  
productivity upon which the generation of  surplus value is built, and that this is most clearly 
seen when there is a great quantity of  labourers simultaneously cooperating together; as we 
shall see in the following, the mobilisation of  players’ creative and cooperative capacities 
constitutes, in many ways, such a mass mobilisation of  cooperative labour-power. Three 
particular developments stand out as exemplary manifestations of  this trend towards the 
incorporation of  players’ freely-given, collective creativity and social cooperation into the 
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video-games industry’s processes of  valorisation: ‘modding’ (Kücklich, 2005; Nieborg and van 
der Graaf, 2008; Postigo, 2003), ‘Massively Multiplayer Online Games’ (MMOGs) (Dyer-
Witheford and de Peuter, 2009; Taylor, 2006a), and gaming architecture based around UCC 
(Donovan, 2010; Hjorth, 2011). 
4.2.1 — The Value of  Modders: Intimations of  Post-Fordist ‘Playbour-Power’ 
One of  the first notable instances of  the trend toward players and fans of  video-games 
becoming directly involved in processes of  production was the emergence of  ‘modding’ in 
the 1990s — an activity whereby players of  PC games would modify programmed game code 
in order to change character appearances, add weapons, create new scenarios, and sometimes 
build whole new games out of  commercial software. However, although modding is a 
particularly notable instance here, other examples of  fan groups adding commercial value to 
the games around which they formed were also emerging during this period. For example, 
fans of  popular games such as Doom and Quake — both released in the mid-90s — 
contributed content to related websites that served as ready-made resources and “tech-
support” guides for other players, creating extensive fan-based support networks that, by 
virtue of  their adding considerably to the commercial value of  developers’ games, were and 
continue to be integral components of  the video-games industry.  
 As an initial indication of  conceptualisation, the development of  productive fan 
networks such as this constitutes a major part of  the broader mobilisation of  video-gamers’ 
creative and playful energies into what — through Marx’s (1973) notion of  ‘labour-power’ — 
might be tentatively considered ‘playbour-power’. The point of  contact here between Marx’s 
notion of  labour-power as the collective properties of  co-operating labourers, and this notion 
of  ‘play-labourers’ is that in both cases there is an underlying emphasis on how their creative 
and productive efforts, when taken as a whole, are free — capital pays nothing for them. In 
this sense, it may be worthwhile to consider the role that play, as an ethic expounding 
freeform-creativity, has become a key resource for the mobilisation labour-powers in post-
Fordist capitalism — that is, for the mass mobilisation of  the cooperative capacities of  
‘playbour-power’. The aforementioned example of  modding provides an illustrative case in 
point through which to discuss this broader mobilisation of  playbour-power within gaming 
audience cultures; a shift in which video-game companies came to recognise, reflect upon, 
and act in accordance with the potential value of  player networks and fan communities as 
sources of  innovation and profit both freely produced and, importantly, sitting outside the 
formal employment boundaries of  design studios and waged-labour development — a 
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particularly salient feature of  post-Fordist capitalism as it is understood by Gorz (1999), 
which he saw as characterised by a shift away from the direct negotiation between labour and 
capital over productive time in the form of  the wage. 
As previously mentioned, modding refers to a general set of  practices whereby PC gamers 
would add to or change aspects of  a given game by altering its programmed code – 
sometimes even developing an entirely new game out of  commercial software – and then 
distribute this for free on the internet. Although modding is commonly considered to have 
begun with the 1983 development of  a game entitled Castle Smurfenstein – an adaptation of  id 
Software’s (henceforth id) renowned Nazi-hunting game Castle Wolfenstein – it did not become 
widely popularised until the mid-to-late 1990s when id, taking account of  previous software 
altering demonstrations by fans, published the source code of  their hugely successful Doom, 
enabling players to create, edit and (re)develop their own levels and in-game scenarios 
(Kücklich, 2005). This move proved to be a huge success for id in a variety of  ways, two of  
which stand out here as particularly important factors when considering the changes taking 
place during this period within the games industry and its relation to its audience cultures. 
Firstly, a rapid proliferation of  player-created mods for Doom helped to generate a near-
inexhaustable interest in the original, commercially-sold software required to run them on 
home PCs. This, in sum, translated into larger than anticipated sales figure for id’s original 
game which, by extension, generated significant profit margins. The second important benefit 
for id was the creation of  ‘a voluntary pool of  production talent, which its recruiters soon 
learned to tap by checking the work of  admired modders and phoning them with job 
offers’ (Dyer-Witheford and de Peuter, 2009: 25). This creation of  a voluntary pool of  
production talent for id is an important point here because, in effect, it provided the company 
with a particularly focused, yet very low-cost model for sourcing potential employees from a 
vast corpus engaged in the kinds of  innovative design work that has underpinned the industry 
throughout its existence. Put simply, these two outcomes highlight how id, by allowing their 
player-audiences to modify their product, established a means of  making their games both 
hugely popular and generative of  valuable productivity on the part of  the communities that 
engaged in this process of  modification; at one and the same time, id Software managed to 
make Doom both commercially profitable and the locus of  a voluntary, yet creative – even 
playful – form of  productivity.  
 The success of  id Software’s experiment with modding was followed by a host of  
other companies, who began to design their games with in-built capabilities for players to 
make additions and/or alterations to the content of  their games. One particular company that 
played a pivotal role in cultivating this as an important component of  their business strategy 
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was Valve Software (henceforth Valve), founded by former Microsoft programmers Gabe 
Newell and Mike Harrington. An important development in modding arose when Valve 
released their successful title Half-Life, a first-person perspective shooting game that, when 
purchased, allowed willing players and amateur developers to access the games core software 
engine along with a range of  free tools provided by the game’s original developers (Nieborg 
and van der Graaf, 2008). Perhaps one of  the most widely cited examples of  modding’s rise 
to prominence as part of  the games industry is the modification of  Valve’s successful Half-
Life into the even more successful game Counter-Strike in 1999 by a group of  player-
developers led by computer scientist student Minh “Gooseman” Le (Kücklich, 2005). Counter-
Strike was nothing short of  a complete conversion – a ‘total conversion’ in modding parlance 
– of  the single-player Half-Life into a fast-paced multiplayer game based around a counter 
terrorism theme in which two opposing teams aim to eliminate one another. The popularity 
of  this mod quickly surpassed that of  Half-Life itself  and gamers reportedly started to buy 
Valve’s original game solely in order to play the Counter-Strike adaptation (Nieborg and van der 
Graaf, 2008). This proved to be very profitable for Valve, who responded by offering Minh 
Le and his modding team employment at the company as professional developers; Le soon 
sold Counter-Strike’s already-valuable intellectual property rights directly to Valve (Kücklich, 
2005; Nieborg and van der Graaf, 2008). By 2000 Valve began publishing Counter-Strike as a 
commercial game franchise; today it is a well-established Valve brand with various iterations 
and is one of  the most highly played online first-person shooter games in existence (Nieborg 
and van der Graaf, 2008). The importance of  this example cannot be understated when 
considering the role freely given, audience-innovated mods such as Counter-Strike have 
contributed to commercial games companies. For developers such as Valve, Counter-Strike is 
an example of  how player-communities have been encouraged to take an active role in 
building a successful franchise that, for those in possession of  the intellectual property rights, 
generates significant revenue even a decade after its inception (Nieborg and van der Graaf, 
2008). Indeed, for companies such as Valve and id, the cultivation of  modding communities 
has proved to be an incredibly worthwhile and cost-effective business strategy.  
 The above examples of  modding form part of  what was previously referred to as a 
broader mobilisation of  gaming audiences into productive playbour forces during the 1990s. 
However, it is also important here to point out how these developments are emblematic of  
the social and economic changes summarised by social theorists as the transition toward post-
Fordism as a hegemonic mode of  production. An important point for consideration here is 
presented by Postigo during his examination of  modding as an exemplar of  post-industrial, 
or post-Fordist transitions from leisure to work:  
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‘As one looks over the immense amount of  work that generating this content entails, one 
cannot help but wonder in what other ways all of  this skilled labour might be 
contributing to the value of  the games being modded … and what broad social forces 
position the work of  these hobbyists for indirect or direct exploitation’ (Postigo, 2003: 
596).  
In other words, what role has modding played in the games industry and in what ways does it 
constitute the mobilisation of  a labour force that is both freely given by hobbyists and 
productive of  economic value for the commercial companies cultivating it. In short, how 
does one make political economic sense of  the emergence and cultivation of  modding by the 
games industry? In order to unpack this issue it is necessary to briefly outline some details 
regarding the control measures and economic apparatuses that the games industry employs to 
regulate and harness the activities of  modders.  
An important tool for many of  the games companies that have sought to cultivate 
modding communities over the last decade has been the construction of  very detailed and 
restricting end-user license agreements (EULAs) that players have to agree to when installing 
their games. A useful example here is the EULA attached to Valve’s Half-Life, which stipulates 
a granting of  a non-exclusive, royalty-free, terminable, worldwide, non-transferrable license 
to: (a) use and modify the ‘software development kit’ in source code form for the sole 
purpose of  developing a mod; and (b) reproduce and distribute the mod in object code form 
solely to end-users of  Half-Life without charge (Kücklich, 2005). This EULA effectively 
enables the commercial game developers to retain intellectual property rights to all mods 
created using their original game software whilst also preventing modders themselves from 
selling what they have created. However, the benefits for commercial companies like Valve in 
possession of  these legal rights are multiple. Firstly, they do not have invest in professional 
wage-labour in order to create and establish a successful game and its brand; as the Counter-
Strike case demonstrates, this was done for Valve by the player-creators of  the game 
(Kücklich, 2005). Secondly, successful mods extend the shelf-life of  the original game 
software from which they are created by virtue of  the fact that this is required in order to run 
them on home PCs – a fact publicly acknowledged by Valve owner Gabe Newell (Kücklich, 
2005). Thirdly, the activity of  modders has served – and continues to serve – as an important 
source of  creative innovation for commercial game companies with the capabilities of  
controllably appropriating it; as Kücklich notes, the creativity of  modders provides 
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professional developers with a huge “test-bed” for creating new and innovative ideas that 
would otherwise prove difficult to implement within increasingly high-risk commercial games 
markets (2005). Furthermore, the creativity of  modders is freely given and therefore costs 
very little for commercial game companies to (a) expropriate as a valuable source of  labour 
and (b) search through as a recruiting pool for potential employees with desired talents and 
skills. As such, modders can add considerable value to already established commercial games, 
build an entirely new brand, and serve as a potential labour market (Nieborg and van der 
Graaf, 2008) – all of  which costs very little for game development companies to cultivate and 
harness. However, while it is very difficult to estimate the exact monetary value of  these 
benefits from modding for commercial game companies, it is nonetheless clear from success 
of  games such as Counter-Strike and Doom that modding has become an important economic 
factor in the computerised games industry (Kücklich, 2005).  
This mobilisation of  what is effectively a free labour force has been conceptualised by 
Postigo through a lens of  social theory pertaining to the rise of  post-industrialism and post-
Fordist modes of  production. For Postigo, modders form part of  a more general process 
whereby hobbyists on the Internet generate goods for free within a perceived leisure context, 
adding content and making up networks of  flexible labour forces that form a principle 
productive force of  the digital economy (2003, 2007). What results in the case of  modding is 
‘the circumvention of  the initial investment risk for the commercial developers as the 
development work is transferred to the fan base where costs are negligble’ (Postigo, 2003: 
597). Importantly, however, this Internet-based form of  labour exploitation is intricately 
interlaced with an ideology of  playful creativity. Indeed, as Nieborg and van der Graaf  point 
out in relation to Valve, the reasons they (Valve) have been able to attract a relatively 
continuous stream of  modders to their products is by rhetorically framing modding as an 
extension play in company documents, press releases, and websites dedicated to company-
player communications (2008). This framing of  modding as an extension of  playful activities 
by Valve highlights the way in which the games industry has carefully managed and projected 
an image of  itself  that emphasises its dedication to producing enjoyable, player-engaging 
games whilst marginalising its dedication to profit-accumulation (Kücklich, 2005). It is 
precisely this ideological framing of  modding as an form of  computer play that, when 
considered alongside it also being an important contributing factor towards the economic 
success of  commercial game companies, that Kücklich adopts the neologism playbour in 
order to place it within the political economy of  the games industry and computerised 
gaming culture(s) in general (2005).  
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In terms of  historical narrative, this emergence of  modding during the 1990s 
constitutes one of  the first well-documented and conceptualised mobilisations of  playbour-
power within the games industry. Placing this within the broader context of  social and 
economic shifts associated with the development of  post-Fodism, Postigo demonstrates how 
Internet-based activities such as modding, forming and supporting communities, and 
pursuing development hobbies represent an emerging form labour that can be harnessed and 
exploited as a source of  economic value (2003, 2007). A key aspect of  post-Fordism that 
distinguishes it from a Fordist mode of  mass produced, invariant consumer goods is the 
perpetual maintenance of  flexible, responsive, and risk-reducing modes of  (re)production and 
innovation. Within a post-Fordist economy ‘[g]oods such as software, computers and other 
technologies, whose production is driven by rapid and continuous innovation and short 
market-life, have become staples of  new consumption as production patterns have shifted 
toward … knowledge goods and services’ (Postigo, 2003). Perpetual innovation is a central 
component of  this economic logic and, above all else, this is what modding and the 
emergence of  playbour more generally has provided to commercial companies such as Valve 
who, rather than investing heavily in professionally-waged development, can also rely on large 
corpuses of  free labourers dedicating their playful creativity to producing content at once 
appropriable by those companies in possession of  the correct intellectual property rights. 
Modding, then, as an integral component of  the games industry emerging to prominence in 
the 1990s, constitutes an archetypal example of  the complex ways in which cultural forms 
and leisure practices environing on the Internet more generally are valorised and made 
profitable through subtle mechanisms (such as intellectual property) that harness their 
economic value to the benefit of  commercial companies and businesses. As Kücklich notes, 
modding illustrates how, in a post-Fordist regime of  perpetual innovation and the constant 
desire for risk-minimising production strategies, commercial game companies benefit from 
the perception that everything to do with computerised games is a form of  play and therefore a 
voluntary, non-profit-oriented activity. Nevertheless, modding was but the first important 
mobilisation of  players into producers to the commercial benefit of  the games industry; 
other, larger mobilisations of  playbour emerged during the late 1990s that enabled games 
companies to extract economic value from their audiences creatively “playing” with their 
commercially-owned products.  
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4.2.2 — Online “Worlds”, Farms of  Gold: Massively Multiplayer Playbour-Power 
Alongside the emergence of  modding was the larger, more nuanced mobilisation of  playbour 
in the form of  MMOGs during the late 1990s and into the new millennium. Developing out 
of  text-based multiplayer games – referred to as multi-user dungeons (MUDs) – that were 
hosted on propriety networks such as AOL, Compuserve, or GEnie in the 1970s and 80s, 
MMOGs amounted to a culmination of  experimentation with the capacities of  the Internet 
as a medium for the commercial delivery of  gaming experiences (Donovan, 2010). After a 
long series of  prototypical experiments with using graphics-based interfaces for online 
multiplayer games during the 1980s and early  90s, there was an explosive growth in 
investment in and development of  MMOGs, especially during the growth and initial 
commercialising phase the Internet in the mid-90s. Text-based multiplayer games (or MUDs) 
that brought gamers together in their hundreds became MMOGs, virtual spaces where 
gamers could gather in their thousands within three-dimensional worlds containing detailed 
landscapes and cities. More importantly, however, was the way in which these massively 
populated online games would engender the development of  a radically alternative business 
model for the games industry. The first commercial MMOG to employ this radically 
alternative business model was released in 1996 under the title Meridian 59; based around a set 
monthly subscription model whereby players would pay a flat rate to The 3DO Company – 
the games publishers – for unlimited access to the online game-world, Meridian 59 attracted 
around twenty-five thousand players at its peak (Donovan, 2010). This subscription-based 
revenue model quickly came to define the design of  every commercial MMOG that followed 
Meridian 59; as Donovan notes, ‘while its 3D visuals were a first for any online role-playing 
game, it was Meridian 59’s payment system that was truly revolutionary’ (2010: 303), paving 
the way for the revenue models of  the next major MMOGs known as Ultima Online, produced 
by Electronic Arts. 
 Released in 1997, Ultima Online provides perhaps one of  the clearest examples of  how 
MMOGs represent an important juncture in the history of  gaming as extensions of  playbour 
and the development of  apparatuses required to harness this form of  production. Due to its 
size and rapidly emergent complexity, Ultima Online became the first game to have an officially 
employed community manager whose job it was to keep the game-world – and by extension 
the monthly subscriptions – running smoothly and profitably. However, the game itself  
suffered from perennial management problems from the beginning, mostly due to its design 
allowing players high degrees of  freedom to interact and, in line with the central thematic of  
the game-world, engage in combat with one another (Donovan, 2010). This resulted in a 
variety of  interesting developments that, for the purpose of  the present study, highlight how 
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early MMOGs such as Ultima Online provided potential participants within this emerging 
market with valuable insights into what is needed in order to profitably mobilise a large 
population players. According to a number of  accounts, the game-world of  Ultima Online 
quickly degenerated into a situation whereby stronger players would rampage through the 
graphical environment ‘slaughtering those weaker than themselves and looting whatever items 
their virtual victims were carrying’ (Donovan, 2010: 304). In response to the lack of  
management over the unrestrained killing of  players’ avatars the game-world experienced 
what Dyer-Witheford and de Peuter describe as a “peasant revolt”; players of  the game 
invaded the virtual castle belonging to the maker of  Ultima Online Richard Garriot – whose 
went by the avatar name of  Lord British – and presented their grievances in loud and 
disruptive protest (2009).  
The response of  Electronic Arts and Origin Systems – the designing company of  
Ultima Online – to this ensuing chaos was to police and regulate the game-world as much as 
possible in order to prevent many of  their two-hundred and fifty thousand monthly 
subscribers from becoming disillusioned and cancelling their contributions to the profit 
stream. For the most part this was done by through game design alterations like the changing 
of  cities into safety zones where players could no attack one another, introducing reputation 
scores, and by creating virtual jails for locking up problematic players (Donovan, 2010). 
Another aspect of  Ultima Online that raised issues for Electronic Arts and Origin Systems was 
the way in which the management of  the in-game world relied heavily upon players freely 
volunteering to answer questions and offer guidance to novice players; this came to the fore 
as an issue when a player initiated a lawsuit against Electronic Arts claiming that, in 
volunteering as an in-game community officer, they had been performing a full-time job 
without recompense (Dyer-Witheford and de Peuter, 2009).  
Importantly, however, these problems encountered within the world of  Ultima Online 
left the games industry with a number of  important lessons to take away concerning the 
mobilisation and effective for-profit management of  an MMOG population. Firstly, Ultima 
Online – despite its issues – signalled the advent of  the Internet as a viable means of  
delivering large-scale multiplayer gaming as a commercialised experience which, formed 
around subscription based revenue models, would engender potentially open-ended profit-
streams. Secondly, Ultima Online demonstrated to developers the need for structured 
management of  and the means to control the complex social worlds to develop within future 
MMOGs; giving players as much freedom as possible was exactly what Ultima Online and its 
population problems taught future MMOG developers to treat with caution (Donovan, 
2010). More important to this historical narrative, however, is how the problems facing Ultima 
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Online highlighted the degree to which MMOGs and their management in the pursuit of  
steady profits depended heavily upon the cooperation, loyalty, and often complicit input of  
player populations. 
Later MMOGs such as Sony’s EverQuest and Blizzard Entertainment’s World of  
Warcraft developed and honed this revenue model established by the earlier Meridian 59 and 
Ultima Online titles. This revenue model – based around players paying monthly subscriptions 
to access actively produce game-worlds subject to propriety legal agreements – optimised the 
ways in which player populations and their energies could be turned into lucrative and open-
ended profit streams. As Dyer-Witheford and de Peuter explicate: ‘[p]layers not only 
purchased the initial software and paid monthly subscriptions, as well as expansions and add-
ons, but also through their social interaction provided much of  the game content’ (2009: 26). 
The scale of  this subtle incorporation of  player populations into production becomes clear 
when one considers that games such as World of  Warcraft and EverQuest have each exceeded 
five-hundred thousand monthly subscribers; today World of  Warcraft alone boasts a 
subscription corpus in excess of  eleven million (Blizzard Entertainment, 2009).  
The ethnographic work of  Taylor (2006a, 2006b) provides some very useful insight 
into the complex and nuanced ways in which these populations of  players are as much 
producers of  the game-worlds they inhabit than they are consumers of  them. In her study of  
the MMOG EverQuest – detailed in the book Play Between Worlds – Taylor notes how the game 
code and architectural design, most notably the function and scarcity of  in-game items and 
resources, have facilitated the production of  markets and systems of  exchange (2006a). 
Detailing the example of  “porting” – that is, the instantaneous transportation of  avatars to 
locations all over the expansive in-game world of  EverQuest, only capable of  being 
performed by druid and wizard characters – Taylor notes how this valuable resource quickly 
became realised as a source of  additional in-game currency or those players who could 
perform it as a service for others (2006a). Of  particular note here, however, was the ways in 
which the development of  this in-game transportation service emerged from the within 
player community and how this community developed a relatively stable pricing system to 
accompany it (Taylor, 2006a). The reaction of  Sony, as the commercial owners and managers 
of  the game-world and its contents, was to redesign the transport system to bring it more 
fully under their regulatory control; they brought about a centralised transport zone 
administered by automated avatars – also known as non-player characters (NPCs) (Taylor, 
2006a). These changes eroded the role of  players in “porting” and thus its value as an in-
game service. ‘Almost overnight the economy around porting crashed. Players who had 
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formerly made a decent living as a kind of  in-game taxi service found themselves practically 
out of  work’ (Taylor, 2006a: 61).  
What this string of  developments within EverQuest highlights is the way in which 
architectural design features of  MMOGs and emergent player cultures interplay with one 
another to form complex in-game economies of  production and service provision, and that 
these economies and cultures are wholly subject to the interests and whims of  the 
commercial owners of  these game-worlds. Indeed, for Taylor this example brings more 
general issues arising from the enlisting of  MMOG player communities into production 
processes to the fore, especially with regard to the ways in which player populations are 
becoming increasingly responsible for the creation of  in-game content and cultural forms 
(2006a); put another way, the ways in which players are becoming productively mobilised into 
playbouring populations that are, at one and the same time, both profitable through their 
monthly subscriptions and the ways in which they are generative of  valuable content and 
services that enrich the complexity, culture, and persistence of  the game-worlds they inhabit. 
 Acknowledging the way in which MMOGs constitute an extension of  other playbour 
forms such as modding into a mass mobilisation of  users as producers (or ‘co-creators’), 
Taylor suggests that there are serious questions to be raised about the avidity and ease with 
which post-industrial capital seems to have mobilised and harnessed the productive energies 
of  audiences (2006a) – especially since these emergent forms of  ‘free labour’ (Terranova, 
2000) have become central to the intertwined factors of  (a) player enjoyment and (b) the 
profitable success of  commercial game companies. However, in order to make sense of  how 
these emerging forms of  playbour are playing out within the context of  the games industry, 
and the digital economy more generally, a broader conceptualisation of  cultural production is 
needed – one that goes beyond simplistic producer/consumer and work/play binaries to 
understand the ways in which these are becoming blurred to the benefit of  large corporate 
forces. Despite the ways in which players have become incorporated into production 
processes, there is heavy weighting toward the power and legal rights of  corporate ownership 
claims, made manifest through EULAs and other propriety apparatuses. In Taylor’s terms 
there is a current “turn”, within both the games industry and the digital economy in general, 
toward privileging corporate interests above creative, independent, and collaborative work 
undertaken by users/players (2006a). Moreover, during the course of  Taylor’s ethnographic 
research on Sony’s EverQuest it becomes clear that there is often a preoccupation within 
gaming communities to discuss and problematize fundamental game-design issues – “how 
can the game’s mechanics be improved?” “is the aritifical intelligence of  automated avatars 
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being improved?” “can more content being introduced?” – rather than broader, more socio-
political concerns about rights, property or access (2006a). 
4.2.3 — User-Created Content: Extensions of  Playbour-Power 
Another strand of  the playbour-power trend that runs parallel to the development of  
MMOGs and modding is the introduction of  multiple forms of  UCC into gaming 
architecture. The ways in which this has occurred since the late 1990s and into the first 
decade of  the twentieth century are again bound up with the development and rise in 
popularity of  the Internet as a medium, meeting place, and distribution method for video-
games and gaming cultures. When looking at the discourses emerging within the management 
of  the games industry during this period (up to and including the present day) there is a 
preponderance of  statements regarding how UCC can be tapped into for commercial 
products (Taylor, 2006a). Within development communities and industry organisations it 
became increasingly commonplace for player-produced content to be noted as one of  the key 
factors in a games commercial success. This notion that the commercial success of  games 
could rest heavily upon the productivity of  players became even more formalised into the 
design architecture of  game-worlds. A good example of  this is the series of  games known as 
The Sims, which, building upon the ideas set in motion by the success of  modding and user-
creativity in games like Quake and Half-Life, had the emerging trope of  players-as-producers at 
the core of  its design. Launched in 2000, The Sims was a game that incorporated tools for 
players to create new clothes for their various avatars and design new interiors for their 
simulated domestic homes. The team involved in producing the game became centrally 
focused upon ‘the idea of  breaking down some of  the barriers that used to exist between 
player and creator’ (Donovan, 2010: 326), which, accordingly, was hailed as one of  the 
primary reasons for the games commercial success. Anticipation surrounding the release of  
The Sims was so high that Electronic Arts gave communities of  soon-to-be player-creators the 
tools needed to start designing avatar clothes and wallpaper patterns (Donovan, 2010). The 
content created by the players of  The Sims accumulated to levels far in excess of  what Will 
Wright and his design team had anticipated (Donovan, 2010), attracting many more players to 
the franchise whilst also demonstrating the commercial capacities of  UCC game design as a 
lucrative and product-enhancing business model.    
 Around this time, the deployment of  user-creation tools within MMOGs became 
central to the maintenance of  in-game communities and increasingly integral to sophisticated 
and technical forms of  gameplay management (Hjorth, 2011); MMOGs such as World of  
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Warcraft had, by 2005, developed a huge ancillary culture wherein players designed their own 
interface modifications for monitoring their status and progress within the game-world 
(Taylor, 2006b). Fitting in within the broader emergence of  UCC within gaming cultures, 
MMOG interface mods such as these became indispensable game-play aids for serious players 
and, as such, added significant value to their contingent game-worlds by improving the user 
experience (Nieborg and van der Graaf, 2008).  
Commenting on the playbour phenomenon as a core ingredient of  Web 2.0, Larissa 
Hjorth notes that player-production processes have become an integral part of  gaming 
communities and the video-games industry’s commercial strategies, noting that it is:  
‘a labour of  love that is supported and then turned into profit by the industry … , 
[p]laybour hits a chord in the politics of  UCC labour practices; it highlights new 
forms of  emergent affective, emotional, creative, and social labour that are being 
deployed by users/players as they transgress conventional consumption and 
production divisions’ (2011: 53). 
However, an additional and important point here is how this mobilisation of  player agency 
and creativity into a productive force has reshaped the way in which the video-games industry 
operates as a commercial entity both framed by — and framing of  — the desire to recognise 
and act upon (potential sources of) value. A recent example of  the extent to which playbour 
has become a central component in the valorisation processes of  the video-games industry 
and its business models is the game LittleBigPlanet, released in 2008 for the Sony Playstation 3. 
LittleBigPlanet’s design is centred entirely upon it being a game creation tool in itself, capable 
of  producing a wide variety of  two-dimensional games glossed by a fun-loving scrapbook 
aesthetic. Within this game, players use editor tools to create and edit new levels and objects. 
These creations can then be shared with other players over the Playstation Network online 
service, providing a sort of  continually developing arena of  valuable content creation. After 
eight months of  its release the game creation tool had, with the input of  hundreds of  
thousands of  user-creators, generated more than a million different game levels – all of  which 
were accessible to players through its social networking-inspired portal. Although this level of  
player-production has rarely occurred outside the PC-games market, it nonetheless 
demonstrates the level to which UCC architectures and, by extension playbour, have become 
central components in the commercial ventures of  the games industry today; indeed, the 
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entire contents of  LittleBigPlanet – the millions of  mini game-levels – was built through 
playbour agency. Donovan summarises this in a distinctly utopian fashion by stating that the:  
‘embrace of  player-generated content underlined just how much the video game 
medium had changed over the years … ; [h]aving begun life as a medium defined 
wholly by developers, video games were rapidly evolving into one that turned 
consumers into artists’ (2010: 331).  
  
The important point missing here, however, is how the games industry has increasingly 
learned to suck up volunteer production as an identified source of  valuable innovation, and the 
issues this throws up for ways in which these processes can be understood as exploitative, 
empowering, or interlaced with subtly contingent dynamics of  valorisation and 
(re)appropriation — in short, how ‘playbour-power’ constitutes a core component of  the 
video-games industry’s commercial success today. The particular significance of  titles such as 
LittleBigPlanet  is that they have integrated the productive potential of  players as a foundational 
part of, at one level, the gaming experience and, at another level, the processes through which 
the value of  this gaming experience is both recognised and valorised as a form of  profitable 
entertainment — a tapping of  the creative abilities and energies of  a player population as 
means of  mobilising the desires of  potential new players. That is, a mobilisation of  a form of  
labour-power that Marx saw as deriving directly from the emergence of  large-scale industry 
— a collective property of  a population of  that is both free and at the same time already 
subsumed under capital’s mode of  its own reproduction (Marx, 1983). The tagline of  
LittleBigPlanet — ‘Play, Create, Share’ — foregrounds the centrality of  this mobilisation of  
playbour-power through an injunction to spend time applying your creative capacities, to 
cooperate and generate (valuable) content (for free) — play in this sense becomes a value 
appealed to in an effort to mobilise the subjective desires of  players into a productive form 
of  ‘playbour’ that is founded upon a cooperative and collaborative ethos. It is in this exact 
sense, then, that through their efforts, desires and energies, players’ subjectivities become 
direct sources of  value-to-be-valorised. 
As the above has attempted to outline, whether it is through providing tools for players 
to modify games, or by providing the mechanisms for them to share content derived from 
their own playbouring experiences, the creative and cooperative capacities of  gamers have 
become significant sources of  abstract economical value through various means and at 
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multiple levels — at the small-scale level of  modder communities and their value as free 
sources of  content creation, to the massively multiplayer level of  populations and their rich 
economies of  practise and exchange, and everything in-between. 
4.3. — What this History Reveals: the Story of  a Constantly Adapting Industry 
 The historical trajectories of  the mobilisation of  ‘playbour-power’ as an increasingly 
recognised source of  value highlights how the very definition of  what constitutes the video-
games industry can be brought into question through an examination of  its commercial logics 
of  valorisation processes. Such an examination brings to the fore: the incorporation of  
modders and their freely-given time and efforts as developers of  valuable content; the 
mobilisation of  players as content creators to build attractively complex in-game cultures; 
and, the building of  immense online game worlds as sources of  apparently unlimited profit 
through both subscription-based revenue models and the initially unintended emergence of  
real-money trading for in-game items and services — what might be described as the 
emergence of  relatively new political economies that, through the processes described above, 
have come to overlap and enmesh with those already exisiting.  
 The rise of  playbour within the audience cultures of  the games industry — when 
considered in the historical context of  the forms and relations of  production that preceded it 
— constituted a subtle incorporation and reverse engineering of  the “work-as-play” (into a 
“play-as-work”) ethos that had characterised the way in which computer games, since their 
inception in 1960s hacker culture, had continually relied upon a constant infusion of  playful 
energies from assemblies of  creative workforces. From the hacker cultures of  the 1960s, to 
the 1970s workforce that challenged Atari’s industry strategy, to the calculatedly managed and 
publicly celebrated designers that animated Nintendo’s revival of  the industry in the 1980s – 
these workforces were all animated by a “work-as-play” ethos, albeit under different regimes 
of  managerial control. As the above has attempted to outline, the next workforce to be 
mobilised in the search for new ways to make the games industry profitable lay outside the 
formal boundaries of  employment and wage-labour, out in the rapidly expanding network of  
online player communities. 
 The aim, then, of  this and the preceding section has been to bring the configurations 
of  labour and valorisation processes that have underpinned the games industry’s trajectory to 
the foreground of  consideration, with the explicit purpose of  outlining the historical 
trajectory of  the video-games industry as a capitalist enterprise founded upon the buying and 
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selling of   entertainment as a commercial commodity. In terms of  perspective, the protracted 
history of  gaming’s commercial development presented here is one that highlights, above all 
else, the dynamics and (re)configurations of  organisational forms and relations of  production 
that have come into existence as expressions of  a continual and iterative process of  valorising 
perceived sources of  value — it is a history of  the ways in which creativity, cooperation, beliefs 
and values, as mobilising forces of desire and calculation, have played a crucial role in the 
formation of  a new media industry and its strategies of  production and accumulation. 
Presenting an historical narrative of  the video-games industry from such a perspective — that 
is, highlighting its initial mobilisation, structural (re)organisation, and  strategic  management 
— does not only paint a unique picture of  how, since its commercial inception in the late 
1960s, it has proceeded to innovate, capitalise upon, and organisationally reconfigure in 
accordance with re-identifications of  potential sources of  value; it also furnishes us with a 
particular frame of  reference from which to begin investigating current developments in this 
highly successful — at times, volatile — new media industry’s methods and means of  both 
identifying and valorising potential sources of  value that can be found within the intricately 
complex social relations of  cooperative associations and creative capacities. Moreover, the 
significance of  value and valorisation as central themes through which to frame an historical 
narrative of  the video-games industry can be further elaborated through a consideration of  
how the commercial logic(s) of  this new media industry tie into broader questions regarding 
the interrelations between new media technologies, labour processes, and the dynamical 
motion of  capitalist (re)production.   
 Understanding labour and its concomitance to the process of  valorisation is a core 
component of  political economic analysis aimed at understanding the social relations of  
production and the foundations upon which they are made possible — whether they are 
exploitative or emancipatory, characterised by struggle and resistance, or merely indicative of  
broader systems of  capitalistic control and appropriation of  even the most intimate aspects 
of  subjectivity. Thus, in relation to the video-games industry, placing questions regarding 
value and processes of  valorisation at the centre of  analysis provides a platform for critical 
investigation into key themes and issues that arise from the conditions of  their 
(re)production, (re)configuration, and appropriation — conditions which, first and foremost, 
have necessitated both a mobilisation and periodic restructuring of  labour- and playbour-
power in the pursuit of  productivity, value and profit. Moreover, a critical interrogation of  
these themes and issues opens up a space for the possibility of  a political economic critique 
of  the conditions and the possible contradictions that attempts to valorise potential sources 
of  value may — or may not — give rise to. That is to say, an investigation into labour, value 
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and valorisation in the video-games industry can provide a stepping stone for formulating a 
broader political economic critique of  the relations, conditions, and potential contradictions 
of  the (re)production processes that underpin dominant forms of  commercialised, new 
media entertainment.  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5. Value in the Video Games Industry Today: Monetisation,   
 Measurement and the ‘Problem of  Profit’ 
Detailing through the history of  the video-games industry up to this point, it quickly becomes 
clear that an investigation of  recent and current trends in the commercial logic(s) of  this 
entertainment industry must take account of  the ways in which it has valorised sources of  
creativity and cooperation beyond its formal boundaries of  labour and employment. 
Understanding these developments as direct expressions of  a more general set of  dynamical 
process whereby sources of  value and means of  valorisation are developed, reconfigured, and 
adapted over time leads one to consider how, and what ways, might these processes be taking 
place in the present? Where might we look to find hints or evidence of  such processes within 
the remit if  an investigation into the video-games industry? As I intend to demonstrate, such 
questions do not require one to look to the peripheries or the margins, but to the recent 
debates and developments that have occupied — and, in many cases, that are still occupying 
— centre stage within the video-games industry.  
 Since the turn of  the millennium, the video-games industry has developed in a variety 
of  directions. For example, multiple forms of  monetised exchange practices within online 
game worlds — the archetypal examples discussed hitherto being Blizzard Entertainment’s 
World of  Warcraft and Sony’s EverQuest — alongside an emerging plethora of  so-called ‘social’ 
and ‘mobile’ games based around a “new” revenue model referred to throughout the video-
games industry as ‘free-to-play’ (or ‘freemium’) gaming, have come into commercial existence 
in recent years. These developments are particularly notable here as they represent core shifts 
and changes and in the way the video-games industry innovating new ways of  thinking about 
sources of  value and methods of  valorisation. These innovations within the video games 
industry with regards to what current and future sources of  abstract economic value might be 
are discussed within this chapter under the heading of  ‘Monetisation Models’, which, with 
regards to terminology, is a direct and explicit reflection of  the ways in which these 
developments are — and have been — discursively narrated within the video-games industry 
by developers, researchers, publishers, industry analysts and so on in the pursuit of  
overcoming what is often seen as the “problem” of  profit. 
 Another salient development that has emerged in tandem with — and indeed, as a 
part of  — this seeking-out of  potential sources of  value within the video-games industry is 
the recent burgeoning of  ‘game analytics’ companies. A particularly noteworthy example of  
such companies being deltaDNA (formerly known as Games Analytics), who specialise in 
providing video-game publishers detailed metricised analyses of  player behaviours ‘right 
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down to event level’ (deltaDNA, 2014) in order to provide advice and direction on how to 
identify previously “untapped” sources of  value and, thereby, further monetary gains beyond 
those currently established. The emergence of  such companies, I shall endeavour to 
demonstrate, is indicative of  the ways in which the general social and cooperative capacities 
of  players, as a central preoccupation of  recent innovations and adaptations within the 
context of  the video-games industry’s commercial logic(s), is being placed under increasing 
levels of  metrical examination and quantification. 
 Overall, what I want to demonstrate in this chapter is that such developments can be 
understood and investigated in considerable detail through a focus upon the ways in which 
the general sociality and subjectivity of  players is today being looked to and analysed as a way 
of  understanding the potential quantified value such qualitative capacities can yeild. Such a 
focus can provide an insightful means of  interrogating the broader question of  how new 
media industries are driving — and deriving from — innovations in the value logic(s) of  
capitalist markets that seek to find ways to impose systems of  measure on the social and 
cooperatively productive capacities of  players/users. A detailed and grounded consideration 
of  questions regarding the ways in which the productive capacities of  video game players to 
create social connections, content and novel gaming experiences for others inform inform the 
commercial calculations of  the video-games industry today constitutes the final stage of  this 
investigation. With this in mind, the following shall proceed to outline and critique the range 
of  aforementioned developments through an investigative consideration of  recent trends in 
the ways that monetisation, measurement, and game design are being both researched and discussed 
as ways for thinking about, identifying, and valorising the potential sources of abstract economic 
value latent within, to refer back to chapter 3, the productive capacities of  players’ 
sympathetic cooperation as participants within a shared world of  playful and meaningful 
engagement. 
 Such questions are central to the ways in which notions of  value are perceived and 
responded to through narrative appeals to core values and beliefs about the directions 
innovations in revenue models can — and indeed should — take. As such, the overall aim of  
this chapter is to present a picture of  certain debates and developments currently taking place 
within the video-games industry that — through a focus upon the aforementioned themes of  
monetisation methods and systems of  measurement — allow one to think through the ways 
in which perceptions, understandings, and desires to make sense of  — and appropriate — 
perceived sources of  value are translated into attempts to negotiate and innovate new methods 
of  valorisation. Often, as I intend to show, such negotiations and attempts at innovation are 
sometimes narrated by video-games designers, publishers, researchers, and company CEOs 
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through an appeal to a shared sense of  core values and beliefs within the industry community. 
Nevertheless, by and large, such negotiations and attempts at innovation can be understood 
as a process of  navigating the perennial “problem” of  profit.  
 Through such a line of  inquiry, one can iterate the discussion back to the broader 
level of  making sense of  these developments in light of  current social theory on the 
machinations of  value and valorisation processes within post-Fordist capitalism, and — 
perhaps — add a new layer of  detail to what might be thought of  — and further investigated 
— as the inner-workings, or developing methods of  the social factory. Indeed, the coalescence 
of  these current developments around a desire to subject the potential value of  intimately 
subjective and social player behaviours to methods of  measurement and monetisation can 
also be placed into direct dialogue with what I have previously referred to as the proposition 
of  an incommensurability between emerging forms of  networked (or, immaterial) 
productivity and capital’s (in)ability to “capture” such activities through processes of  
quantifiable valorisation. In pointing to this, and the ways in which it may be elucidated 
through the examples of  gaming metrics and monetisation models, I aim to open up this 
proposition of  incommensurability and place it firmly under investigation; indeed, it seems 
pertinent to point to the increasing role of  metrics and systems of  measurement — both 
within and without the video-games industry — as possible instances of  concerted attempts to 
overcome (or, to use Marx’s terminology negate) the problem of  valorising the supposedly 
“un-valorisable”. Through this, a particular — though, I would suggest, considerably unique 
— contribution can be made to broader discussions regarding the subjection of  social life in 
general to the ‘logic of  capital’ (Skeggs, 2014). 
  
5.1 — The Perceived Problem of  Profit: Issues of  Monetisation and Measurement  
In order to gain insights into these developments and innovations in methods of  valorisation, 
data was collected from a range of  sources and materials. This collection of  data took place 
over the course of  three years, from mid-2011 through to mid-2014; during this time, a range 
of  information and data — industry-insider bulletins, research white papers, market reports, 
publicly available interviews with industry specialists, website advertisements and so on — 
was collected with the explicit purpose of  gaining insight into “how members of  the video 
games industry are reflecting upon its methods and means of  generating revenue”. The 
collection of  this information, for the most part was fairly straightforward; all it required was 
a willingness to be exposed to the circuits of  advertisements, advice-giving, and discussion 
that are in place for those who are involved in various sectors of  the industry itself. To 
  
achieve this, I went about subscribing to the email-lists of  leading industry report companies 
such as gamesindustry.biz and gamasutra.com, global conference bulletins on game design, 
marketing, and monetisation strategies, alongside obtaining employee handbooks, research 
white papers, monthly briefs, brochures, and dossiers from companies such as Valve 
Corporation, Games Analytics, Palymetrix, and DFC Intelligence. This exposure to the daily 
communications and goings on within the video-games industry yielded a colossal amount of  
information on the ways in which revenue models, player behaviours, games design, and 
markets were being reflected upon and discussed strategically — on the ways this new media 
industry is thinking about where value can come from and how to valorise it. This process I refer to 
subsequently as the perceived “problem” of  profit.  
5.1.1 — Monetisation Models: Value, Values, and the Perceived “Problem” of  Profit 
Over the last decade there has been a notable increase and prevalence of  what are often 
termed under the rubrics of  ‘mobile’ and ‘social’ video-game formats. Although portable game 
devices such as the Nintendo Game Boy have been in circulation since the late 1980s, the 
commercial successes of  mobile multimedia and “smart” devices such as the Apple iPhone 
and Google Nexus have facilitated an immense proliferation of  these ‘mobile games’ (Chan, 
2008; Koivisto, 2007). This is a recent development in the computer games industry that 
many market researchers have focused in on as a key area of  potential market growth; one 
market research company, offering a prediction in 2009, reported that the Apple iPhone alone 
will drive the mobile games market from a then-current valuation of  7.2 billion US dollars to 
an estimated 11.7 billion by 2014 (DFC Intelligence, 2009). The perceived problem, however, 
was how to formulate and refine a monetisation model that would meet such high 
expectations — the answer arrive at was ‘free-to-play’.  
 The terms ‘social’ and ‘online’ gaming have also become dominant tropes in the last 
decade or so for describing the ways in which — through the ‘participatory’ and ‘networked’ 
architectures of  the Internet (what some commentators call ‘Web 2.0’) — video-games are 
becoming increasingly designed around an ability (and desire) to facilitate online participation, 
engagement, creativity, and collaboration between players (Hjorth, 2011). Alongside this, 
there have been many important and — for both critical and celebratory observers — 
interesting developments taking place with regard to the aforementioned genre of  ‘massively 
multiplayer online games’ (MMOGs), particularly with regards to the subscription revenue 
models these ‘virtual worlds’ are founded upon as sources of  commercial profit. Taken as a 
whole, these developments all coalesce around two broad trends in the ways in which the 
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video-games industry has innovated, adapted, and reconfigured in accordance with what can 
be adequately described as the ‘percieved problem of  profit’. These innovations are: (a) the 
emergence of  a revenue model known as free-to-play, ‘freemium’, or ‘paymium’ and (b) 
experimentation with and further adaptation of  the micro-transaction and real-money trade 
(RMT) economies that, as I have shown previously, first emerged in the form of  clandestine 
markets and ‘gold farms’ that were, at-one-and-the-same-time, both part of  and positioned 
outside the revenue streams generated by the commercial game-worlds of  Massively 
Multiplayer Online Games. 
  
The first key development I want to draw attention to here is the emergence of  the ‘free-to-
play’ revenue model that has come into existence alongside the proliferation of  ‘mobile’ 
multimedia and “smart” devices. In simple terms, the core features of  ‘free-to-play’ games are 
that they allow players access to a significant portion of  in-game content at no cost. In many 
cases this involves potential players being granted access to a fully functional — and, in 
theory, relatively “beatable” — gaming experience; however, a core set of  mechanics are 
coded into the game architecture that incentivise the player to pay small fees in order to buy 
in-game items of  various kinds, retry difficult levels, and generally progress through what the 
game has to offer. For example, a hugely popular ‘free-to-play’ puzzle-game named Candy 
Crush Saga, which requires the player to eliminate blocks of  multicoloured and sweet-looking 
virtual “candy” at increasing levels of  difficulty, grants the player five “free-tries”, or “lives”, 
one of  which are “lost” every time a level is failed. Once these lives are exhausted, players are 
presented with a number of  options to replenish them: firstly, players can send requests to 
their Facebook friends, inviting them to play and, thereby, replenishing the inviters lives; 
secondly, players can wait for an allotted time period for these lives to replenish themselves 
(half  an hour per life); or, thirdly, players can purchase new lives directly from an in-game 
store using their credit card or PayPal and so on. Although this is a rather simplistic overview, 
it is nonetheless clear how this revenue model constitutes a significant departure from the 
traditional retailing of  games hardware and the monthly subscription models of  MMOGs like 
World of  Warcraft.  
 The ways in which this revenue model is being discussed within the industry, by 
developers, publishers, executives and so on, paints a particularly insightful picture of  the 
kinds of  innovations taking place with regards to how value is “thought about” within the 
industry. Such discussions reveal a great deal about the kinds of  technical lexicons being 
developed in order to describe from where and how value can be sought, and the playing out 
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of  decision-making processes about the implementation of  new regimes of  profit; moreover, 
at times, they also reveal a great deal about the values and beliefs that are mobilised when talking 
about the value of  players in a monetary, profit-seeking sense. 
 A particularly insightful starting comment on the perceived promise and potential of  
the ‘free-to-play’ games revenue model is contained within the following statement made by 
Michail Katkoff, an executive producer at the multi-million dollar games company Zynga: 
‘When you're talking about services and f2p [free-to-play], you're talking about bigger 
audiences … With bigger audiences, you have much more leverage to create revenue. 
Because now not only can you create revenue through in-app purchases, you can also 
create a lot of  revenue through advertisements because you have that much traffic. We're 
not talking about doubling; we're talking about 10 times bigger audience sizes.’ (Katkoff, 
quoted in Sinclair, 2013a: [online]) 
Of  particular note here is the overt sense of  promise expounded by an appeal to the potential 
for garnering audience sizes of  such considerable scope that there will be a possibility for 
“leveraging” revenue in multiple ways. Important terms such as “traffic”, “in-app purchases” 
and “advertisements” are referred to here as core ingredients for thinking through and 
reflecting upon the ways in which, ultimately, the free-to-play model of  gaming holds much 
promise for generating incredible levels of  revenue through an attraction of  greater audience 
sizes — quite literally, there is a sense of  quantity begets quantity here, the greater the 
cumulative attention-time, the more profitable the game. This final point is elucidated by 
Katkoff ’s follow up statement on the uses of  technical knowledge for understanding the 
value of  players:  
‘Instead of  looking at ARPU [average-revenue-per-user] or conversion rate, I usually like 
to look at retention … The longer time players actually spend in one specific game, the 
more likely they are to convert, either by watching ads, making in-app purchases, or 
inviting their friends to play along.’ (Katkoff, quoted in Sinclair, 2013a: [online]).  
In a similar, yet more technically described fashion, Katkoff  describes here the information 
and methods he employs to reflect upon the potential sources of  value to be found within 
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gamer populations. What is particularly revealing is that he refers here to ‘retention’ as a 
valuable metric for him to think about the best ways to understand the conditions through 
which players increase in their revenue potential — for Katkoff, the most important 
condition is time spent within the game because, as he sees it, this makes players “more likely 
to convert” into revenue. Of  note here is that this notion of  conversion refers directly to a 
perceived sense of  a latent value potential in both the subjective experience of  players (time 
spent in the game) and their sociality interconnectedness (the possibility of  inviting their 
friends along). This perceived sense of  a latent value has multiple dimensions — the 
possibility of  watching advertisements through increased attention-time, the direct purchasing-
power required to acquire in-game content, and the value of  the general sociality of  already-
existing players to introduce new players. As was discussed in chapter 3, it is the general 
socially co-operative ability of  people to establish connections and share beliefs, experiences, 
and values that constitutes the foundational productive power of  social life in general. Here it 
is clear that this general capacity for sharing (the gaming) experience “with friends” is at the 
forefront of  consideration as a means of  understanding the value of  players’ time in an 
abstract economic sense of  revenues.    
The importance of  obtaining technical knowledge as a crucial means through which 
to understand and “make sense of ” potential forms of  value latent within players of  free-to-
play games is reflected upon in the following account given by Tayber Voyer, a self-described 
“thinking ape” designer and producer within the video-games industry. Of  particular note in 
the following is an emphasis upon understanding context and the ‘emergent behaviour’ of  
players. In a presentation on the importance of  metrics for games design, Voyer posited the 
following: 
  
‘With player feedback, you can learn and understand context. And context is what 
creates emergent behavior. And behavior makes your product great … They're [players] 
the people that pay for your game to exist. And even if  they aren't a high spender, they're 
critically important to the ecosystem of  your game. Every player is’ (Voyer, quoted in 
Sinclair, 2013b: [online]). 
Although noticeably less couched directly in monetary and revenue terms, the points of  
emphasis here upon player behaviour, context, and the ecosystem of  games are nevertheless 
enmeshed in a process of  “thinking” about the productive potential of  players’ participation 
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in the game. For Voyer, the role of  various forms of  feedback for understanding context and 
player behaviour cannot be overemphasised as means through which to reflect upon how 
every player — even those who do not directly spend large quantities of  money — is of  
critical importance to what he refers to as the “ecosystem” of  a given game. This appeal to 
the notion an ecosystem, though not explicitly couched in terms of  value, nevertheless 
alludes to a sense of  the overall “health and systemic balance” of  a game and its player 
population — an allusion that, given the previous reflection of  Katkoff  on the revenue 
virtues of  audience size, nevertheless implies some form of  overall sense of  the value of  
players, no matter who they are and what they do, to the “commercial health” of  the game. 
Moreover, there is a peculiar ethical dimension to Voyer’s account that comes to light through 
his referral to players being the reason the game exists — a sort of  indirect eschewing of  the 
commercial purpose of  games as generators of  revenue and capital, and a foregrounding of  
the player population as the foundation of  a “great game”.  In a sense, this constitutes a sort 
of  indirect attempt to downplay the commercial basis of  games and draw attention to the 
primacy of  an ethical foundation for their existence: it is the players themselves that make 
games great, not the companies to whom they belong — players and their behaviour are the 
game.  
 And yet, at one and the same time, there is a noticeable sense of  commercial 
“ownership” of  the game as a means of  valorising gaming behaviour (‘behaviour makes your 
game great’) that sits alongside an appeal to a kind of  ethical value that elevates players to a 
position of  power over existence (‘They're [players] the people that pay for your game to exist’) — 
a central theme of  this juxtaposition between reflections upon commercial value and ethical 
values, then, is a preoccupation with the overall perpetuation and continued existence of  the 
video-games industry as both a creator of engaging experiences and subject to the value-
judgements of  those whose experiences it seeks to valorise.  
 Such ethical appeals to a notion of  the overall progress of  the industry through explicit 
discussions of  — and reflections upon — means and methods for valorising player 
behaviours, is particularly common in the discursive exchanges taking place within the video-
games industry. Consider, for example, the following statement from industry analyst Rob 
Fahey, in which an ethical notion of  ‘salvation’ is mobilised in a discussion about the 
commercial, profit-seeking future of  the video-games and its problematisation as an 
“unknown”: 
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‘The salvation of  core game development will lie, in some way, with a strategy that allows 
players who are deeply engaged with a game to spend more money on it” [emphasis 
added] (Fahey, 2013: [online]). 
From this pithy, yet highly insightful, comment it is clear that there is a central concern for 
the future profitability of  the video-games industry, and that this concern is expressed in a 
two-fold equation of  a “problem” and “solution”. Firstly, there is an explicit referral to the 
perceived “problem” of  how to design and develop video-games in the future as an issue of  
‘salvation’, of  saving the industry from some form of  implied damnation, destruction, or 
decadence . Secondly, Fahey goes on to posit that the source of  this salvation is to be found 16
within a game design strategy that ‘allows players who are deeply engaged with a game to 
spend more money on it’ — the problem of  salvation, through this proposal, translates into a 
technical problem of  “how to get more players deeply involved”, so that this salvation might 
be realised in the form of  more money. What we can see here is a rather remarkable and 
seemingly seamless process of  translation between (a) values, (b) abstract economic value, and 
an articulated need for new methods of  (c) valorisation: the imperative to (a) “save” the 
video-games industry requires a concerted reflection upon where (b) economic value can be 
found, and this further requires a reconfiguration of  (c) the means and methods of  its 
appropriation. That is to say, in an overtly noticeable sense, the future of  the industry is 
posed as a problem of  “where will profit come from?”, yet this is posited — in the first 
instance, but certainly not the last — in distinctly moral terms. 
 In pointing to this I am not attempting to suggest that there is a complete uniformity 
of  opinion and shared values amongst video-game designers, developers, company leaders 
and so on — rather the opposite. Indeed, there are many instances where the values and 
beliefs of  people working within the industry come into direct conflict over the direction of  
its commercial future. Instead, the picture I am attempting to portray here is rather more 
simple: that the future of  the industry and its developmental direction is framed by a primary 
concern for how and in what ways revenue can be generated from “new” sources — that is, it 
is a picture of  what appears to be the prevailing priority of  a new media industry. An example 
of  the rile against the ascendancy of  the free-to-play revenue model is demonstrated in the 
following, where ‘code enforcement officer’ of  Devolver Digital, Graeme Struthers responds 
 In itself, this is eerily reminiscent of  what Weber (2003) identified as a peculiar germination point 16
of  the spirit of  modern capitalism — the protestant ethic, founded as it was upon a preoccupation 
with divine salvation
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to the wide-spread speculation that video-game consoles will — as a consequence of  this 
ascendancy — become obsolete as ‘mobile’ and ‘social’ gaming takes centre stage: 
"I was so fed up of  people telling us we should do free-to-f***ing-play, in-app-f***ing 
purchases, whatever the f*** that is, and that consoles were dead. So f*** all of  those 
people and their f***ing shitty stance. Consoles aren't dead” (Struthers, quoted in 
Pearson, 2014: [online])  
It is clear from the fervour of  Struther’s comment on the free-to-play model that we can not 
consider there to be a single unanimous agreement upon it as the future direction of  the 
video-games industry Rather, it seems more pertinent to highlight how it is a key point of  
discussion, debate, and reflection with regards to a more general — and primarily constant — 
preoccupation with “where the industry is going”; and this, it must be reiterated, is often 
articulated in terms of  “what revenue models are appropriate to such a future”. Indeed, 
reflection and discussion centred upon a general uncertainty regarding the future of  the 
video-games industry appeared to be a daily topic in the streams of  news, debate, interviews, 
and research findings examined over the course of  this investigation. As the following 
comments from Peter Molyneux regarding the morality and potential of  the free-to-play revenue 
model shows, this is clearly a core topic for considerable debate and discssion. Note that he 
refers to the potential of  free-to-play games through metaphor of  “the cube”: 
“There are very few checks in place. I think that a lot of  the people we call whales are kids 
that have grabbed their parents phones. I know my son has done that … Well, I know 
what's in the middle of  the cube. And whoever breaks in there, I promise you this, it is 
the most amazing thing … It’s a big cube; what's inside? Only one person will find out, 
and whether that one person then goes on to tell the rest of  the world, I don't 
know” [emphasis added] (Molyneux, quoted in Handrahan, 2012: [online]). 
Initially, Molyneux makes reference to the recent controversies over how much money is 
being spent in free-to-play games, in some cases accumulating invoices in the thousands of  
pounds (see: Poulter, 2013). It is interesting to draw attention to the way in which this is 
addressed here by Molyneaux and the terms employed. Firstly, he places the current validity 
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of  this revenue model into question through a reference to “checks” not being in place to 
control how much — and how easily — players can spend hard currency on in-game content, 
referring to those who do as “whales” — a common term throughout the industry for a small 
percentage of  players who spend phenomenal amounts of  cash on in-game content relative 
to the majority active players of  free-to-play games. This light touch upon the possible 
problems this revenue model might give rise to is then followed up by a much more 
exuberant and enthusiastic comment regarding its future potential — it is, for Molyneaux, a 
cube to investigated and “worked out”.  
 Despite the lack of  a direct reference to monetary or revenue gains to be made, there 
is a noticeable sense of  the potential of  this “free-to-play cube” being a potential gain for those 
companies that can exploit it; this is most clear in the way in which Molyneaux comments 
that only one “person” will “break into it” and the question then will be wether that “person” 
reveals their secret to the rest of  “those seeking the centre of  the cube”. What is being 
alluded to here through this elaborate — and possibly evasive — metaphor is the possible 
discovery and revealing of  a “business secret”; a secret, if  you will, pertaining to the “best 
possible” way to garner the attention, time and productive potential of  player-audiences as a cube 
puzzle. Again, as the above examples have illuminated, there is a peculiar admixture here 
between value and values, between the ways in which values, beliefs and desires are framing 
devices for thinking about a more abstract and economic notion of  value. At one and the 
same time, Molyneaux invokes the “problem” of  profiteering as a sort of  “cube” puzzle — 
describing its adequate solution as the “most amazing thing” — whilst also reflecting on the 
possibility of  wether those who “discover” a solution to this problem will be motivated to 
share their “secret” with “the rest of  the world”. Value is being narrated here as an object of  
mystery, amazement, and discovery. At the same time, the ethical value of  sharing and 
collaborating on the problem of  “figuring out” value is invoked through a rumination on the 
prospect of  such an “amazing” feat being achieved in a potential future. Nevertheless, in both 
cases one can glimpse here how value is considered and made the subject of  speculation 
through reflection upon its nature and potential source(s); Molyneux’s “cube” of  currently 
unknown quantity and scope is, at one and the same time, players and their potential 
productivity as a source of  value-creation — the “problem” is figuring out a means to identify 
the “most amazing” way achieve this. 
 Up to this point, I have started to provide an outline for considering how and in what 
ways the discussions taking place within the communicative circuits of  the video-games 
industry in relation to the free-to-play revenue model reveal — even if  only in a passing 
glimpse — how the shared beliefs and values of  video games industry participants are 
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oriented towards a shared notion of  value as a standardised, economic measure expressed in 
terms of  revenue and profit. Moreover, I have also intimated toward the ways in which we 
might go about considering the ways in which such shared values — in the sense of  appeals to 
ethical imperatives such as cooperating, collaborating, and empowering — are invoked and 
deployed in direct connexion with “thinking through” how to identify, configure, and valorise 
collective player behaviour an subjective experiences as potential sources of  a standardised, 
measurable source of  value. From here, it is useful to point to a number of  examples of  the 
implementation of  the free-to-play and ‘micro-transactions’ revenue models to provide some 
clarification and further insight beyond what, so far, has been a detailing of  speculated 
potential.  
   
Enter King Digital’s Candy Crush Saga, the archetypal success story of  the free-to-play model 
— and there have been many failures to be sure. The story of  Candy Crush Saga is not only a 
story of  immense capital accumulation through sales revenues, it is also the story of  a multi-
billion dollar Intellectual Public Offering (IPO) and the ascendancy of  two figures behind its 
creation into the top-thousand wealthiest people in Britain. Initially released in April 2012 for 
Facebook, and the following November as a mobile app for smartphones, Candy Crush Saga is 
a puzzle game that requires the player to horizontally or vertically “swap” the position of  two 
adjacent pieces of  candy to create sets of  matching colour. As previously mentioned, the 
game grants players five “free-tries”, or “lives”, one of  which are “lost” every time a level is 
failed — and once these lives are exhausted, players are presented with a number of  options 
to replenish them: through in-app purchase; requesting help from friends via Facebook; or 
waiting for a given time period. The success of  this game in monetary terms was, by 
September 2013, simply immense — so much so, in fact, that King Digital prepared for an 
IPO estimated at that time to value at around $5 billion (Brightman, 2013).  
 Over the course of  2014, the success of  Candy Crush Saga’s free-to-play revenue model 
continued to the tune of  astonishing statistical breakdowns of  “how many players”, “how 
much revenue”, and, importantly, “how many more new players”. One analysis conducted by 
The Guardian estimated that, over the course of  2014, players of  the game spent £865 million 
on the in-app purchases alone (Dredge, 2015). It is perhaps worthy of  note here too that in 
May 2014, Riccardo Zacconi (co-founder of  King Digital) — along with a number of  others 
involved in the creation of, and investment in, Candy Crush Saga — were entered into the The 
Sunday Times Rich List, a generalist guide to the wealthiest people in Britain (Weber, 2014). 
In July of  2014, it even became possible to buy Candy Crush Saga confectionary in selected 
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stores across the United Kingdom (Weber, 2014b). One would not be amiss to suggest that, 
in many ways at least, it only took one year since Molyneaux’s allusion to “the cube” for 
someone to “reach the middle” using the free-to-play revenue model, and the results were 
amazing — startling even.  
 Another particularly interesting development to detail here, especially with regards to 
adding a sense of  chronological unfolding from the discussion of  MMOGs and their online 
worlds within the preceding chapter, is the design of  — and experimentation with — micro-
transactional revenue methods in Activision Blizzard’s Diablo III. Prior to the release of  Diablo 
III there was a great deal of  industry discussion, speculation, debate, and interviewing about 
the innovations and design decisions Activision Blizzard were planning on implementing. 
Unlike earlier MMOGs developed and published by Blizzard Entertainment (before it merged 
with Activision) — World of  Warcraft being the prime example — where the revenue model 
was based solely upon monthly subscriptions to gain access to the game, Diablo III would also 
include an official in-game action house. Ultimately, this story is one of  failure and a shutting 
down of  this in-game auction house in March 2014 (Leibl, 2014); nevertheless, the 
speculation, articulated intentions, and discussions surrounding its development and 
implementation provide a further level of  detail to the analysis hitherto provided.  
 The main features and functions of  this in-game auction house were to provide 
players with the ability to spend real-world currency to buy and trade in-game content such as 
gold, weapons, and armour, whilst also offering the opportunity for those willing to pay a 
“nominal transaction fee” to exchange accrued in-game wealth for hard-cash. There were 
many dimensions to the types of  transactions that this in-game auction house afforded, some 
of  which allowed players to purchase subscription credits to another of  Activision Blizzard’s 
MMOGs — World of  Warcraft. Nevertheless, of  particular interest here is the ways in which 
key figures involved in the development, decision-making, and (attempted) implementation 
of  this innovation discussed and reflected upon its purpose. In an interview about this 
introduction of  real-world currency transactions into an MMOG, lead designer of  Diablo III 
Jay Wilson explains: 
“Certainly there's an economic element to the auction house for us, but it came first and 
foremost as: what do we want to do for the players? What service can we possibly offer 
that would make the game experience better? … If  we make money on it that's great, 
we're a business, we want to make money. But not at the expense of  the customers - but 
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because we've offered them something that was worth their money” (Wilson, quoted in 
Weber, 2011: [online]). 
Here it is clear, once again, that there is an interesting interrelation between what Wilson 
himself  calls an “economic element” to the decision to implement the in-game auction house, 
and an appeal to alternative, more ethically-oriented values of  wanting to provide the “best 
possible service for the customer”, and — it must be noted — of  not wanting to pursue 
money “at the expense of  the customer”; for Wilson, this constitutes the primary motivational 
force of  the decision to implement the in-game auction house. Leaving aside issues regarding the 
complexity of  correlating accounts with actions, it is nonetheless the case that an intricate 
process is taking place here between a consideration of  an abstract economic notion of  value 
on the one hand, and values as an expounded primary goal of innovation. This is made 
especially clear by the way in which Wilson explicitly downplays the role of  money as the 
incentive for implementing the in-game auction house, stating that, although they (Activision 
Blizzard) are in the business of  making money, this should not come at the “expense” of  the 
players. In a later interview, Wilson added some further clarification to his position on what 
he clearly sees as the perceived “problem” of  ethicality with the potentially profitable in-game 
auction house:  
"We want to make money because making money means we get to make more games, 
and we get to make bigger games … I don't think it's a bad thing to want to make 
money. I think it's a bad thing to want to make money off  things that are not a good 
service or product [a] for your customer, and that's our inherent belief, is that it's okay to 
make money on a service we provide for our customers that [b] we think is a good 
service worth paying for” [emphases added] (Wilson, quoted in Weber, 2012: [online]) 
There is an interesting and noticeable “problem” — one might say, contradiction — that 
Wilson is attempting to navigate here: that — although not couched in such terms — there is 
a perceived incompatibility between monetary and ethical incentives for building the in-game 
auction house in Diablo III, between value-as-money and values-as-belief  as the motivation 
for this innovation. In order to overcome this perceived “problem” of  the ethicality of  
profiteering, Wilson invokes an explicit sense of  “belief ” in the ability to make money by 
providing experiences that are, to use his terminology, worth investing in for prospective 
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players. There is a two-fold aspect to the contradiction I am alluding to here in Wilson’s 
attempt to navigate this perceived “problem”: firstly, he indirectly invokes a sense of  
empowerment on the part of  players to evaluate whether products are [a] not in their interest, 
“not worth paying for” — that is, not of  value to players; subsequently, he goes on to suggest 
that [b] “we” — the developers, publishers and so on — are in a position to invoke “our own 
value-judgements on” what services are, and are not, worthy of  investment on the part of  
(potential) players. Whilst not wanting to overcomplicate the line of  argument here, is it not 
worth pointing out that — given Diablo III is a paid-for experience in the first instance — 
initial investment of  both time and money is required on the part of  players to reach a 
judgement on whether such investments are indeed “worth it” — oddly, this leaves the act of  
judging worth, evaluating value, in a retrospective arrangement to the very act of  investing. 
Nevertheless, the more pertinent point here is that — regardless of  the particular way in 
which the ethicality of  Diablo III’s in-game auction house is narrated by Wilson — there is 
nonetheless a clear connexion emerging between the processes of  attempting to innovate 
new methods and definitions for making sense of  the value of  player populations, and the 
invocation of  values as resources for legitimising such attempts as “for the good of  the 
player”. 
 An interesting question emerges from such an observation: although it is often the 
case that values are mobilised or invoked as a means to downplay the overarching 
predominance of  seeking profits, is it also the case that the opposite arrangement can be 
observed? That is, are values explicitly invoked as a means to emphasise profiteering? In the 
following statement, co-founder of  Blizzard entertainment (now Activision Blizzard) Frank 
Pearce reflects upon the potential of  Diablo III as a means to prevent World of  Warcraft players 
from becoming the patrons of  other, competing games companies: 
“For us, I think it’s really important that we recognise that somewhere, sometime it's 
likely that [a] someone is going to cannibalise World of  Warcraft players, so [b] it’s better we 
cannibalise them ourselves than let someone else do that, because [c] if  we cannibalise them ourselves, 
they’re still a Blizzard customer” [emphases added] (Pearce, quoted in Pearson, 2011: 
[online]). 
In the first instance of  Pearce’s above rumination, he alludes to what he considers to be a 
threatening possibility of  competing interest for Activision Blizzard’s existing corpus of  World 
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of  Warcraft players — the metaphor for competition here being “cannibalism”. Moreover, this 
perceived “threat” of  another video-game company cannibalising one of Activision Blizzard’s 
greatest sources of  commercial profits is posited in terms that approximate a form of  
‘calculative pragmatism’: “someone is going to cannibalise the source of  our profit-streams, 
so it’s better if  we do it ourselves first”. The admixture of value (profits) and values (better for us) 
here is particularly striking if  we consider for a moment its three-part unfolding: firstly, [a] 
there is a call for a collective “we” (insert: Activision Blizzard) to come to terms with the 
inevitability of  market competition (insert: cannibalism) over “what really matters” (insert: the 
profiting potential of  players time and attention); secondly, [b] a proclamation of  self-interest 
is invoked through a juxtaposition of  “we” versus “someone else” — “given this inevitability 
it is “better” for us, our interests as a commercial company take precedent”; and finally, [c] 
through the former two propositions, an objective of  retaining “Blizzard customers” is 
arrived at. Thus: [a] since “cannibalisation” will happen, [b] “we” must be the ones to [c] “do 
it”, because that is what is “better” for us. For Pearce, the “problem” of  profit is not one of  
attempting to justify or downplay profiting from “others/players” — though this 
manifestation of  the “problem” of  profit was certainly present in previously referred-to 
accounts, particularly with regard to a notable desire to neutralise or downplay profiteering as 
a primary motivation for implementing monetising game design. Rather, for Pearce it is a 
“problem” of  prevailing over the consonant interests of  “others/companies”. In either case, 
the “problem” of  profit has a double sense: (i) where and how can it be sourced from, and (ii) why 
is this “necessary”. The former of  these being the problem of  valorisation in the first sense 
— as a problem of  quantification, of  extending the application of  capital’s ‘logic of  
valuation’ (Skeggs, 2014); the latter being the problem of  valorisation in the second sense — as 
a problem of  qualification, of  validating this logic. 
From the above what we can see is a clear and very explicit engagement on the part of  games 
industry analysts, publishers, CEOs and others, in discussion about two key interrelated 
points. Firstly, there is a noticeable and very clear consideration of  what — referring back to 
the notion of  sympathetic cooperation and the constituent powers of  the social contained 
within Chapter 3 above (Terranova, 2014) — these games industry professionals view as the 
general productive power of  populations of  game players that is understood as their collective 
abilities to, for example, create the social ecology of  a game-world or introduce new players 
to a given game. The second of  these points, is the way in which these social activities of  
player populations are discussed in terms that — at one and the same time — identify them 
as both productive of  the “amazingness” and novel character of  the gaming experience, and 
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as a potential source of  abstract economic value in the form of  revenue and profits. What is 
particularly interesting here, moreover, is the way in which discussion focussed upon the 
monetisation of  player behaviours and sociality was often framed in relatively moral or ethical 
terms that, instead of  overtly stating the intention to generate profits, often invoked the 
player experience as an end point of  game development.  
 This point is particularly clear the above ways in which economic value-related 
concepts are invoked alongside and in connexion to appeals to various values perceived to be 
collectively held by the industry community — creative innovation, producing the best possible 
experience for gamers, leading the industry forward and into the future. Such appeals to 
‘progressionary visions’ and audience satisfaction sit directly alongside open and explicit 
discussions about how to best translate the minutiae, everyday aspects of  gamers’ social and 
subjective experiences and relations — their friendship connections, values, desires, 
motivations and, importantly, their attention — from a generally perceived productive power 
of  the social gaming experience, into a directly ‘monetiseable’ form of  economic value. As 
such, what I have outlined so far, can in this light be considered a clear demonstration of  how 
the games industry has been fully engrossed in the contemplation of  how to translate the 
productive power of  the sociality of  players into economic productivity — that is, the above 
demonstrates some key insights into how the video games industry is currently engaged in a 
search for ways to valorise the core productive capacities of  social and sympathetic 
cooperation into economic value. A further demonstration of  the way in which the video 
games industry is searching out such ways to valorise the social capacities players can be seen 
in the development of  systems of  measurement and game metrics. 
  
5.1.2 — Measurement(s): Game Metrics and the Potential to Valorise the Hitherto Un-Valorised 
Another noticeable trend within the video-games industry in recent years is the creation and 
rapid development of  businesses founded upon the provision of  predictive analytics services 
to video-game publishing companies, all of  which is geared toward understanding — and 
adapting to — player behaviours for the explicit purpose of  ever-more-efficient monetisation. 
When placed in juxtaposition to the above analysis of  commentaries on the introduction, 
innovation, and potential of  revenue models, the modus operandi of  these analytics companies 
— the ins-and-outs of  the services they provide, the ways in which they advertise these 
services and so on — provide a wealth of  insight into how such ventures in the methods of  
capital are opening up what might be referred to as as the ‘potential to valorise the hitherto 
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un-valorised’; in other words, a concatenation of  valorisations that operate at multiple-levels 
and upon various forms of  “latent-value” potential.  
 Moreover these games analytics companies, viewed through the investigative lens 
developed thus far, are a prime site from which to consider the ways in which the video-
games industry resembles ‘an assemblage of  assemblages in which technical, cultural, social 
and physiological components intervene’ (Terranova, 2010: 164). I would like to further 
suggest, however, that these companies and the analytic services they perform, epitomise a 
broader and far-reaching mobilisation of  measurement systems that might be thought of  as a 
relatively ‘automated milieu of  methodologies’ that are geared directly toward the 
measurement and, by extension, valorisation of  sociality and social life in general. These 
methodologies, as relatively hidden and increasingly pervasive ‘processes of  automated 
traceability’ (Steigler, 2009: 129), are — I intend to show through the example of  games 
analytics — providing a methodological basis through which the cooperative capacities of  
people going about their daily lives, making connections and producing the worlds in which 
they live (Terranova, 2009), are becoming subjected to systems and regimes of  measure that 
are going rise to the possibility for capital to create new operative categories of  valorisation.   
 Over the course of  my data collection, one of  the first noticeably advertised games 
analytics companies to appear on industry market bulletins, email lists, and conference 
headings was Edinburgh UK based Games Analytics, founded in 2010. They are a self-
described “player relationship Management” (PRM) firm that specialise in “free-to-play”, 
“social casino” and “real money gambling” solutions. I shall begin by detailing some of  the 
business advertising slogans of  these gaming analytics companies before moving to show a 
few diagrams of  the case study research they have conducted in recent years. Just to note, I 
have obtained the case study research papers from their own website, they are free to 
download and consult.  
 Games Analytics market themselves with a number of  interesting rhetorical devices; 
terms like “power”, “engagement” and interestingly for the purposes here “maximise”. More 
specifically, on Games Analytics’ website the main banner heading states “maximise player 
engagement”; without wanting to seem too presumptive at this juncture, the term maximise 
does seem to share a very high degree of  consonance with valorise and accumulation. One 
notable instance of  the way in which Games Analytics advertises itself  to prospective video 
game development companies is taken from one of  the brochures downloaded from their 
website: 
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‘Not all players are the same. Understanding your players and personalizing the player 
experience significantly increases engagement to improve retention & monetization. 
Access to rich event data in high performance database tools allows users to go beyond 
dashboards and generate key insights by using powerful data mining, A/B testing and 3D 
segmentation tools. (Games Analytics, 2013: [online])  
There are a number of  interesting points to make here, not least the explicit encouragement 
to monetise, but notice that monetise is equated with retention — this metric crops up a great 
deal in the data collected. Nevertheless, the main point to make here with regards to the ways 
in which this company is setting itself  up can be seen in the statement “not all players are the 
same” and its subsequent postulation of  a need to understand and personalise the player 
experience. This, alongside the detailed descriptions given of  the metrics and “data mining 
tools”, is all geared toward the overall aim of  retention and “monetisation”. But it is also 
denotive of  the lengths to which these companies were claiming they could go to in terms of  
eliciting details about player behaviours; the appeals to their “methods” for making sense of  
players’ behaviour is particularly striking in this case because it is enmeshed with a sense of  
“allowing” you to do so much. The following is a prime example of  this “allowing”, or 
“revealing of ” supposedly hitherto unforeseen micro-details about the behaviours of  gamers 
and the information that can be gleaned from this: 
  
‘The self-service platform allows your whole team to view and explore rich game 
& player data in a fast and flexible environment. With full data access and a 
unique combination of  Performance Metrics Dashboards, Slice & Dice Analytics 
and Explore Data Mining Tools, Measure 2.0 supports cohort comparison, 
custom event funnels and more in order to help you understand key blocking 
points in your game, such as mission difficulty or tutorial funnel’ (Games 
Analytics, 2013: [online]).  
To get a good sense of  what exactly all these analytics are geared towards, I have included 
below one of  the many diagrammatical representations included within the games analytics 
brochure (see: figure 1). 
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 The detail of  what is being analysed here by this diagram gives a very good sense of  
how these companies are thinking about the sociality and behaviours of  people in terms of  
their value. Firstly, the two largest groups, ‘Losing Momentum’ and ‘Sporadic Semi-Engaged’ 
both have what are referred to as low retention rates, which Games Analytics analysts suggested 
was because there were parts of  the game were considered “boring” and consequently 
causing players to leave. As such, the game developer was advised by Games Analytics to add-
in more features to this part of  the game for players who fall into this group. Note that this 
does not translate into direct monetisation, instead the keyword at the bottom of  the diagram 
is Revenue Potential — in other words, players that exhibit certain behaviours are seen “as of  
more potential revenue than others”. Already there is a strong sense here of  a connexion that 
is being established between the subjective experiences of  individual players and the 
development of  a sophisticated system of  measuring how to improve this experience according 
to the needs and desires of  the given player.  
 Perhaps one of  the most interesting categories above — and of  significant 
implication given the nature of  this investigation — is the “Social Involver” and its revenue 
potential, which significantly outstrips all other categories in this metric. There is a term used 
by gaming analytics companies — “virality” — which denotes “highly sociable” people who 
“will respond well to rewards and incentives to introduce significant numbers to the game”. 
This metric is an indicative measure, then, of  how likely the player is to introduce new players 
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Figure 1: Early play segments: taken from Games Analytics (2011a)
to the game through their social connectivity and relations. Given that this “virality” metric 
denotes the likelihood of  someone introducing another person to the game — yet this does 
not amount to any form of  direct monetary purchase or economic expenditure in the first 
instance — what is it that is thought to be of  value to make this such an important predictor 
of  revenue potential? 
 The theory of  sympathetic cooperation outlined in chapter 3 demonstrates its 
explanatory power here as a means of  beginning to unpick the the ways in which general 
social life is the foundational basis upon which production is built. As was demonstrated in 
chapter 3, the notion of  sympathetic allows us to begin unpicking the ways in which 
contemporary capitalism is expropriating value from the ‘the associative dynamics through 
which individuals … capture each other’s attention, compose every-varying new beliefs, 
desires and forms of  association, and constitute a socius by continuously re-actualising the 
world’s possibilities’ (Terranova, 2014: [online]). The revenue potential of  players according to 
their virality metric, as a measure of  the likelihood of  a given player to introduce a new non-
player (and potential paying customer) to the game, appears to be an apposite example of  
exactly the kinds of  means we must look to if  we are to male sense of  how contemporary 
capitalism is expropriating value from the associative dynamics and associations of  
individuals. Indeed, the virality metric outlined here appears to function primarily as an 
indicator of  how productive a given players social relations are to the increasing of  the overall 
population of  players of  the game — and this, furthermore, is where the potential revenue 
lies in correlation with the sociality of  the players.  
 Secondly, there is a definite way in which these abstract concepts of  virality and 
revenue potential are reflected back onto the organisation of  social player relations in the 
form of  reflexive games design decisions. As the Games Analytics solution creed suggests, 
these metrics can be utilised to help foster adaptive game design that is specifically tailored to 
the needs and behaviours of  definable player populations. As such, it seems appropriate to 
question wether or not we must consider the ways in which abstract economic concepts such 
as these come to play in the formation and reformation of  the social worlds that the 
capacities of  cooperation give rise to, and, moreover, the forms of  value that are made 
possible through these processes. If  we are to make sense of  the possible ways capital can 
capture the productive powers of  cooperation, to produce not just objects or subjects, but 
worlds to live in, then we must also consider the possibility that these methods of  capture 
may also come to play a pivotal role in the production social life, much like they do here in 
the context of  the social life of  the video game.  
  153
 Nevertheless, my main aim in detailing the ways in which gaming metrics are utilised 
to predict the revenue potential of  players concerns what can be considered here as the ‘value 
of  sociability’. As was discussed throughout chapters 2 and 3, a major contribution from the 
Autonomous Marxist school of  thought is the idea of  notion that we are living in a period 
where all of  social life is becoming subjected to capitalistic processes of  valuation, where all 
of  social life is becoming characterised as a factory without walls — a social factory. The 
analysis provided thus far in this chapter points inexorably to a situation where this thesis 
comes to the fore as a particularly apposite means of  describing the ways in which the video 
games industry, through the innovation of  new revenue models and systems of  measurement, 
places a high value on the general capacity of  gamers’ sociality — so much so that, as the 
above figure showed, the active sociality of  players was considered to be by far the greatest 
predictive metric of  revenue potential. In this case, there is a direct connexion established 
between the qualitative capacities of  players as producers and re-creators of  the social worlds 
of  values, beliefs and relations in which they live and the developing quantitative measures 
that seek to subject these productive capacities to predictive valuation. For the gaming 
industry, this connexion is centred around the value of  the sociability of  gamers. Consider the 
following extract, taken from a best-selling industry text entitled Social Game Design: 
Monetization Methods and Mechanics, written by Tim Fields and Brandon Cotton — both of  
whom are long-standing game designers. The section of  the book this is taken from is 
entitled ‘Motivate LTNV’, the meaning of  which will become immediately apparent:     
‘As we’ve hinted at previously, there are other ways to derive indirect value from your users, 
even if  they don’t pay you a penny or click on a single ad. When users invite their friends, 
they increase their lifetime total value (LTNV). Even if  that particular player never gives 
you a dime, there’s always a chance that their friends will spend money in your game, or 
view ads. Thus you should always seek to build game mechanics that reward (or 
mandate) users who invite friends into your game … Ultimately, motivating players to 
invite their friends through your game mechanic increases the viral nature of  the game, 
which in turn leads to user acquisition, which is the quickest way to more revenue. 
Behaviors that maximise this motivation lead to a higher LTNV and thus a more 
profitable game’ [emphases added] (Fields and Cotton, 2012: 164).   
 It is certainly not easy to suggest that there is a clear and determinate form of  
subjugating exploitation going on here of  the kinds Marx was witness to in his time of  mass 
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standardised labour. Nevertheless, it is equally difficult to ignore the overarching emphasis on 
how to calculatedly reveal and exploit the latent value of  gamers’ everyday social lives on 
increasingly minutiae levels of  social processes and relations. That is, it is very difficult to look 
past the ways in which the video-games industry is actively seeking to both define and exploit 
the value of  sociability through calculated means of  measure and metricisation. Consider the 
following quotation, once again from Games Analytics: 
‘There really is no alternative to employing effective behavioral analytics in games; the 
future of  the industry and competitive advantage lies in the ability to turn game data into 
actionable insight. Companies like GamesAnalytics have been created to help developers 
and publishers improve player engagement and maximize revenue through 
understanding player behaviours. The secret lies in putting analytics at the heart of  your 
development culture; it should not be an afterthought. Once engrained in your business 
it will pay back its cost many times over’ (Games Analytics, 2011b). 
5.3  — Discussion: Incommensurability? 
A few points of  theoretical reflection are necessary at this juncture for reigning in a sense of  
what the above observations imply for the aims of  this investigation, especially those outlined 
in the latter sections of  chapter 3 regarding the primacy of  cooperation to the productivity of  
social life in general, and, more specifically, the proposition that today we are witnessing the 
emergence of  a social factory logic that is confronted by a central problem: the 
incommensurability of  such social relations and cooperation with a capitalist system of  
valuation. In the first section of  this chapter, I dedicated considerable time to a discussion of  
how and in what ways developers, designers, analysts and so on have been heavily engaged 
over the past few years in a discussion about how the video games industry should maintain 
itself  as profitable enterprise: this discussion was framed by what I have referred to as the 
“problem” of  profit. In the second section, I have attempted to demonstrate, by way of  
example, some of  the innovations in systems of  measurement that are currently being 
deployed to try and develop quantified categories for valuating the sociality of  players 
through predicted revenue metrics. I want now to briefly return to the proposition of  a social 
factory logic and the incommensurability of  the social as a framing device for discussion of  
the above analysis. 
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 In close connexion to the social factory thesis, certain writers operating out of  the 
Autonomous Marxist school of  thought have postulated that there is a problem of  
incommensurability between the products of  social production and the laws of  capitalistic. 
What is presented by this apparent incommensurability is a current need for capital to search 
for rules of  social production and the measuring unit that defines these rules, much like labour-
time and productivity were for the industrial model of  capitalist production (Marazzi, 2011b). 
As was discussed in chapter 3, this situation brings capital to a point in which the implications 
concerning ‘the question of  measure’ (Marazzi, 2011b) are of  paramount concern if  a system 
of  surplus value accumulation is to be established. As subjective difference and the 
cooperative capacities of  people going about their daily social lives become increasingly 
incorporated into technical systems that attempt to capture their value, so too is capital 
presented with a problem measure. This is due to the very qualitative processes of  cooperation 
and creativity that form the basis of  the productivity of  social life in general that confront 
capital ‘with incommensurable criteria of  valuation’ (Marazzi, 2011b: 79).  
 The overall point here is that there is a current preoccupation with making sense of  
the ways in which the qualitative dimensions of  production today are subjected to quantified 
measure; and that, for some writers, this is a central problem facing capitalist processes of  
valorisation as it attempts to expropriate measurable value from immeasurable differences in 
subjectivity. There is, in other words, a preoccupation with the very same problem Marx 
outlined in his analysis of  surplus value generation — the problem of  profit — the main 
difference being that capital is confronted with purportedly immeasurable differences in 
subjectivity rather than homogenous masses of  predefined labour processes. To summarise, 
the here is one of  quantifying the qualitative social relations, beliefs and values that, referring 
back to the aforementioned notion of  sympathetic cooperation, constitute the foundational 
basis of  the productivity of  life in general.  
 Considering this issue in light of  the analysis provided in the first section of  this 
chapter, the appeal to ethical values of  creating the best possible experience for the user/
player was mobilised as a means to politically legitimise — or at the very least, maintain a sense 
of  distance from — the perceived “problem” of  private interest in “profit”; yet the latter of  
these was, without question, the overt interest expressed by the pursuit of  monetisation 
through technically sophisticated forms of  measurement and metrics. Without wanting to 
overemphasise this point it is clear that within the video-games industry there is a noticeable 
enmeshing of  value and values, a complex and iterative unfolding of  both ethical and 
calculated foundations for seeking out means and methods for valorising the previously un-
valorised.  
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 With this in mind, it seems pertinent to point to how much of  the above reflections 
upon — and research into — “players as sources of  currently un-tapped value” were framed 
in terms of  how best to understand social and psychological behaviour and attention- and 
playing-time; all of  which was underpinned by an explicit desire to structure, segment, and 
channel this attention-time as the key source of  players’ latent value through game mechanics, 
advertisement interventions, and (social) incentives. 
 The second section of  this chapter detailed some of  the ways in which games 
analytics are providing a quantitive “solution” to the problem of  valuating players sociality; 
for this, the concept of  ‘the value of  sociality’ was considered as having the explanatory 
power to help us explain the interactions of  the iterative and reflexive process by which the 
gaming industry has sought to harnesses and measure social cooperation to develop and 
predict quantitative calculations of  economic value. Without wanting to come to a full-gone 
conclusion on the proposition of  incommensurability given the breadth and scope for 
investigating such a claim across all spheres of  social life, I nonetheless want to suggest that 
in the case of  the video-gaming industry and the kinds of  connectivity, sharing, community 
formation, and measurements of  sociality being developed — capital is doing a pretty good 
job. Of  course, I by no means want to suggest that the video gaming industry has discovered 
some previously unheard of  means to negate the problem of  incommensurability. Rather, my 
aim here is a more tentative suggestion that if  we look closely at the ways in which certain 
industries or sectors are developing and innovating new ways of  measuring the participation 
of  their audiences, then it may become clear — as is the case with the video games industry 
— that the difficulties of  quantifying social cooperation as a source of  economic value is very 
much a central problem upon which a great deal of  effort is currently being spent.   
  With this in mind, it seems pertinent to point to how much of  the above reflections 
upon — and research into — “players as sources of  currently un-tapped value” were framed 
in terms of  how best to understand social relations and attention-/playing-time of  gamers; all 
of  which was underpinned by an explicit desire to structure, segment, and channel this 
sociality and attention-time as the key sources of  players’ “latent value” through game mechanics, 
advertisement interventions, and (social) incentives. The two metrics of  retention and virality 
were, of  course, central to the quantitative measurement of  attention and sociality 
respectively. 
 Perhaps it would be useful to suggest these developments not as ‘free labour’, but 
they very much resemble the core tenet of  the social factory thesis, in a different way — 
rather than focus upon what people are doing as immaterial labourers, I have attempted to 
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paint a picture of  the ways in which we might go about investigating another dimension of  
the social factory. Notably, the ways in which capitalistic logics of  valuation are being thought 
through with an eye to establishing where value might be sought out and how it can be 
captured. 
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6. Conclusion 
6.1 — Scope of  the Study 
This thesis has sought to address the need, in relation to the video games industry, to 
‘consider the types of  labour that players/users/producers are performing as part of  broader 
shifts in consumption/production paradigms’ (Hjorth, 2011: 48). This is especially important 
given the recent emergence of  participatory and collaborative architectures in video-games 
and so-called ‘Web 2.0’. More generally. Hjorth (2011) has stressed that an investigation of  
this kind must look far beyond the market hyperbole of  “empowerment” and “exploitation”, 
of  unbridled creativity and inclusion founded upon a perceived ethic of  playful engagement. It is 
important to consider the political and economic relations of  the processes involved, and the 
way they interact with social processes and social cooperation in order to generate and then 
expropriate  value. This is the endeavor that this thesis has sought to supply.   
The key and overarching research question for this inquiry was identified in the Introduction 
and refined in Chapter 3:  How is (qualitative) sociality subjected to (quantified) capitalistic 
valorisation?   
With specific reference to the video-games industry, this foundational question resolves itself  
into three further subsidiary research questions which this thesis has addressed, namely: 
(i)  What are the sources of  value in the video games industry today? 
(ii)  What are the means of  valorisation in the modern video-games industry?”; and,  
(iii)  How and in what ways is value being identified, developed and then expropriated within 
the video-games industry today?” (addressing the so-called ‘problem of  profit’). 
The foundational research question (‘How is (qualitative) sociality subjected to (quantified) 
capitalistic valorisation?’) was further developed in Chapters 2 and 3, with a focus on the 
‘social factory’. In Chapter 2 we considered a number of  core issues that confront 
contemporary sociology in its approach to, and ability to raise questions about, the internal 
dynamics of  capitalism, the way in which modern capitalistic production methods generate 
value, and their interactions with social problems and social development.  These raise 
questions that have been posed by writers such as Roger Burrows and Frank Webster, and can 
also be seen in the macro social analyses of  Daniel Bell and Manuel Castels. There has, 
nevertheless, been a notable lack of  analysis in contemporary sociological research of  the 
dynamics of  capitalism, and of  its role in generating and shaping social change.  
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6.2 — Some Key Insights and Conclusions 
Autonomous Marxist literature offers a starting point for an examination of  these issues; it is 
also key to this study, in having maintained a focus upon the dynamics of  capitalistic 
production systems and their social consequences. Chapter 2 offers a review of  the extant 
literature and considers the differing theories on the nature of  value and on the process of  
valorization. This analysis used as it's starting point a key insight  from Marx’s own writing, 
namely that  labour in the sense of  ‘work’ can be eliminated, in the sense that it no longer 
necessarily equates with a compartmentalized or employment-defined notion, and that ‘non-
work’ also has relevance to the generation of  value in an advanced capitalistic economy where 
value can also be generated by the ‘general intellect’ of  participants in capitalistic production 
processes: ‘labour … appears no longer as labour, but as the full development of  [personal] 
activity itself ’ (Marx, 1973, quoted in Gorz, 2010: 14-15). It then explored in some depth the 
literature of  two schools of  sociological thought on the relationship of  capitalistic production 
and social change, namely: (i)  sociological literature on the rise of  ‘post-industrial 
society’ (Bell, 1973) and the ‘information age’ (Castells, 2009, 2010a, 2010b); and, (ii) 
Autonomous Marxist writings on the ascendancy of  a ‘post-Fordist’ form of  capitalist 
dynamics founded upon a ‘social factory’ logic (see Hardt and Negri, 2000; Marazzi, 2008; 
Virno, 2004, 2007). The latter school of  thought is often referred to as ‘cognitive 
capitalism’ (Berardi, 2009; Vercellone, 2007). We noted in particular the lack of  a critical 
engagement within sociology with key political economic issues regarding the ways in which 
technological and socio-economic change is both shaped by — and generative of  — capitalist 
market dynamics. This deficiency is especially evident in the work of  Bell and Castells, which 
displays a notable lack of  attention to questions concerning the labour process, the 
production of  (surplus) value, and (potential) changes in capitalist accumulation strategies as 
fundamental characteristics of  contemporary socio-economic change.  
Two concepts employed by Autonomous Marxist thinkers in their analysis of  the digital or 
“new” economy (see for example Berardi, 2009; Terranova, 2004) offer important insights 
into the inter-relationship between new forms of  capitalistic production and processes of  
social change. These are the concept of  ‘immaterial labour’ (Lazzarato, 1996) and the ‘social 
factory’ thesis (see Gill and Pratt, 2008; Terranova, 2000, 2004; Virno, 2004). These place 
questions concerning the logic(s), dynamics and organisational form of  capitalist 
accumulation at the centre of  their analysis. Their analysis shows us that in the 1990s, when 
sociology and cultural studies appeared to be failing to provide viable theoretical frameworks 
for understanding emerging interrelations between new and digital media technologies and 
the systemic functioning of  capitalist dynamics, the Autonomist Marxist school of  thought 
  160
carried out the important role of  maintaining a critical focus upon capitalism as driving 
contemporary socio-economic change (see: Burrows, 2005; Gane, 2003, 2005; Webster, 2005). 
This is a very different approach to that of  thinkers such as Bell and Castells, in that it offers 
a critique of the political economy of  information technologies and new media through an 
engaged reworking of  the Marxian concepts of  labour, value and production. The discussion 
in Chapter 2 demonstrated that the emphasis upon labour and the production of  value within 
the Autonomous Marxist literature gives us a referential framework for understanding 
contemporary social change that, though not perfect, at least avoids the lack of  conceptual 
exposition and analysis found in the literature on the information age (including that of  Bell 
and Castells, and their adherents). The work of  sociologists in the Autonomist Marxist school 
of  thought provides an important point of  reference for the consideration of  the impact of  
capital and labour in relation to contemporary forms of  production, including the new media, 
and has special importance for the present study for this very reason.  
The analysis in Chapter 2 also shows that the Autonomous Marxist literature offers important 
insights into the emergence of  a post-Fordist mode of  production; that is, one  characterized 
by an increasing emphasis upon knowledge, information, and a general preponderance of  
cognitive, or ‘immaterial’ dimensions of  what is considered to be a general and all-pervading 
labour process, over the segmented labour of  the mass-manufacture assembly line (see: 
Lazzarato, 1996; Marazzi, 2008; Virno, 2004, 2007). This is an especially important insight 
when we consider the ‘new’ modes of  production prevalent in the contemporary computing 
industry and the new media examined in Chapter 5.  As was argued in Chapter 2, the notion 
of  general intellect found within Marx’s Grundrisse was a pivotal springboard for Autonomous 
Marxism’s conceptualisation of  the shift in emphasis away from mass manufacture and 
manual production (in short, Fordism) and towards the cognitive, immaterial properties of  
post-Fordist labour. This led to an emphasis on ‘cognitive capitalism’, in which the relation of  
capital to labour is marked by the increasingly immaterial, computational, emotional and 
‘cognitive’ character of  labour (Berardi, 2009; Vercellone, 2007). This has been accompanied 
by a shift to a position where the value of  the commodity is determined not by the quantity of  
labour-time that went into its production, but by a productive process that rests primarily 
upon the qualities of  knowledge, cognitive skills, and the immaterial labour processes engaged 
in its production (Vercellone, 2007; Virno, 2004, 2007). For Virno (2004), for example, the 
contradiction between the post-Fordist mode of  production being based upon a diffuse 
general intellect – that is, upon knowledge, cognitive skills, and various immaterial forms of  
labour – and the manner in which these are quantified and measured, is an illustrative 
empirical realization of  Marx’s “Fragment on Machines” (Marx, 1973), in which he outlines 
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the impact that immaterial forms of  work and production will have upon the future industrial 
capitalist system and the inherent contradictions that would arise from such a development.  
This has direct relevance to the subject of  this study, namely the video gaming industry. The 
ultimate expression of  this emphasis on immaterial forms of  production can be seen in the 
proliferation of  ICTs and various forms of  new applications of  digital media through which 
‘capitalism seeks to involve even the worker’s personality and subjectivity within the 
production of  value’ (Lazzarato 1996: 134). In summary, then for the Autonomous Marxists, 
the notion of  immaterial labour signposts the ways in which capitalism has sought to take 
what is learned, experienced and consumed in the temporal zone of  traditional non-labour 
time and incorporate this into cycles of  value-production; this then becomes part of  labour-
power and thus a profitable resource. As has been demonstrated in Chapter 5, this resource is 
today becoming ever-more prevalent with the development of  extensive, new and networked 
media technologies that enable this process to become ever more diffuse throughout 
quotidian social life. Importantly, the Autonomous Marxist emphasis on a mode of  
production based upon general intellect does not refer to any specific class or group of  
knowledge or informational workers — it refers to a more general and, to some extent, 
totalising process whereby knowledge, information, and communicative sociality are subsumed into 
processes of  capital accumulation. 
For Autonomous Marxists the notion of  immaterial labour (or ‘free’ labour; see Terranova, 
2004) captures those activities carried out by individuals on the Internet that are 
simultaneously voluntarily given and unwaged, enjoyed and exploited. This might include the 
building of  websites, the modification of  software, reading and participating in discussion 
forums or virtual spaces, and contributing to websites based around user-created content 
such as YouTube or Facebook. In the context of  digital media, all of  these form part of  a 
process whereby production and consumption are reconfigured into forms of  labour that we 
do not immediately recognise as such, for the simple reason that they do not approximate to 
traditional notions of  waged labour. Nevertheless, they are part of  a prevalent contemporary 
value logic that does not rely on the exploitation of  a formally employed labour force.  
In the context of  the new media and digital technologies, the generation of  value is not 
underpinned necessarily by legal relationships of  employment of  a wage labour relation, but 
by harnessing the voluntary participation in the social factory of  participants in gaming 
activities and the social media. The generation and valorization of  value in the new media 
industries is, therefore, itself  paradigmatic of  the social factory, the ‘factory without 
walls’ (Terranova,  (2004: 91)  in contemporary society.  Internet-based activities such as user-
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creation on social networking sites, online game-world participation, and content sharing — 
video, image, text, music etc. — highlight how the value of  innovations in the digital 
economy relies upon continuous, updateable work carried out by ‘users’ under the guise of  
leisurely consumption. The notion of  a social factory, then, highlights above all the idea that 
the productive activities of  Internet users’ and participants in the wider digital economy can 
be considered as a generalizable labour process that is generative of  surplus-value.  
This thesis has stressed that the question of  capitalism in contemporary sociology has been 
to some extent marginalized, and has sought to redress this. The interpretation of  the social 
factory thesis that I have developed in Chapters 2 and 3 places a central emphasis upon the 
need to interrogate the ways in which capitalistic valorization methods and processes have 
adapted to incorporate increasingly detailed aspects and intimate facets of  participants 
everyday social lives. In other words, the particular application of  the ‘social factory’ concept 
developed in this thesis enables us to identify how modern capitalistic processes subject 
intimate aspects of  everyday social life to systems of  quantification and measurement in 
order to generate, assess and expropriate surplus value. In particular, as demonstrated in 
Chapter 5, this has enabled the video-games industry to perpetuate the accumulation 
imperative in a modern digital setting.  
  
Chapter 2 rebutted criticism levelled at the contributions of  the Autonomous Marxist school 
of  thought, and especially criticism of  the apparent imprecision and haziness of  ‘immaterial 
labour’ as a concept for describing changes in contemporary labour processes. It was 
demonstrated in Chapter 2 that immaterial labour is only one conceptual facet of  a complex 
and constantly developing set of  arguments and discussions both within and in dialogue with  
Autonomous Marxist literature. An important Autonomous Marxist contribution has been its 
focus on the changing nature of, and relations between, labour and value production and the 
implications of  this for a systematic understanding of  the socio-economic condition we find 
ourselves in today (see especially: Fumagalli, 2011; Morini and Fumagalli, 2011; Vercellone, 
2010). Chapter 2 concluded that while it is important to acknowledge the limitations of  the 
various aspects of  Autonomous Marxist thought, it remains the most important contribution 
that addresses what this thesis has referred to as the ‘marginalised question of  capitalism’ in 
contemporary sociological literature. Moreover, the importance of  the social factory thesis 
cannot be understated, as it provides an important convergence point for making sense of  
not only changes in labour processes and the dissolution of  work and non-work time, but 
also changes in the ways in which we can make sense of  labour as a value-generating process and 
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the production of  value as a hallmark of  labour. In other words, the notion of  a social factory 
entails a dedication to understanding both changes in what constitutes labour and changes in 
the way that (surplus-)value is generated, maintained, and intensified as parts of an analytical 
framework for understanding mdeorn capitalistic processes – especially those at work in the 
new media and digital technology industries. Chapter 3 examined in some depth a wide 
spectrum of  social theory including, the wider meaning of  what is meant by the ‘social 
factory’, and notions of  sympathetic cooperation etc. We also saw that a reading of  Marx's 
labour theory of  value, using metaphysical arguments including fetishims etc., offer little 
assistance in explaining valorisation in the computer games industry. These approaches have 
little to offer in terms of  understanding valorisation in the computer games industry 
compared with the autonomous Marxist approach outlined above and in more detail Chapters 
2 and 3. 
The study of  the modern video game industry offered in Chapters 4 and 5 has sought to 
illustrate the importance of  the autonomous Marxist analysis developed in the earlier 
Chapters, and to use this to offer a critique of  the development and expropriation of  value in 
the contemporary video games industry. Chapter 4 emphasized, for example, the importance 
of  the rise of  ‘playbour’ within the audience cultures of  the games industry and highlighted 
how the next workforce to be mobilised in the search for new ways to make the games 
industry profitable lay not within the formal boundaries of  employment and wage-labour, but 
outside it in the rapidly expanding network of  online player communities. Drawing on an 
autonomous Marxist approach, the thesis has focussed on the configurations of  the labour 
and valorisation processes that have underpinned the gaming industry’s expansion and 
development. The analysis developed in Chapters 4 and 5 examines the video-games industry 
as a capitalist enterprise founded upon the buying and selling of  entertainment as a commercial 
commodity. The history of  video gaming’s commercial development presented in Chapter 4 
highlights, above all else, the dynamics and (re)configurations of  organisational forms and 
relations of  production that have come into existence as expressions of  a continual and iterative 
process of  valorising perceived sources of  value. This is essentially a history of  the ways in 
which value has mediated the formation of  the new media industry and its strategies of  
production and accumulation. 
The analysis of  the processes of  valorization offered in Chapter 5 illustrates the innovative 
ways in which the industry has sought to measure and extract value from social interactions 
and social cooperation within the gaming community. The development of  businesses 
providing predictive analytics services to video-game publishing companies was highlighted as 
facilitating greater understanding of  player behavior and enabling its efficient monetization. 
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Indeed, the development of  broader and sophisticated measurement systems has resulted in 
what has been referred to as an increasingly pervasive ‘processes of  automated 
traceability’ (Steigler, 2009: 129). These are, as demonstrated in Chapter 5, representative of  
Postone’s (2003, 2004) proposition that the abstract domination of  value has no determinate 
locus, that it is embodied within people and things — so, the task is to see what characteristics 
of  abstraction might be accessible in concrete form.  
Another notable development has been the development of  the “Social Involver” and its 
revenue potential derived from the novel concept of  “virality” – that is focusing on “highly 
sociable” people who “will respond well to rewards and incentives to introduce significant 
numbers to the game”. The ‘value’ here is not generated by a direct monetary or commodity 
exchange, but something more akin to a potentiality or expectation that additional gamers will 
be attracted to the product. This is a new indicies of  value, in that the “virality” metric denotes 
the likelihood of  someone introducing another person to the game, albeit there is no direct 
monetary purchase or “gain” in the first instance. Marx’s theory of  value can be used to 
interrogate this modern phenomenon.  This involves an abstraction (thinking of  players as 
potential, the formation of  population categories). But these abstractions are dominating the 
organization of  social/player relations in the form of  reflexive games design decisions. The 
activities of  players in-game are analysed from without through abstractions. These are reified 
into economic categories like “virality Measures”, which, as explained in Chapter 5 can then 
influence the game-design choices.   
In this context, the concept of  "sociality", has considerable value in helping us to explain the 
interactions of  the iterative and reflexive process by which the gaming industry harnesses 
social cooperation and uses it to develop value. In the case of  video-gaming and the kinds of  
connectivity, sharing, community formation, and general sociality that the analysis of  the 
modern video gaming industry offered in Chapters 4 and 5 has developed, we can see that 
capital has been able to develop new strategies and techniques to measure the previously 
unmeasurable, and in so doing to valorise intimate social relations in a way that enables it to 
develop, measure and expropriate ‘value’ in ever more innovative and nuanced ways. 
Returning finally to the ‘social factory’ thesis, we might conclude that many of  these 
developments should not be seen as the use of  ‘free labour’: rather they focus upon what 
people are doing as immaterial labourers.  In so doing the thesis has painted a picture of  the 
ways in which we might go about investigating another dimension of  the social factory — 
notably, the ways in which representatives of  capital’s logic have thought through and 
reflected upon where value might be sought out, pursued, hunted, and captured. And how 
they have then acted upon this with innovative strategies to develop and expropriate value in 
  165
the social factory. 
6.3 — The Enduring Value of  the Theory of  Value  
This thesis has built upon and adapted an autonomous Marxist approach appropriate to 
investigate the development of  new sources of  value in the video gaming industry, and the 
strategies it has developed to expropriate that value. Perhaps the most important insight that 
emerges from this study is that the theory of  value has a number of  facets that underpin its 
continuing relevance in a completely different economic and social environment to that in 
which Marx wrote. These are characterized by its open textured, value neutral, and context 
transcendent nature. How value is generated, and how it is understood and valorized are not in 
themselves important. The theory provides a framework of  values and concepts that has 
relevance irrespective of  these issues i.e. irrespective of  the empirical case under investigation 
or its temporal context. This makes it uniquely suitable to prosecute further research not only 
into the video games industry, but also into the generation of  value and the development of  
new capitalistic production methods in other industries. There is a common logic arising from 
the study of  value, and its generation and capture by the gaming industry, that can be applied 
to the development of  value in other innovative 21st century industries such as social media 
(Facebook, Twitter , Instagram  etc.). The genealogy and history of  the techniques and 
methods used to measure, and in each case to expropriate user populations' potential and 
perceived latent value, may differ in different cases and contexts, but the underlying principles 
established by a re-reading of  the theory of  surplus value presented in this thesis will in every 
case provide an invaluable framework for analyzing the inner workings of  capitalistic 
production and valorization processes in each case.  The thesis has also highlighted the 
adaptability of  capital, and how can we use this knowledge to understand the way in which 
capital develops and adapts to new production techniques, technologies and processes. It has 
also highlighted what remains the same - what is continuous and what changes.  There is an 
underlying logic to capital strategies that remains constant, although it does vary in the 
manner of  its application in different contemporary contexts. The focus and direction that 
this thesis has undertaken can also tie into the wider preoccupation within sociology with 
issues concerning measurement and value, and values (see for example ‘Measure and Value’, 
The Sociological Review special issue, ed. Atkins and Lury, Wiley-Blackwell, 2012) 
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6.4 — Postscript: Values Haunting Value? 
From such a viewpoint it seems pertinent at this closing juncture to bring into question the 
proposition that — under an iteration of  capitalism where it becomes increasingly possible to 
identify social life in general as a ‘social factory’ — we must look to how: 
   
‘it is the lacks, the residues, and the excess that cannot be captured by capital’s 
mechanisms of  valuation … [I]n order to think beyond the logic of  capital [we must] 
show how values will always haunt value.’ (Skeggs, 2014: 1).   
Though the investigation offered here has only begun scraping the surface of  such a 
proposition within a particular — and perhaps not-so-representative — domain of  social life, 
it is nonetheless difficult to think of  a way to reconcile the dictum that “values will always 
haunt value” with what has been observed to be an onward march — not without its 
stumbles, it must be said — of  capital’s mechanisms of  valuation, muddled and married as 
they are with values; in this connexion it is noticeable that we find a nexus of  values mediating 
value, and value mediating values. Embedded within the commercial logics of  the video-games 
industry are explicit appeals to, and juxtapositions of, on the one hand, ethical values of  
playful engagement, creativity, loyalty, sharing, and progress; on the other, an explicit and 
overarching desire to monetise the currently non-monetised, to find ways to measure the 
previously unmeasured and potentially valuable. Perhaps it is no coincidence that the reverse 
side of  value’s coin is, in fact, values. There is a definite need then, if  such a case can be 
made, for investigating the reverse order of  Skeggs’ proposition: the extent to which values 
are put to work for value. 
 Only by descending down into the inner-workings of  the social factory does it 
become possible to glimpse the cross-sections of  an intricate and dynamical relation between 
value and values — between the abstract dominance and concrete expressions of  capital’s 
reproductive motion. A relation that, above all else, reveals a great deal about the essence and 
ethics of  valorisation in both senses of  the term — of  the translational power of  capital to seek 
ever more effective means of  quantifying the seemingly unquantifiable, and to validate this 
power through its own values, embodied as they are within people and things. As far as this 
investigation goes, it has not provided much in the way of  thinking beyond what Skeggs 
refers to above as capital’s mechanisms of  valuation — perhaps this will require looking 
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somewhere beyond or marginal to the astonishing successes of  the twenty-first century’s 
most accomplished form of  commodified entertainment. 
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